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
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


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*Dep't of the Navy*  
*From*  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.  
WAR NOTES No. VII.  
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

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# THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

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A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS  
RELATIVE TO THE  
SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

ARRANGED BY  
REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA Y TOPETE.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH.




OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

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WASHINGTON:  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.  
1899.





024 May 09 L.S.

## INTRODUCTORY.

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In the Cortes at Madrid, on the 30th day of October, 1899, the minister of war was requested by the Count de las Almenas and Senators González and Dávila to transmit to the senate chamber as early as possible the proceedings held in the supreme council of war and navy, from August 1, 1899, to date, relative to the wars in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

The minister of war, replying, said in part:

I do not know whether the Count de las Almenas and the worthy companions whom he represents have sufficiently considered the grave step of bringing into a political chamber and submitting to parliamentary discussion adjudged causes of the extreme gravity of those referred to. I repeat that, while I greatly respect such right, I believe that there may be serious objections to a debate of this nature, because perhaps the high tribunal of the army and navy, which has adjudged these causes in accordance with law and its own conscience, and to whose functions and importance great respect is due, might suffer, though only apparently, in its prestige. For that reason I consider it neither expedient nor prudent to transmit to the chamber the documents asked for.

It is not, therefore, probable that the proceedings of the courts in the cases of Admirals Cervera and Montojo will be made public.

Admiral Cervera, having in view the vindication of himself, had obtained from the Queen in August permission to publish certain documents, given in this number of the War Notes, which make a most interesting and connected history of the naval operations of Spain during the war, and show without need of argument the causes of her weakness.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,

*Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT, December 6, 1899.

Approved:

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,

*Chief of Bureau of Navigation.*



## TO THE READER.

Being in possession of the documents herein collected, I have thought it my duty to publish them in order to enlighten the public, and that they may serve as a lesson for the future and as data for history.

I had thought first of having a short statement of facts precede them, but considering that the events are so very recent, and have affected our unhappy country so much, that any criticism might easily degenerate into passion, I have thought it best to give simply the documents and let them explain for themselves everything that has happened.

I should have liked to do this earlier, but put it off until the termination of the cause in which I was made a defendant, and since then it has taken some time for me to obtain permission to publish these papers, owing to my position as a naval officer and the nature of the documents, most of which either came from the ministry of marine or were addressed to it.

To that end I applied to Her Majesty in a petition, a copy of which follows, and secured a royal order, a copy of which also follows.

The collection is printed in two kinds of type. The smaller type refers to documents printed in a certain work where errors and omissions have crept in, and the larger type refers to documents furnished by myself, the originals of most of which are in my possession, and to others taken from various publications and even from the journals of the sessions of the Chambers.

If this publication should help us to mend our mistakes in the future, my wishes are granted, for all I ask is that I may be useful to my country.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

MADRID, *August 30, 1899.*



## PETITION.

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MADAM: Pascual Cervera y Topete, rear admiral of the navy, sets forth to Your Royal Majesty, with the most profound respect as follows:

It is well known that owing to the destruction of the squadron under my command in the battle of July 3, 1898, a cause was instituted in which the decree of the supreme council of war and navy has absolved your petitioner and others. But such decree, in which only a majority concurred, is not sufficient to satisfy the opinion which, misled at the time of the events and for a long time afterwards, has been manifested in a fierce campaign against the honor of your petitioner, that of the squadron which he commanded, and of the entire navy.

Upon noticing these symptoms the writer attempted to give the country a full explanation, and to that end he solicited and obtained the election as senator for the province of Albacete, but did not even have a chance of discussing the proceedings of his election.

When your petitioner had been made a defendant in the proceedings above referred to, he deemed it his duty not to speak until the court had pronounced its sentence.

The writer has in his possession many original documents and authentic copies of others, and among them there are not a few that have been published with errors, and others that have been printed without authorization, but have come to the knowledge of many people, and these likewise contained many errors which are bound to mislead public opinion.

These documents, many of which were at the time of a confidential nature, need no longer be kept secret, since peace has been reestablished and the publication of the same would correct many of these errors and serve as a lesson for the future. For all these reasons your petitioner humbly prays that Your Majesty will permit him to publish, at his expense, the documents referred to in order to enlighten the Spanish people.

Dated August 18, 1899.

## ROYAL ORDER.

His Majesty having been informed of the petition forwarded by your excellency on the 18th instant, asking for permission to publish, at your expense, certain documents in your possession relative to the squadron under your command in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, on the 3d day of July, 1898, His Majesty the King (whom God guard), and in his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom, in conformity with the opinion furnished by the counselor-general of this ministry, has been pleased to authorize your excellency to publish all orders issued by the ministry of marine relative to the squadron destroyed at Santiago de Cuba. The above having been communicated to me by royal order, through the minister of marine, I notify your excellency accordingly for your cognizance, and as the result of your petition referred to.

Madrid, August 22, 1899.

MANUEL J. MOZO, *Assistant Secretary.*

Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA Y TOPETE.

## COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE

### SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

PRIVATE.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
*Madrid, November 28, 1897.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In answer to your esteemed letters I wish to say that I entirely approve of the instructions issued to the squadron and of everything you state relative to speed, diameters, and tactical movements. With great pleasure I read the telegram relative to firing trials on board the *Vizcaya*, after so many doubts and different opinions. But we should, nevertheless, not abandon ourselves to unlimited confidence, and your good judgment will know how to restrict the use of these guns<sup>1</sup> until we have the new cartridge cases, which, I have been promised, will begin to arrive early in November. I am continuing my efforts toward fitting out the torpedo boats, but we have to contend with scarcity of engine personnel, and this need is further increased by the men working under contract who are about to leave the service.

Wishing you every happiness, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

Nothing new in the Philippines.

SANTA POLA, *December 3, 1897.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Upon my arrival here I received your favor of the 28th. I am much pleased to know that you approve of the instructions I have issued to the squadron. The *Oquendo* was ready day before yesterday, for all she needed was to have the diaphragm of the condensers cleaned. I am of your opinion that we should wait for the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases before using these guns for

<sup>1</sup> Reference is had to the 5.5 inch González-Hontoria rapid-fire guns.



target practice, and I am thinking of spreading the report that we are waiting in order not to decrease our supply. One thousand five hundred cartridge cases seems very little to me. I think we should have at least twice as many, which is the regular supply for this class of ships. In order to obviate any comment on the fact of our not using the 5.5-inch guns, I am thinking of having target practice with the 11-inch guns only on certain days, and on other days with the small guns day and night, unless you should issue orders to the contrary. Night before last we had an exercise with the scouts of this ship and the *Teresa*, which was very interesting; the vedettes were discovered with the aid of the searchlights. We are continuing experiments with the latter in order to ascertain the best installation for them. The highly interesting question of the radius of action of these ships can be only approximately settled with the data furnished by this trip of mine. The reasons why it can not be definitely settled are that the *Teresa* has used an unreasonable amount of coal, for which fact I transmit to-day to her commander a reprimand for the firemen; and the *Oquendo*, owing to an erroneous interpretation of one of my signals, did not follow instructions, but we have data which may be presumed to be correct for the *Oquendo*. I will send you in the near future the computations relative to this matter. I believe I have already advised you in my former letter that I intended to go out with a squadron for a few days. I also want to give the steam launches and their officers some tactical exercises, under the direction of a superior officer.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
*Madrid, January 9, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have just had a call, not only from the committee of the Ansaldo Company, but also from the Italian ambassador, relative to the 9.84-inch guns of the *Colón*, and I am afraid we will have some trouble concerning this matter. As the report of the advisory board (centro-consultivo) is utterly opposed to the acceptance of gun No. 325, and still more of No. 313, you will understand that the junta over which you preside should suggest to me some solution toward substituting for these guns, at least temporarily, guns of other systems. For my part I have conveyed the impression that if two other guns, to the exclusion of Nos. 325 and 313, could be tried within a very short time, and such trials should show satisfactory results, the Government might perhaps terminate this unpleasant matter.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

I have in mind, my dear Admiral, what constitutes the press in this country, and the way they have of always treating us unfairly.

*The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Giron).*

[Extract.]

HAVANA, January 8, 1898.

Two and one-third millions are due the navy, and should be liquidated so as to make it possible to place in commission a number of vessels which are now at the navy-yard with injuries that can not be repaired for lack of funds.

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BATTLE SHIP VIZCAYA, THE ADMIRAL,  
*Cartagena, January 29, 1898.*

HIS EXCELLENCY SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The telegram I sent you yesterday notified you that the *Vizcaya* was ready, with her fires lighted, to go out just as soon as she received instructions and money, the only things she now lacks. It is true that three or four men belonging to her crew, and who are absent with my permission, have not yet returned, but they have been telegraphed to and will be here very shortly. However, if the money and instructions should arrive before they do, the ships will go without them. She has about 600 tons of coal on board and will continue coaling until the instructions come, or until her bunkers are entirely filled. She has fires under six of her boilers and is filling the other four boilers with water. She has also commenced distilling water, which will be continued as long as may be necessary. She has provisions on board for forty days. The 2.24-inch gun mount which was sent to *plasencia de las armas* and has not yet been returned, has been replaced by another one from the *Lepanto*. The *Vizcaya* is short one lieutenant, as *Alvargonzález* was sent ashore; and as none can be furnished by the maritime district of Carthagena (departamento), I will send for one from the *Alfonso*; but owing to our hurried departure he may not arrive in time, and we can not wait. The other two Bilbao cruisers are also being fitted out. The *Teresa* begins to coal at once, and the *Oquendo* will receive her relieving tackle to-day, after which she will immediately commence to take on coal and lubricating material. As far as the water supply for these ships is concerned, it is all right; for, thanks to the exertions of Bustamente and concessions of the Captain-General, the English company will be ready by to-morrow to furnish us water at the dockyard at a price of 0.032 peseta per cubic foot. I have telegraphed to Barcelona to ascertain when we are to have the sea biscuit. If the coal arrives from England, the ships can fill their bunkers again, and if not we will only have coal enough to reach Las Palmas. You are well aware that there is not in the squadron a man in the crews who has any savings; therefore there are two things lacking: First, they should be ordered to make assignments to their families, so as not to condemn 500 or 600 families to starvation, which might even affect the discipline; second, money should be assigned to us at Havana for our own living, because if they count upon our having collected the pay for January and propose to pay us to date

we shall perish miserably. On this vital point I send a telegram. The *Furor* will be ready to go out in a couple of days. The *Terror* will require at least a week before her boilers will be ready. I gave the Captain-General your message concerning the torpedo boats and the crew of the *Vitoria*. We have not yet received the January consignment, and I send a telegram relative to it. Three of our steam launches are not in condition to be used, and I have asked the Captain-General to let me have those of the *Lepanto* and keep ours here to have the boilers repaired, and they can then be used for the other ship. The fleet is short five lieutenants and five ensigns, and the departamento says that it has none to furnish. This scarcity will affect especially the *Alfonso*, and in order to remedy it to a certain extent I am going to commission the four midshipmen at the head of the list and transfer them to the *Alfonso*. I do not know whether I am forgetting anything.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *January 30, 1898.*

DEAR COUSIN JUAN SPOTTOERNO: About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United States. I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it should be necessary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself, when we had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of intentions. To-day we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with the other one, so that the two may be my military testament. The relative military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse for us, because we are reduced, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the *Colón* and the torpedo-boat destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more. What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at. There is the *Cataluña*, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. And the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals. Let us consider, now, our private industries. The Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima supplies the engines of the *Alfonso XIII*; Cadiz, the *Filipinas*. If the *Carlos V* is not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company of La Graña has not completed its ships, as I am told, and only these

(*Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa*) are good ships of their class; but, though constructed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The *Vizcaya* carries a 5.5-inch breech plug which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged without coming to a conflict, which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us. I intrust to you a most interesting correspondence which I had with General Azcárraga, and which I desire and request you to preserve, together with this letter and the former one. In it you will see the opinion of Azcárraga. Without troubling you further, I remain your most affectionate cousin, who intrusts his honor to your hands.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, July 2, 1898.

GINÉS MONCADA,  
ANTONIO MARTÍ.

*Certificate.*—Ginés Moncada y Ferro, mining engineer, and Antonio Martí y Pagán, attorney at law, state upon their honor that they repaired this day to the residence of Juan Spottorno y Bienert, at the request of the latter, who exhibited to them a letter from His Excellency Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, addressed to Mr. Spottorno, dated January 30, 1898; that the undersigned read said letter and affixed their signatures thereto. They were also shown a collection of documents, of which they read only the headings and signatures, which documents had been intrusted to Mr. Spottorno by Rear-Admiral Cervera, and which are as follows: Letters from their excellencies General Marcelo Azcárraga and Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo; copies of letters addressed by Admiral Cervera to the last-named gentlemen, and to his excellency Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, and to Mr. Spottorno; copies of official letters addressed to his excellency the minister of marine; the original proceedings of the council of war held on April 20, 1898, at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, by the captains of the Spanish fleet; an opinion written at said council of war, signed by Capt. Victor M. Concas; a copy of a telegram addressed by Capt. Fernando Villamil to his excellency Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. A detailed account is made of all these documents, which we sign to-day. Mr. Spottorno

stated that he must have among his papers at Madrid a letter which Rear-Admiral Cervera wrote to him two or three years ago from Cadiz, and which is referred to in the letter of January 30, 1898, which we have signed, and in which letter, which is in answer to one written by Mr. Spottorno to Rear-Admiral Cervera from Madrid, relative to naval matters, Cervera said in substance that he foresaw, through the fault of the whole country, a maritime disaster while he (Cervera) was placed in command of the fleet, and that he feared that he would be held responsible, as the Italian Admiral Persano was held responsible for the destruction of his squadron, for which the whole country was to blame. As men of honor we attest all that has been set forth.

Dated at Cartagena, July 2, 1898.

GINÉS MONCADA.  
ANTONIO MARTÍ.

CARTAGENA, *February 3, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMÚDEZ.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The *Colón* has arrived, after encountering heavy weather in the Gulf of Leon, which carried away a ladder, a boat, and some other things of minor importance. I did not want to put this in my telegram, so as not to alarm the uninitiated. We have not yet received the consignments for January, and as the squadron has very little money left it has been necessary, in order to get the *Vizcaya* off, to resort to private funds. On the other hand, the departamento has already received its monthly allowance for February. Can not something be done so that the squadron will not always be kept behind? A remedy must be found if it is desired to keep up the good spirit now prevailing among the crews, and I beg and implore that you will be kind enough to remedy this evil. The storm which the *Colón* has encountered has shown the necessity of her having scupper holes, and I will see to this at once. I shall not have the *Colón* fill up with coal, on account of the condition of her bunkers, unless you should give orders to the contrary. I have received the royal order corroborating the telegram concerning the consignments, and you will allow me to insist on my petition about which I wrote Moret.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 3, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO MORET.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I presume you know that upon my arrival here I found the *Vizcaya* ready to go out, and I have had the pleasure of telegraphing to that effect to the minister of marine, who ordered the fires to be lighted. I mention this because it shows the good spirit of the crews, which extends to every class, as evidenced by the fact that

not a single man was absent at the roll call, although many of them had leave granted and some had gone to Galicia. [There is no wealth in the Navy (I am not speaking of the officers particularly, although I do not exclude them). There are many classes of boatswains, gunners, machinists, firemen, and dock-yard men who have nothing but their pay, which, as a rule, is small, and out of that at least two-thirds of this personnel have to take care of families, for I do not count the unmarried men; nor do I count the seamen and gunners' mates, who can leave their prizes to their families, for while they have the same pay as the others they have fewer needs, and though I plead for all I want to base my argument on truth. Thus each one of these ships about to sail from the Peninsula, leaves intrusted to Divine Providence about 100 families, and yet every one of the men was there! Why? They trust that their Admiral will look out for them, and that the Government of His Majesty will act favorably on my just petition. But I telegraphed to the minister of marine, asking that the Government authorize the establishment of assignments to the families, and he answered that existing regulations would not permit this, and I therefore sent him a letter on the 31st, a copy of which I inclose, asking that you will read it. To-day I am in receipt of the corroboration of the telegram from the minister of marine, in which he says that the concession depends also on the minister of colonies, and that he will renew his petitions on that subject. It is for this reason that I trouble you, feeling sure that you will pardon me for taking up your attention for a few moments. I don't like to trouble anyone, and have a great aversion toward a certain class of business. As an illustration of this, I will tell you that while my son Angel was attached to the legation at Pekin, in order to protect it with the detachment under his command, he was the only one who received his pay in Mexican dollars. The whole legation with the exception of himself received theirs in gold. And although we are both poor, I never troubled anyone about this when the minister of colonies refused his entirely justifiable request that his pay be made the same as to the others.<sup>1</sup> But the matter in question to-day is very different. I am not advocating my own interests nor those of my family, but of my subordinates, and it is the admiral's duty to look out for them. I therefore beg that you will call this matter up and have it favorably disposed of as it should be.

Trusting that you will do so, I remain,

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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<sup>1</sup>Three months after the date of the above letter he was partially indemnified—forty-three months after the termination of his commission in China.

[Confidential.]

## GENERAL CAPTAINCY OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Although I am sure that I am telling your excellency nothing new, I think it is not idle in these critical times to make a study of the condition of this fleet, if only to complete statistical statements of condition and power as to those matters which, for reasons I need not here set forth, do not appear in such statements. We must discount the *Alfonso XIII*, which has been under trials for so many years, and which we shall apparently not have the pleasure of counting among our available ships, which are therefore reduced to the three Bilbao battle ships,<sup>1</sup> the *Colón*, the *Destructor*, and the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*. The three Bilbao battle ships are apparently complete, but you who have had so much to do with them while in command of the squadron, and since then in your present position, know only too well that the 5.5-inch guns, the main power of these vessels, are practically useless on account of the bad system of their breech mechanism and the poor quality of their cartridge cases, of which there are no more than those now on board.

The *Colón*, which, from a military standpoint, is no doubt the best of all our ships, is still without her heavy guns. In this matter I have, at your instructions, communicated with General Guillén, in order to find a possible remedy, if there is one. The *Destructor* may serve as a scout, although her speed is deficient for that kind of service with this fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror* are in good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 2.95-inch guns. As for the supplies necessary for the fleet, we frequently lack even the most indispensable. In this departamento we have not been able to renew the coal supplies, and at both Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half the amount of biscuit we wanted, including the 17,637 pounds which I had ordered to be made here.

We have no charts of the American seas, and although I suppose they have been ordered, we could not move at present. Apart from this deficient state of matériel, I have the satisfaction of stating that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that we do not have better and more abundant material, better resources, and less hindrances to put this personnel in condition fully to carry out its rôle. I will only add the assurance that whatever may be the contingencies of the future these forces will do their full duty.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, February 6, 1898.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

*Madrid, February 6, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I take advantage of this being Sunday to answer your esteemed letters, beginning with the political situation. This has not changed at all. We are still receiving visits in Cuba from American vessels, always with the assurance on the part of the United States that they are simply visits of courtesy and friendship. If they involve any other design—as, for instance, to exhibit their ships and show their superiority over those stationed in our

<sup>1</sup> I have used this designation as being the official one; but I have never considered these ships battle ships, and I deem it a fatal mistake not to designate ships properly.

colonies—their object is attained. The nucleus of their force is stationed at Dry Tortugas and Key West, under pretext of carrying out naval maneuvers, which are to last until the 1st of April. We shall see what will be the outcome of all this. It troubles me a great deal, and I am trying to concentrate in Spain all the forces we have abroad. What you tell me of the *Vizcaya* is entirely satisfactory to me, and I shall write to Havana all you have stated about this ship, and also as to her departure.

The official report on the voyage of the *Colón* has acquainted me with the work that is being done on her, and I have telegraphed the Captain-General to have the work done at once, aside from the scupper-holes, which you will have made on your own account. General Guillén has probably called on you. His plans can not be decided upon until this office is acquainted with them, for influences are being brought to bear here for the acceptance of the 10-inch guns, which I shall try to prevent, because it would be a second edition of the 9.45-inch guns and mounts of the *Regente*. To-morrow I expect to see a gentleman sent here by Perrone, no doubt for the purpose of discussing these guns, which matter is to be considered by the council of ministers.

I am awaiting the result of the board sent out, and hope that no compromise will be made with Canet. As to the voyage of the *Colón*, I want to thank her commander for his skillful seamanship. You did well not to cause any alarm, since her injuries can be easily repaired and will not prevent the ship from leaving. I should like to comply with your wishes and take the *Alfonso XIII* from you, but we must await her final official trials and find out what this ship is able to do—that is to say, whether she can be considered a cruiser or whether it will be necessary to assign her to special service. From what we know of her I think it will be the latter. Your report as to the lack of officers has been forwarded to the director of personnel with my indorsement. We are very short of officers, especially ensigns; ten have gone out this last six months and six will go out the next six months. These are all the ships fitted out in addition to those still abroad, with much reduced complements.

To your petitions for dues for services, I have answered by telegram that there has been no delay on the part of this ministry, and if any delay has occurred at all, it has been caused by the departamentos in honoring orders of payment without preference of any kind.

Your communication concerning assignments, indorsed by me, is meeting, on the part of the minister of colonies, with the same interest which you manifest.

The subject of the exchange of Philippine drafts has given me a good deal of trouble, their money being worth only 50 per cent. But in spite of the time elapsed, this transaction has not been reduced to a normal basis. You are well aware that this central department has no funds of any kind, nor any branch of the administration, to meet these



expenses. Consequently the minister of colonies must advance it, to be reimbursed by the tariff on the colony, since we have no colony fund, such as exists in the army, taking as a basis the funds of the regiments and military institutions.

I believe I have overlooked nothing referred to in your letters.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, *February 8, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The engineer from *Creusot* has arrived. He tells me that the first guns will be ready in June, and as it is my belief that they never keep their promise, it will surely be later than that and this solution does not appear acceptable to me. Are there no other guns that could be used? If so, it would be better, and if not, the Armstrong guns, although they are not as good as might be desired. The dynamo of the *Colón* can be fixed here; but as the injury is in the coil, and we have no spare one, I beg that you will ask for another coil.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

*Madrid, February 8, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I telegraphed you to-day to have the *Oquendo* ready as soon as possible, as she is to perform the same mission as the *Vizcaya* in the Gulf of Mexico, conformable to the council of ministers, as the result of the opinion of the Governor-General of Cuba, transmitted in a cipher cable from Manterola. This will be the last detachment of ships from your squadron, for if it were necessary to send away any more, you would go with the *Maria Teresa* and some others of the ships that are now abroad and are to be incorporated with the fleet. For the present we can count only on the *Colón* and *Alfonso XIII*, although the latter is still under trials; but I hope your flag will be better represented in the future. I have given orders for the training school to be transferred to the *Navarra*, and you will transfer the second commander to any ship as you may think best, because the ships that visit Cuban ports do so simply under the representation of their commanders.

The division of destroyers and torpedo boats will assemble at Cadiz, and will proceed to Cuba under the protection of the *Ciudad de Cadiz*. Upon the arrival of the destroyers that are still in England, they will be incorporated in the squadron. As to the *Colón*, I have an Italian committee here, but shall decide nothing until I know the result of the

junta over which you preside. If they have any reasonable and equitable proposition to make I shall advise you immediately. I have told them positively that guns Nos. 325 and 313 can not be accepted. I have received your confidential letter, but I do not quite share your pessimistic views as to the 5.5-inch guns, for the guaranty of Colonel Sánchez and the firing trials held on board the *Vizcaya* have demonstrated that our fear concerning them was greatly exaggerated, and with the new cartridge cases I hope it will be dissipated entirely. There will be 2,000 tons of coal left at Cartagena, in addition to the coal ordered yesterday.

As to the other matters you referred to, I will do what I possibly can to remedy them. I should like to write more fully, but you will understand that I have not a moment's time, with so many problems to solve and so many vessels abroad that I want to bring back to Spain.

I believe the Americans will reenforce their European station, although in my opinion their tendency will be rather toward the Canaries.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

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CARTAGENA, *February 9, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I received yesterday your letters of the 6th and 7th and your cipher telegram instructing me to get the *Oquendo* ready to be commissioned. As soon as I received the telegram I sent one to my adjutants to hurry matters at the arsenal, and the commissary of the fleet to buy the provisions, for as these can be had right here I did not want to get them until the last hour, and without having recourse to the departamento, for fear of the everlasting roundabout way which delays everything. I hope, when the instructions arrive, she will be in condition to have her fires lighted, if such should be the order, and day after to-morrow she will be able to go out. But if she is to leave the squadron, as would appear from the telegram giving the order to transfer the gunnery training school to the *Navarra*, she must be supplied with money, for you know how little these ships have left.

I shall wait for instructions and act in accordance therewith, in the meantime using my best efforts to do what may be necessary, or telegraphing to you in case my efforts should be futile. I am very grateful to you for keeping me posted as to the political situation, which is very critical indeed and troubles us all a great deal, owing to the lack of means for opposing the United States in war. This is certainly no time for lamentations, and therefore I will say nothing of the many things that are in my mind, as I know them to be in yours. I thank you very much for expressing satisfaction about what I have said relative to the *Vizcaya* and for writing to Havana so that she may be kept in as good condition as she leaves here. My departure is not quite what the news-

papers made it out to be, although this time they have not changed the essence of the few words I said to them.

The boats of the *Colón* are to be ready to-day. I note what you tell me about the heavy artillery of the *Colón*, and your instructions will be carried out. It is very much to be regretted that there is always so much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 9.6-inch guns, for, if we finally take them, it will seem as though we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things should come to the worst—and you are better able to judge of this than I—it seems to me we should accept, as the proverb says, “hard bread rather than none;” and if we have no other guns, and these can fire even 25 or 30 shots, we should take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient, and we should lose no time about it, in order that the vessel may be armed and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible.

I neglected to tell you that the *Oquendo* has only a little over 700 tons of coal, because there is no more to be had here. I received a telegram from Moret relative to the assignments, and I beg that you will not drop this matter. As to the provisions, we shall do what you ordered in your letter of the 7th. I believe I have forgotten nothing of interest.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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CARTAGENA, *February 11, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Soon after dispatching my two cipher telegrams to you yesterday, relative to the 5.5-inch guns of these ships and the heavy guns of the *Colón*, I received your letters of the 8th and 9th, which I now answer, giving you at the same time whatever news there is since yesterday. The *Oquendo* is ready to go out, except as to some things which are lacking, and which she will have to go without. To give orders to light the fires I am only waiting for an answer from you to the telegram which I sent you last night, asking whether she is to receive the same authorization as the *Vizcaya*, and the same amount of money as delivered to the latter vessel, for the *Vizcaya* carried £6,000 and the February pay, and surely there are not funds enough at this departamento to enable the *Oquendo* to leave under the same conditions as the *Vizcaya*.

As soon as I finish this letter I shall go ashore and look after this very interesting matter. If we are to take the *Alfonso*, although she is of slow speed, it will be necessary to supply her with officers and many things that I have had to take from her, owing to the scarcity of everything here, in order to make her as useful as possible. The gunnery training school has been transferred to the *Navarra*. The second commander is on board the *Colón*. The telegram I sent you yesterday, relative to the heavy artillery of the latter ship, is the result of my conference with Guillén. The junta will meet to-day, and I will at

once notify you of the result of the session, but I believe it will not differ essentially from my telegram of yesterday.

Guns numbers 325 and 313 are bad and should under ordinary circumstances be rejected; there is no doubt of it; but if the necessity is really urgent and we have no others, there seems to be no remedy, except either to compel the firm to change them, or, if that is not possible, to take them, bad as they are. Yesterday the engineer of the Creusot people said that the first two 9.45-inch guns would not be ready until the latter part of June, if they are to be delivered as planned, but if they are to have trunnion hoops it will take longer. After they have been delivered they will have to be tried at the Polygon proving ground, transported to the harbor and mounted. When will all this work be finished? It is safe to say that it will not be before September, and that prospect seems worse than to take the guns they offer us.

Guillén went to see whether 7.87-inch guns could be mounted on board, and found that it was impossible with the present turrets, and so it seems there is no other remedy but to submit to the inevitable law of necessity and make the best of it. We can either have them exchanged for better ones later on, or we will pay less for them, or we can simply rent them. If we do not accept a solution of the problem in that direction, we will have to make up our minds that it will be six or eight months at least before the ship can be ready. As long as we use the 5.5-inch guns with the present extractors they seem to me utterly worthless, even more so than the guns of the *Colón*; and this is not pessimism, but sad reality. But I use with regard to them the same argument as with regard to the *Colón* guns. If we have no others, we must use these and fight with them, if the case should arise; but it would be very much better if it did not arise.

Guns numbers 20 and 28 of this ship, which Guillén says are completely useless, can be changed at once; that would be choosing the lesser of two evils. And when the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* return, the guns that Guillén may point out in those ships can be exchanged; I believe there are four of them, not six, as my telegram said yesterday. This, and the new cartridge cases, is the best we can do for the present; but as they are makeshifts, made necessary by the circumstances of the moment, they must be done away with eventually, as has long been the wish of all who have had anything to do with this vital matter. We must take to heart the lesson we are experiencing now, and not expose ourselves to another. You know that better than I do, as you have had more to do with these matters, and for a longer time than I.

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will have noticed that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases which might cause alarm or stir up passion. With these private letters and confidential communications it is quite different, and I believe that I owe you my frank opinion, without beating about the bush.

May God help us out of these perplexities.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 12, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The *Oquendo* is ready and will go out this afternoon, after exchanging the large bills she has received for smaller ones or silver. She takes with her a little more than the 10,000 pesetas mentioned in your telegram, not only because she would actually not have enough, but also in order to obviate the contrast in comparison with the *Vizcaya*, which carried 150,000 pesetas in gold. She lacks spare gear, and I have authorized her to buy the most indispensable things in the Canaries, provided she can get them there. The lack of everything at this arsenal is quite incomprehensible.

I am very anxious for this ship as well as the *Vizcaya* to complete their voyages and be incorporated with the fleet, either at Havana or in Spain, without running into the mouth of the wolf. I can not help thinking of a possible war with the United States, and I believe it would be expedient if I were given all possible information on the following points:

1. The distribution and movements of the United States ships.
2. Where are their bases of supplies?
3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of operations.
4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron—the defense of the Peninsula and Balearic islands, that of the Canaries or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally?
5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either event? I should like also to know the points where the squadron will find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here, for instance, we have not even found 4-inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor other things equally simple. It would also be well for me to know when the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* may be expected to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron or form an independent division, and in that event what will be its connection with ours? If I had information on these matters I could go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in possession of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one or two others, perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the present situation, because this nervous strain can not be borne much longer.

By this time you have probably received the telegram I sent you regarding the heavy artillery of the *Colón*, and I have nothing to add to the report which goes by this mail. To-day Guillén and I will look

into the matter of the 5.5-inch guns of these ships. There are not six useless ones, as I said in my telegram and as Guillén had told me, nor four, as I said in my letter yesterday, but five, two of them on board this ship, which can at once be exchanged for guns from the *Princesa*. I have talked with Guillén about the frequent injuries to the 2.24-inch Nordenfelt mounts, and it seems to me that it would perhaps be well to substitute for these mounts some of the old type, provided the conditions of resistance of the decks of these ships will admit of it.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Confidential—Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
*Madrid, February 15, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I will answer your esteemed letters, in which you express your opinions with a sincerity and good will for which I am truly grateful to you. Last night a meeting was held of the council of ministers to discuss the serious Dupuy de Lome matter. With the acceptance of his resignation (without the usual formula, "Pleased with the zeal," etc.), and with some explanations, this unpleasant incident will be disposed of satisfactorily.

*The Colón.*—I have received the report of the Junta, which expresses itself in favor of mounting at once on the *Colón* 9.92-inch A. guns. Numbers 325 and 313 can not be accepted; to do so, even temporarily, would cause trouble, as the opinion on this question is final, and if it were carried to the Cortes, through the excitement of the press, it would place us in a very unfavorable position. I believe it could be solved promptly by the delivery of two guns by the Ansaldo Company, with whom alone we will have to settle this matter, and this can be done by dint of tact and energy, a combination which is absolutely necessary in order to obtain satisfaction under our contract.

In my interview with the Italian ambassador, in which he explained the difficulties in which the Italian Government would be placed before the Chambers if we were to refuse guns of the type which they have accepted, I said to him: "It will not be difficult for me to prove to you by technical data that the guns which are offered to us are not acceptable. But the Italian navy, through the Ansaldo Company, can easily propose two other guns which, after having been tried according to our practice and found satisfactory, would be accepted." Through different channels I know that this question will soon be solved to our satisfaction—the 5.5-inch guns. I understand the defect of the extractors and realize how it affects the rapid fire. This defect can not be remedied for the present. You ordered some made by hand, and this step was approved.

The two guns of the *Maria Teresa* will be changed, and as to the new

cartridge cases, I have very specially impressed this matter upon Faura, who has gone to England. The decks of cards asked for are on the way. Bustamente torpedoes will be furnished as far as possible, for I have to bear in mind the Philippines and Cabrera Island. As to the squadron, I want to get it away from the departamento, but that is difficult just at present until we see what is decided as to the *Colón*; for it seems to me that the rear-admiral's flag should not show itself with less than three ships. The *Carlos V* and *Pelayo* are to join the squadron; when that is done, your force will be as large as is at present within our power to make it.

As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about it. A division composed of the *Numancia*, *Vitoria*, *Alfonso XIII* (or *Lepanto*), the destroyers *Audaz*, *Osado*, and *Proserpina*, and three torpedo boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz. In Cuba the *Carlos V*, *Pelayo*, *Colón*, *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa*, three destroyers, and three torpedo boats, in conjunction with the eight larger vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position to cover the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and try to destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has established its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal.

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut off communications and commerce with Europe—all this subject to the contingencies which may arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will be decided who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in these matters, you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the staff of this ministry, which I placed at your disposal, including the attack upon Key West. I will advise you as to the location of the United States ships and other data for which you ask.

I will also inform you that twelve or fifteen steamers will be equipped as auxiliaries to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confidence I will tell you that if any ship of real power can be found, either cruiser or battle ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by April. My life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already weighing upon me under the circumstances are now added the elections and candidates for representatives.

I believe, my dear Admiral, that all the energy and all the good will of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward preparing for the events which may happen.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

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CARTAGENA, February 16, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I received your favor of yesterday, which I hasten to answer, leaving my letter open until to-morrow in case there should be anything new by that time. To the grave

Dupny de Lome affair is added the news of the explosion of the *Maine*, which has just been reported to me, and I am constantly thinking of the *Vizcaya*, which should have arrived in New York to-day. God grant that no attempt is made against her.

I shall be very glad if the matter of the armament of the *Colón* can be settled satisfactorily. The letter from Perrone Hijo which I sent you may have contributed to this. As Guillén is going to Madrid, I will say nothing to you concerning the 5.5-inch guns. I shall be very glad if the two of this ship are changed. I do not know when the *Pelayo* and the *Carlos V* will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the former I know nothing at all, but I have received some news concerning the latter and certainly not very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for her to be ready.

It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the *Numancia* will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the *Lepanto*. Of the *Cárlos V* and the *Pelayo* I have already spoken. The *Colón* has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns.

The eight principal vessels of the Havana station, to which you refer, have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn-out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us very dear. Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that with this force, attenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against that country will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned.

As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids with our fast vessels, in order to do them as much harm as possible. It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it proper to analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments.

I will leave this painful subject and wait until to-morrow.

*The 17th.*—Nothing has happened since yesterday and I will trouble you no further. The explosion of the *Maine* seems to have occurred under circumstances which leave no doubts of its being due to the vessel herself; nevertheless, I fear this may cause new complications and a painful position for the *Vizcaya*, which God forbid.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.



[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
*Madrid, February 23, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Pardon me for not answering your letters before. In spite of the *Maine* catastrophe—at least, so far—and in spite of the pessimistic tenor of some newspapers, our relations with the United States have in no manner changed. Eulate, who had to be given new instructions so that he might judiciously shorten his stay in New York, and use every manner of precautions, especially in coaling, has conducted himself with rare tact and refused to attend any festivities, alleging as an excuse that he considers himself in mourning. But as usual there are other things that worry me. Sobral, whom I have telegraphed to come home immediately, is making unfavorable statements on the organization and discipline of the United States Navy in his interviews with reporters of United States newspapers, and remonstrances are beginning to arrive.

How anxious some people are, my dear Admiral, to make themselves conspicuous and talk. It never occurs to military and naval attachés at Madrid to have these interviews with reporters, and express their opinions. Just think how this country would rise up in arms if the United States attaché should say that there was no discipline or organization in our navy, or things on that order. As to your squadron, instructions have been sent to Cadiz for the delivery of the three 5.5-inch guns, and I am in receipt of advices from London that the first installment of cartridge cases will shortly be forwarded to Cadiz.

As for the two guns of the *Colón*, Ansaldo has been notified that Nos. 325 and 313 are not acceptable, and that he must, within a very short time, submit two others for trial. He tells me that the Italian navy is very kindly disposed toward us; so I am hoping for a favorable solution. However, you are aware that I am not a partisan of guns of that caliber. I think their military value is imaginary rather than real. Moreover, I have an idea that they might affect the stability of the *Colón*. In my opinion the most desirable solution would be to take 7.87-inch guns instead, as I believe that there is great military value in medium-caliber guns, owing to their rapidity of fire. Monstrous guns and torpedoes are terrible weapons, but only on special occasions.

You will receive a less number of torpedoes than you asked for, because I have to bear in mind Cabrera Island and the Philippines. In reply to your questions relative to studies on the war with the United States, I have sent you information on the location of their ships in commission, bases of supplies, coaling stations, etc. They really only have Key West; the others are at San Luis (Atlantic), and at their navy-yards on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. Their ships, as far as the draft is concerned, are calculated for banks extending a long distance into the sea, as at New Orleans, for instance.

You will realize what my situation is. I am working as hard as I can to assemble in Spain all the elements of power we have abroad. I am also trying to develop our forces, especially as to speed. As I have told you before, my idea, though perhaps somewhat optimistic, is to establish two centers of resistance, one in Cuba, the other in the peninsula; and by the end of April our position will probably have changed. We shall have to be very careful, and if possible avoid until then any conflict with the United States; but we have to reckon with the excitable nature of our nation and the evil of a press which it is impossible to control.

I should like to make dispositions relative to your ships, but the *Teresa* is waiting for the 5.5-inch guns, and the *Colón* for a solution of the question as to her 9.84-inch armament. The *Alfonso XIII*, although probably not permanently under your orders, must be included for the present while her trials are going on. When you consider the *Colón* ready for target practice let me know, and orders will be issued for her to go to Santa Pola. I will close this letter and see what I can do toward procuring funds for getting those ships ready—in this poor country which has to send 16,000,000 pesos to Cuba every month.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

I am also looking after provisions, coal, and extra guns.

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[Confidential.]

HONORED SIR: His excellency the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with the confidential letter of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative to studies made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has suggested to me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit to your excellency:

If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as published in the December number of the *Revista General de Marina* and in our general statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle ships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*; the armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*; the protected cruisers *Atlanta*, *Minneapolis*, *Baltimore*, *Charleston*, *Chicago*, *Cincinnati*, *Columbia*, *Newark*, *San Francisco*, *Olympia*, *Philadelphia*, and *Raleigh*, and the rapid unprotected cruisers *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, and *Montgomery*. Against this we have, following the same classification, the battleships *Pelayo*, *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*, armored cruiser *Colón*, and protected cruisers *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Lepanto*; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the *Pelayo*, *Cárlos V*, and *Lepanto* to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the *Alfonso XIII*.

I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still in service, the ram *Katahdin*, the *Vesuvius*, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate enough. Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United States has 41,589 tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471

tons, against our 6,840; in protected cruisers, 51,098, against 18,887; and in fast unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we have none.

The total vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against our 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is superior to ours. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87 inch are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84, 7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24, 1.65, and 1.45 inches be represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1, which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in inches  $\left(\frac{(\text{caliber in inches})^3}{100}\right)$ , we find that the artillery power of

the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29,449; that of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (*Colón*) by 6,573; that of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected cruisers by 12,300.

Therefore, according to these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*, which probably will not be ready in time; the *Lepanto*, which surely will not be ready, and the *Alfonso XII*, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.

✓ This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough to send me. These two reports constitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attainment of such control.

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use it as a base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become formidable.

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations

for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but one motto: "The fulfillment of duty."

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 25, 1898.*

His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE.

CARTAGENA, *February 25, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your favor of the 23d and will answer your questions. I am very glad to know that our relations with the United States have not changed, for I believe a rupture would mean a terrible catastrophe for poor Spain, who has done all she can and is by no means ready for such a blow, which would surely be fatal. The reports and statistics forwarded to me by the staff of the ministry have suggested to me certain considerations, which I shall send to-morrow or the day after, also officially, the same as I received the reports that suggested them.

We must not indulge in any illusions relative to our situation, although we are ready and willing to bear whatever trials God may be pleased to send us. It is one thing to meet with energy and manliness whatever may befall us, and another thing to indulge in illusions as to the results to be expected. Eulate's conduct has afforded me much pleasure, and I have written to him at Havana, congratulating him. Sobral is disgusting. I can hardly believe that he could have been guilty of such indiscretion; I should rather believe that our numerous crafty enemies have invented all that.

According to a letter received from Cadiz the 5.5-inch guns need a slight alteration in order to be installed in the mounts of this ship, and it would perhaps be easier to have that done at Cadiz. It is very important that the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases should arrive and be charged, to replace those we now have. I am glad the *Colón* is almost ready. I believe you are right; the ship would be worth more with four 7.87-inch guns than with two 9.84-inch, which are about equivalent in weight; but as she is built for the latter it can not be helped. I have received the royal order regarding the torpedoes, but the torpedoes themselves have not yet arrived.

I realize how hard you must be working and how many disagreeable things you have to contend with and as we all have who love our country. I believe you are really optimistic in your views about a rupture with the United States. You think that if we can hold off until April our relative positions will be considerably changed. I believe that is an illusion, for, from what I know, it is my opinion that the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V* will not be ready by that time, and at the rate we are now progressing it is very doubtful whether the *Colón* will be.

Nor will the *Lepanto* be ready, and the *Alfonso XIII* will never be anything more than she is now. The *Vitoria* may perhaps be ready for service, but the *Numancia* will not be. The *Colón* can go out for target practice whenever it may be desirable.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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CARTAGENA, *February 26, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: When I received yesterday, the letter in which, among other things, you asked me if the *Colón* could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, nor a machine to re-form the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

To obviate this, two ways are open, one a slow one, which is to bring the appliances that are lacking and to construct a furnace in which to recharge the cartridge cases; and the other, a rapid one, which is to purchase cartridge cases for the charges on hand, and this could be done at once, as the manufacturers have some on hand which they would let us have. Moreu has asked them and they answered that they had, and gave the prices, but those were unintelligible. For this reason I telegraphed you suggesting the purchase of the cartridge cases comprising 720 5.9 inch and 432 4.7 inch. I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions?

Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the Queen and by the whole council of ministers.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
*Madrid, February 28, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your confidential communication and letter, both on the same subject. I want

to wait till I have somewhat recovered from the painful impression caused by the reading of your letters before answering them. As to the cartridge cases of the *Colón*, I am trying to find the means I lack for solving the question you suggest.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, *March 3, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impression caused by my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly sad, and still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one sees. In your very letter we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the *Colón* arises from the want of means (money), and this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. The question is to recharge the old cases. This was asked for relative to some empty 5.5-inch cases which it was ascertained are in this departamento, and the answer is that they can not be recharged here.

I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of preparation. I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities—that is, to you and to the whole Government through you—clearly and without beating around the bush. Now, let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private and confidential.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

*Madrid, March 4, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I notified you that, when I should have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused by the reading of your confidential letter, I should answer it, and I now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting some of our vessels at Havana, which are available for a conflict with the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so excessive as would appear from your lines.

In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering that it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific for the protection of San Francisco and the San Diego arsenal, as also

their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are being maintained there.

With your good judgment you will understand that the long and difficult voyage which these forces, among them the *Oregon*, would have to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region unprotected, could not be effected without the knowledge of others, and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking. I must therefore refer you to the inclosed statement. While it shows deficiencies, which the Government is endeavoring to remedy at any cost by the acquisition of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist to such an extent as stated in comparison with the United States Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order to concentrate our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time—the whole month of April, in my estimation.

Since I have been in charge of this department His Majesty's Government has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval forces, which are being remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity with such knowledge the Government has endeavored, and is endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also to the general interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which were not easy of solution.

But with your good judgment you will understand, and I want therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba. Our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the sentiments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and is trying by every possible means—political, international, and military—to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the prevailing opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that reason is endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Havana harbor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in operation, where our ships will be able to repair slight damages, for it is my opinion that it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to repair those injuries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the short period of time in which international military campaigns are enacted, compared with the material interests they affect.

The other harbors of the island, such as Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In your estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews of mercenaries (mercenarias), and you might find historical facts, evok-

ing sad memories for us, to confirm what I say. I will close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us will fulfill the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you my opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

*North Atlantic Squadron—Possible formation.*

United States.	Tons.	Spain.	Tons.
New York .....	8,200	Vizcaya .....	7,000
Indiana .....	10,288	Pelayo .....	9,900
Massachusetts .....	10,288	Carlos V .....	9,250
Texas .....	6,315	Maria Teresa .....	7,000
Brooklyn .....	9,271	Oquendo .....	7,000
Iowa .....	11,410	Colón .....	6,800
Montgomery .....	2,000	Alfonso XIII .....	4,826
Marblehead .....	2,000	M. Ensenada .....	1,064
Detroit .....	2,094	Alfonso XII .....	3,900
Nashville .....	1,071	Venadito .....	1,189
Terror .....	3,600	Reina Mercedes .....	3,908
Yorktown, dispatch boat .....		Infanta Isabel .....	1,189
Total tonnage .....	66,537	Total tonnage .....	62,818
Five torpedo boats; average speed, 21 knots.		Three destroyers and three torpedo boats; average speed, 25 knots.	

63,018.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

March 5, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of a telegram from Ansaldo, in which he says: "We yesterday repeated our request to Messrs. Armstrong, of Elswick. They telegraphed would order ammunition for guns by letter, which we shall communicate to you. The constructing firm uses great diligence, but can not furnish cartridge cases before August. We make another request of the Italian navy.—G. Ansaldo."

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

[Confidential.]

CARTAGENA, March 7, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your personal letter of the 4th, to which I am about to reply, but you must first permit me to give you a general idea of our situation as I see it. That it is the intention of the United States to engage us in a war appears beyond all doubt, and it therefore becomes more important each day to



examine into the advantages and disadvantages which such a war may have for us.

Inspired by these ideas, I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to the official communication through which I was advised of the distribution of the American vessels and the condition of certain points on the United States coasts, and I did so in my confidential letter of February 25 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more freely in a confidential letter, I will reply to your communication.

An examination of our forces, based upon what I already knew and upon recent information and observation, not only confirms what I said, but shows it to be still worse. I have visited the *Vitoria*, on which I counted, and from my examination of her I have drawn the conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. Neither does my information permit me to count on the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, nor *Numancia*.<sup>1</sup> And yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal observation, I include them in the inclosed statement, solely because you have included them in yours.

Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict—either war, negotiations direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or otherwise—the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability—that is, that we should obtain a victory—that would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would always be a disaster.

Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become

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<sup>1</sup> This prediction was actually fulfilled, since, after the signing of the peace protocol, it was necessary to send the *Pelayo* back to La Seyne to be completed, and even before the signing the 3.94-inch guns of the *Carlos V* had to be dismantled. The *Numancia* is in the arsenal at La Carraca receiving her artillery, and it can not be said when this will be ready. None of these vessels, therefore, were ready at the declaration of war.

graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison with the last. Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem, already pointed out by somebody, arises, Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.)

I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the character of modern vessels. Although I do not attach much importance to certain details which can have but little influence on the general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some upon which you touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answering your letter. The accompanying statement, which appears to me to be more correct than the one inclosed with your letter, shows that our forces in the Atlantic are, approximately, one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery power.

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resistance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, the *Vitoria*, nor the *Numancia* will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 5.5 inch ammunition.

It seems sure that by the end of April the 10-inch guns of the *Colón* will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of those of the Americans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority would be in torpedo boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive there in good order. I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which is not for me to analyze.

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an old ridge rope. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. More than one official letter has been written on this interesting subject. In times past, forty-three days after the *Hernán Cortés* was laid down, the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers

of a steam launch of the *Teresa*, and I do not yet know when it will be finished. This will probably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the Havana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all.

As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way. I beg that you will not consider this an argument against yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speaking of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me. These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express them to you with the request that you will transmit them to the Government. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them personally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

#### NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.—COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES FLEET.

*Vessels more or less protected now composing the squadron, or unprotected, but with a speed of over 15 knots.*

Spain.			United States.		
	Displacement.	Armament.		Displacement.	Armament.
Vizcaya .....	7,000	6,130	New York .....	8,200	6,400
Oquendo .....	7,000	6,130	Indiana .....	10,288	9,304
M. de la Ensenada .....	1,064	1,100	Massachusetts .....	10,288	9,304
	15,064	13,360	Texas .....	6,315	4,550
	23 per cent.	23 per cent.	Brooklyn .....	9,271	7,880
			Iowa .....	11,410	8,360
			Montgomery .....	2,089	4,100
			Marblehead .....	2,089	4,100
			Detroit .....	2,089	4,100
			Terror .....	3,600	2,896
				65,639	60,994
To these may be positively added:			Minneapolis .....	7,375	4,790
Infanta Maria Teresa .....	7,000	6,130	Columbia .....	7,375	4,790
Cristóbal Colón .....	6,840	6,490		14,750	9,580
Alfonso XIII .....	4,828	4,340			
	18,666	18,960	Atlanta .....	3,000	4,270
Doubtful additions:			Charleston .....	3,730	4,570
Pelayo .....	9,917	6,987	Chicago .....	4,500	4,470
Carlos V .....	9,250	5,620	Newark .....	4,098	6,740
	19,167	12,607	Philadelphia .....	4,324	7,640
			Dolphin .....	1,485	700
			Yorktown .....	1,703	3,320
				22,840	31,710

<sup>a</sup> Without the 9.84-inch guns, the value of which is represented by 1,248.

In the South Atlantic they have the Cincinnati, 3,200 displacement; 4,795 armament.

All the other vessels have very little military value, with the exception of the torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this statement, and also the *Katahdin* and *Vesuvius*.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

*Madrid, March 13, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I take advantage of this being Sunday to write to you in answer to your confidential lines on our respective opinions relative to the events which may develop in Cuba, if it should come to the worst. I have informed the Government of our deficiencies, and I repeat to you what I have said before, namely, that the Government will act prudently in order to maintain friendly relations with the United States, and try by every means to ward off any conflict, since the opinion as to our unfavorable situation is unanimous.

I will now speak of matters relative to your squadron and the reinforcement which it may receive. I have a telegram from Ansaldo, saying that the question of the 9.84-inch armament of the *Colón* will be solved this month, by means of two new guns at Spezia. He also tells me that he has applied to the Italian navy for 5.9 and 4.7 inch cartridge cases. The first installment of 5.5-inch cartridge cases is now on its way to Cadiz, and others will soon follow.

By letters from Ferrándiz I am advised that the engines will be tried by the 15th, and that the ship will be ready to go out by the beginning of April. The *Carlos V*, I am told, will also be ready by the middle of that month.

What the newspapers say as to the purchase of ships is true, although I deny it. I do so because it is owing to publicity that the negotiations for the two Brazilian cruisers,<sup>1</sup> which were commenced under favorable auspices, came to naught. My efforts are bent on cruisers, torpedo boats, and even steamers of over 1,000 tons displacement and 20 knots speed to serve as dispatch boats. The squadron is being kept at Cartagena, because it has not been decided what course it is to follow. It will probably go to Cadiz, but the *Colón*, if her armament can be completed, which is to be hoped, will have to go to Genoa, and that will leave only the *Maria Teresa*, *Alfonso XIII*, which has not yet completed her endless trials, and the *Destructor*.

Arrangements have been made to send the testing and recharging machinery to Cartagena.

I will close now. I leave it to you how arduous my work is. To-day, Sunday, which the Lord has set aside as a sacred day of rest, I commenced my work at 8 o'clock in the morning and close it at 9 o'clock at night with these lines.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

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<sup>1</sup> The two cruisers referred to are the *Almirante Abreu* and the *Amazonas*, which were purchased by the United States while Spain was negotiating for them. They are now the *New Orleans* and the *Albany*.—O. N. I.

[Confidential.]

CARTAGENA, *March 16, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your favor of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favorable conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the general statement, and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, provisions, etc. We have nothing at all.

If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest importance that the whole council of ministers, without exception, be fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war, but to find some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the more time is spent the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war.

From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since we can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we can not treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious, perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of consideration does not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of the situation. Before dropping this subject to answer the other points of your letter, permit me to repeat what I said in my last communication, and to which no reply has been made in yours.

Perhaps it would be well for me to inform the members of the cabinet myself. If this is deemed expedient I am ready to start at the first intimation. Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them, I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 10-inch guns of the *Colón*. He has disappointed us so many times already. The 5.5-inch cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. You know that this vessel has only 30, and it is to be supposed that the stores of the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* are not better supplied. For the present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and supposing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz in the near future, at this rate we will not have finished until October. Then they

have to be charged, etc.; therefore they can never be ready in time for the present conflict. I thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them until April.

The engines of the *Pelayo* are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? These will not be ready. If the old battery could be mounted temporarily! But I doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the crew which brought the *Pelayo* was taken from the *Vitoria*, which is another proof of our excessive poverty. I shall be very glad if the *Carlos V* is soon ready, but I understand that the 3.94-inch battery has not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made. I never had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels.

Too much fuss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the *Garibaldi*, and now we have lost the Brazilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the *Colón*, an excellent ship, but which has not yet been equipped, and the *Valdés*. And supposing that we had everything our own way and that Providence should grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves in the condition explained in my last and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the destination of the fleet.

I believe the *Teresa* ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge cases are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were mounted. Really, if the *Colón* goes to Italy, the admiral's flag will not be very well represented, but this consideration should not be placed above the requirements of the service, and if the dissolution of the fleet should make it advisable I could lower my flag and leave the ship, and hoist it again when the ships now scattered were united again in a body, unless the reunion should be for a few days only. I say this to you to remove all idea of personal considerations, which I have always made subject to the interests of the service. Moreover, the flag is the same here as at Cadiz.

When the English fleet arrived there were three ships in the harbor—the *Navarra*, with the flag of the Captain-General; this ship (*Teresa*), with my flag, and the *Colón*, with that of Paredes. I will trouble you no more; believe me, I regret having troubled you so much, but the voice of my conscience, which, animated by love for my country, tells me that I thus fulfill a high duty, is what impels me to do so in order to aid, in this way also, the old and cherished friend to whose lot it has fallen to bear this heavy cross.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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CARTAGENA, March 19, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: When I received your cipher telegram night before last, I asked for rectification of the name of the ship to be fitted out, but with a strong presentiment that it was the

*Colón.* I had her enter the dock yesterday morning, and at once commenced coaling, which I hope to complete to-day, although over 500 tons are required to replenish her bunkers. When I received your other cipher telegram this evening, I answered at once, and will now add that this ship (*Maria Teresa*) is already in the dock, and we are about to begin putting in the 180 tons of coal which she needs. The gun that is ready will be mounted in a little while. It is a pity that we do not have the other two; they will not be ready for ten or twelve days.

In the way of 5.5-inch ammunition we carry 78 rounds per gun, but of these only 30 cartridges have been pronounced serviceable by Guillén. I saw Pedro Aguirre yesterday and asked him concerning the ships at Havana. He says that there is but one ship ready, namely, the *Venadito*. I had him repeat this statement several times. He also told me that the dock did not work. If the defects can not be remedied we will have to do something about the *Viscaya*, as she has not had her bottom cleaned for eight months. As I know nothing further than what your telegrams tell me, I am very much perplexed and do not know what orders to issue relative to the berthing of petty officers. Could you make any suggestions, I should be greatly obliged to you. I presume you have received my letter of the 15th, which I hereby confirm.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
Madrid, March 21, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: You ask me about the commission of the *Colón*. It is as follows: Since it is desirable to shorten the itinerary laid down for the torpedo-boat flotilla there is some idea of having the *Colón* accompany it to Puerto Rico. As this ship can not enter there, she would have to go to St. Thomas for coal and return to Spain to complete her armament. As two captains will take part in this expedition, the second in command of the squadron is to go. I do not know yet whether this will be carried out. As it is possible that she may go to Cadiz when she has finished mounting her guns, she can get her charts there and begin to take on the cartridge cases.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, March 27, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Your favor of the 24th was received yesterday. I am ready and waiting for orders to proceed to Cadiz.

As I stated in one of my former letters, I take with me all of the 5.5-inch projectiles which are in this departamento, namely:

Ball cartridges.....	500
Ordinary shells of English manufacture.....	333
Ordinary shells made at Cartagena.....	216
Segmental shells of English manufacture.....	67
Segmental shells made at Cartagena.....	112
<hr/>	
Total number of projectiles.....	1,228

The Cadiz Departamento, which I asked on the 21st for a statement of the projectiles on hand, answered that they have: Ball cartridges, 27; ordinary shells, 460; segmental shells, 150; steel shells, 40; total number of projectiles, 677, which, added to those now on board, shipped from this Departamento, namely, 1,228, make a total of 1,905; but as the number of cartridge cases contracted for is, I believe, 4,500, we are short 2,595. Even if we use all the shells that we have, some of which, of English manufacture, are quite defective. Moreover, we should have spare ones for those that are fired. The shell workshop here is not in operation, and if you think well of it, an order might be issued to resume work. I think the *Colón* should have target practice, but at anchor, not under way. It would be worth while to stop a day to that end, or have her go out from Cadiz expressly for that purpose.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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PUERTO REAL, *April 2, 1898.*

HIS EXCELLENCY SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: It seems hardly credible that since my arrival here I have not had time to write to you, as I have been wanting to do. But owing to long distances and many things to be done I have not been able to write. In spite of the heavy weather we arrived safe and sound, and the injuries of the *Colón* were of much less importance than I thought at first. Only a few tubes were disabled, and for that reason I asked you by telegram to procure from Niclausse the 50 tubes which he has ready. I have made requests for the coal and lubricating material, in order that we may always be ready for any emergency. My fears are realized, for the conflict is approaching at a rapid rate, and the *Colón* does not have her heavy guns; the *Carlos V* has not been delivered, and her 3.94-inch armament is not mounted; on the *Pelayo* the redoubt is not completed, and I believe she lacks her secondary battery; the *Vitoria* is without her armament, and of the *Numancia* we had better not speak.

But after all, it is well that the end is coming; the country can not stand this state of affairs any longer, and any arrangement will be good, however bad it may seem, if it can save us from lamenting a great disaster, which we may expect if we go to war with ships half



armed, and only a few of them, and with want of means and excess of incumbrances. I shall take along all the ammunition that is ready, so that these two ships, such as they are, can be counted upon at any moment. The circumstance that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are so far away is very unfortunate, because if they are not incorporated soon they may be separated from the squadron.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CADIZ, April 4, 1898.

I believe it very dangerous for torpedo-boat flotilla to continue voyage. As I have no instructions, deem it expedient to go to Madrid to receive them and form plan of campaign. The Canaries trouble me; they are in dangerous situation. If during my absence it should be necessary for squadron to go out, it could do so under second in command.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, April 4, 1898.

Your cipher telegram received. In these moments of international crisis no definite plans can be formulated.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

April 4, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your telegram and letter. In these moments of an international crisis, while diplomacy is exerting its influence and while a truce is being discussed, and even the situation of the respective naval forces, nothing can be formulated or decided. Next time I shall write you more fully.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CADIZ, April 6, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In last night's mail I received your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram concerning the same matter. It is precisely on account of the general anxiety prevailing that it is very important to think of what is to be done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads. If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States the question would be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar their way.

But as our forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by establishing there a base of operations crush our commerce and safely bombard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when the time comes.

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there will be vacillations and doubts, and after defeat there may be some humiliation and shame. You will understand these frank and loyal statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more than to help the Government and act with circumspection.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

*The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).*

HAVANA, April 7, 1898.

Public opinion remains dignified and quiet, though somewhat excited by reports of impending war. Some dissatisfaction expressed over lack of ships in island. Those now here not in condition to render service. Detention of flotilla at Cape Verde leaves our coasts unprotected. You know international situation better than I under present circumstances, and will realize expediency of sending ships.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, April 7, 1898.

Squadron must go out to-morrow. Proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Immediately upon arrival take coal and water. Communicate with semaphore Canaries to notify you of anything new. Instructions, which will be amplified, are in substance to protect torpedo-boat flotilla, which is placed under your orders, *Amazonas* and *San Francisco* being in Europe. These are the only American ships there at present.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CADIZ, April 7, 1898.

These battle ships are ready for any duty. Beg that you will permit me to insist on having general plan of campaign to obviate fatal vacillations. No doubt Government has formed its plan; I must know it without fail if I am to cooperate with it intelligently.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CADIZ, April 7, 1898.

Will leave to-morrow evening for Cape Verde, where torpedo-boat flotilla is placed under my orders. Not knowing plan of government, and not having been told what to do next, I shall await instructions, protecting the Canaries.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, April 7, 1898.

Hurry of departure prevents for the moment making you acquainted with plan you ask for, but you will receive it in detail a few days after arrival at Cape Verde, as steamer loaded with coal is following in your wake.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

Your cipher telegram of yesterday received. Shall await instructions at Cape Verde.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

It is 5 o'clock p. m., and I am about to leave with *Teresa* and *Colón*.

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CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

HIS EXCELLENCY SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have received all your telegrams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out this evening. I have just sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At Cape Verde I shall await the instructions which you are to send me. The reproduction of the cipher telegram differs in one word; it says that the instructions *se ampliarán* (will be amplified), while the first telegram received said *se emplearán* (will be used). That is the reason why I indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as previously stated, I shall wait.

I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some plan, even on general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the Government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago.

I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our correspondence of the last two months you will see, not that I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not have any illusions as to what we can do which will be in proportion to the means available. Without troubling you any further,

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,  
*Madrid, April 7, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: We are in the midst of a serious international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war at any cost, we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the influence of foreign powers; but the President of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the Admiral of the squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the navy—or God himself has singled you out for that purpose—to carry out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your intelligence and valor.

I believe that I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined, which you will work out with your captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which His Majesty and the Government place in your high ability.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

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INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED AT THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

*The Minister of Marine (Bermejo) to the Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera).*

[Confidential.]

HONORED SIR: Although up to date the friendly relations existing between Spain and the United States of North America have not changed, yet, in anticipation of possible complications, and in view of the probable presence in European waters of the United States cruisers *San Francisco* and *Amazonas*, it becomes necessary to protect the first torpedo-boat division, which has recently reached the Cape Verde Islands, whether it be deemed expedient for such division to proceed to the West Indies, or whether it be necessary for it to return to the Canaries.

Immediately upon receipt of this order you will therefore proceed with the flagship and the *Cristóbal Colón* to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, where the division referred to is to join your fleet and remain for the present under your orders, together with the trans-Atlantic steamer *Ciudad de Cadiz*, which accompanies it. At St. Vincent you will await instructions, which will be forwarded in good season, and if the exigencies of the service should make it advisable for the squadron and torpedo boat division to proceed to Puerto Rico you will do so, bearing in mind that if prior to your departure the situation should have become aggravated the battle ships *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* will join you at Cape Verde or meet you at 18° 30' north latitude and 53° 30' west longitude. This point has been determined from the general Spanish chart of the Atlantic Ocean, and you will stand for that point for the purpose indicated.

The protection given the torpedo boats by you will place the division in much

better condition from a military standpoint, as each battle ship, as well as the trans-Atlantic steamer, can take charge of two of the torpedo boats for the purpose of provisioning them and lending them such other aid as may be necessary during the voyage, which under these circumstances can be made in less time and with greater safety. As far as the contingencies feared make it possible to determine the objective of the expedition, it will be the defense of the island of Puerto Rico. In this operation you will take charge of the naval part, in cooperation with the army, with the concurrence of the Governor-General of the island, without forgetting, however, that the plan rests with you alone, in view of your incontestable ability, in your capacity as admiral, to measure the forces of our probable enemy, estimate the significance of their movements, as well as the best purposes to which the ships under your command can be put.

If the case in question should arise, you will deploy the squadron so that the different tactical units composing it will sustain each other, supported by the destroyers and torpedo boats, and not present a compact mass to the enemy, unless the hostile forces should be equal or inferior, in which case it will be expedient for you to take the offensive. It is on these bases that your plan must rest, considering as the principal factor the speed of our ships, which, as a general rule, is superior to that of the enemy's ships, and taking into account that the hostile forces which, if the case should arise, will operate in Puerto Rico will probably not exceed 7 ships, including 3 auxiliary vessels.

As it may become necessary to give you further orders during your voyage from Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands, you will pass within sight of the semaphore of the Canaries (Punta Anaga). As to the provisioning of your ships at St. Vincent, the necessary instructions have been given to the commander of the torpedo-boat division; and in Puerto Rico, in case it should be necessary to go there, you will find every kind of supplies, including ammunition.

In everything compatible with these instructions you will observe the orders transmitted to the commander of the torpedo-boat division, as far as relates thereto. The foregoing is communicated to you by royal order, and at the same time I beg to tell you that, in view of the grave circumstances through which the nation is passing at present, the Government of His Majesty places full confidence in your excellency's zeal, skill, and patriotism, and in the incontestable valor of all who are subject to and will obey your efficient orders.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MADRID, April 8, 1898.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 14, 1898.

Arrived here safely. Am anxious to know instructions. I beg for daily telegram. Need 1,000 tons of coal to refill bunkers.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 14, 1898.

Serious news. Transatlantic *San Francisco* leaves for Cape Verde with instructions and 2,000 tons of coal. But begin coaling anyhow from the coal ordered to be purchased by commander of flotilla. *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* under way since 9th to join you.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 15, 1898.

Situation continues to be grave. Violent and humiliating speeches against our country in United States Congress. Great powers appear desirous of peace. Con-

fidential information received from Washington that flying squadron, composed of *New York*, *Texas*, *Columbia*, *Minneapolis*, and *Massachusetts*, put to sea the 13th to prevent our battle ships from joining you. Doubt this to be true, war not having been declared, but you should nevertheless be warned. Provide yourself with everything necessary, and upon arrival of battle ships refit them immediately.

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*Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).*

CAPTAINCY GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: In compliance with the orders of your excellency, and as I have had the honor of telegraphing you, I sailed from Cadiz on the evening of the 8th with the *Colón* and *Teresa*, shaping my course for Punta Anaga, island of Teneriffe, where I communicated with semaphore on the morning of the 11th, and received your order to proceed, and the information that indications were more favorable. I advised you that the squadron had arrived there safely.

The *Colón* was waiting for me off the city of Santa Cruz. A tug had brought her an official letter from the commandant of marine, transmitting to me said telegram from the semaphore, adding that on the previous evening a steamer had been waiting for me at Punta Anaga, to communicate the telegram to me. At 9 o'clock a. m. of the 11th I shaped my course for St. Vincent, Cape Verde, casting anchor at Puerto Grande on the 14th at 10 o'clock a. m. Here I found the first division of torpedo boats, whose commander placed himself under my orders and advised me that nothing of importance had occurred.

We had a good voyage, with wind and sea in the first quadrant (from northward and eastward), calming down as we reached a lower latitude. Our usual speed was 12 knots, at times reduced to 11 knots, so as to arrive in daytime and have no trouble in reconnoitering. The coal consumption of the *Colón* has been enormous, and that of the *Teresa* also quite large. During the voyage of 1,570 miles, with the speed above mentioned, the *Colón* has used about 500 tons and the *Teresa* about 400. The consumption, therefore, of the *Colón* has been 3,738 pounds per horsepower per hour, at 12 knots speed, and 3,919 pounds at 11 knots, and that of the *Teresa* 2,546 and 2,969 pounds, respectively. Upon arrival here the *Colón* had only 550 and the *Teresa* 570 tons left. I wish to call your excellency's attention to another point, also of great importance. Thinking about this extravagant consumption of fuel, I attribute that of the *Colón* to the type of her boilers and lack of experience in managing them, and that of the *Teresa* to the very low pressure in the boilers, considering that the engine is of the triple-expansion type. When I gave an order to raise the pressure from 100 to 150 pounds the first engineer in chief made certain explanations to me, which I impart to your excellency under separate cover, and as I fear that his objections are well founded I have decided not to raise the pressure in the boilers of this ship, except in peremptory cases.<sup>1</sup>

Upon arrival here I dispatched to you the following telegram: "Arrived here safely. Am anxious to know instructions. I beg for daily telegram. Need 1,000 tons of coal to refill bunkers." This evening the captain of the *Ciudad de Cadiz*

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<sup>1</sup> The engineer in chief says that he has noticed that whenever the pressure in the boilers has been raised above 115 pounds there has been some injury, especially in the joints of the auxiliary steam piping, which he attributes to the lack of expansion joints, in conjunction with the facts that the boiler tubes have lost much of their resistance, and that there are a few slight leaks in the seams where the furnaces are joined to the boilers, which might become serious if the pressure were raised in the latter, and he therefore advises not to do so under ordinary circumstances, because the saving in fuel would not compensate for the expense of repairs and interference with the service.

notified me that he had received the following telegram, dated at Cadiz the 14th, at 5.05 o'clock p. m.: "Steamer *San Francisco* has sailed from Las Palmas with 1,000<sup>1</sup> tons of coal for the fleet. Notify the admiral." This morning I received your excellency's telegram of the same date (7.50 p. m.) referring to the same matter and to the battle ships *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*. After consulting with the second in command and the captains, I answered as follows: "For coal they ask 51 shillings per ton paid in London. As it is much needed I have ordered it to be bought. Nothing new." Just as I am about to close this letter, which is to go by a steamer leaving to-night, I received your other telegram, dated to-day (12.50 p. m.), referring to the movements of American ships.

Yours, etc.,  
ON BOARD INFANTA MARIA TERESA,  
*St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 15, 1898.*

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, *April 16, 1898.*

Nothing new. Owing to last report of your cipher telegram concerning flying squadron, the torpedo boat flotilla is fitting for battle, lightening the coal which hampers it.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, *April 17, 1898.*

Owing to heavy weather, have been unable to complete taking on coal purchased. *San Francisco* has not arrived. Am impatiently awaiting her arrival.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, *April 18, 1898.*

*San Francisco* has arrived.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, *April 19, 1898.*

*Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* have safely arrived.

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ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 19, 1898.*

HIS EXCELLENCY SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The *San Francisco*, and with it your instructions and letter, arrived yesterday. If the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten days and must arrive to-day or to-morrow, for that is all the time they would require to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am thinking that perhaps the date stated, the 9th, is that of the cablegram issuing the order, and not the date of sailing, in which case they will arrive later.

The boilers of the *Ariete* are practically unserviceable, so that this vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram from minister to Cervera says 2,000.

fleet. She could only be used for local defense. The boiler of the *Azor* is 11 years old and is of the locomotive type, and that tells the whole story. As for the destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*, their bow plates give as soon as they are in a sea way, and some of their frames have been broken. Villaamil has had this remedied as far as he has been able. The *Plutón* had an accident of this kind when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez can not be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the *Vizcaya*, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the Canaries.

It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as well as the small island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran Canary. From your instructions it seems that the idea of sending the fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely. Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico is loyal, it will not be such an easy task for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal, it will inevitably follow the fate of Cuba, at least as far as we are concerned.

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, as I have already said, for the Canaries; and above all I fear the possibility of a bombardment of our coast, which is not unlikely, considering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or five vessels of higher speed than our own.

For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for me to do, and I will not take any decision without your opinion and that of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter. I leave this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen.

I was here interrupted by the information that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the *Vizcaya* needs docking badly.

During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more coal than the *Oquendo*, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed to which you called special attention in your instructions. Both are now coaling, but it is slow work, for, unfortunately, we do not feel at home here. We are indeed unlucky! Until to-morrow. The mail has come in and will shortly go out again, I will therefore close this.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.



*The Governor-General of Puerto Rico (Macías) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).*

[Extract.]

PUERTO RICO, April 20, 1898.

Your excellency and the minister of war know scant resources at my disposal. I should know what our naval forces are doing. Do not know situation of our squadron.

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Upon reaching this harbor I had the honor of notifying your excellency of my arrival under date of the 15th. Agreeable to your orders I acquired and distributed between the *Colón* and *Teresa* the 700 tons of coal, which was all I could obtain here at the exorbitant price of 51 shillings per ton. I also purchased all the lubricating oil I could find (about 125 gallons of olive and 132 of mineral oil), so as to be able to supply the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*. At the same time I made efforts to get boats for unloading the coal of the *San Francisco*, and succeeded, though not in as large number as desired.

The *San Francisco* arrived on the 18th at noon, and at daybreak of the 19th the unloading of the coal was commenced. Her captain delivered to me the instructions which you mentioned. The custom-house raised some difficulty and wanted to collect duty on the coal landed; but the matter was settled by the governor of these islands, after conferring with the government by telephone.

On the 19th, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* arrived; the latter at once commenced to coal, working all night. The *Oquendo*, which has about 200 tons left, could not begin to coal until the following morning. The fitting out of the vessels will be continued with all possible speed. The battle ships had nothing special to report. In the torpedo-boat division slight defects have been noticed in the joints of the bow plates of the *Terror* and *Furor*, which we have remedied temporarily. (The *Plutón* had these same repairs made at Ferrol.)

The boilers of the *Ariete* are in poor condition, so that this torpedo boat, far from being of use, is an impediment. Her engines are very delicate. In a separate letter I confirmed to your excellency all the telegrams which I have dispatched since my last communication. The sanitary condition of the fleet is good.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD INFANTA MARIA TERESA,  
St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898.

*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Berméjo).*

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of the proceedings of the meeting of the captains which I called to-day at your suggestion. As the mail is about to go out I do not have time to speak about it fully, but will do so in my next letter.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898.

PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of the vessels, having met on board the cruiser *Cristóbal Colón*, by order of his excellency the commander

in chief of the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the following question: "Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here for any contingency?" Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose of establishing bases of operations.

In consideration of this and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of the Government to these matters by means of a telegram, as follows:

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SQUADRON TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE:

In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to the Canaries. *Ariete* has boilers in bad condition; boiler of *Azor* is very old. *Vizcaya* must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country.

PASCUAL CERVERA.  
 JOSÉ DE PAREDES.  
 JUAN B. LAZAGA.  
 EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.  
 VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.  
 ANTONIO EULATE.  
 JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.  
 FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

ON BOARD CRUISER COLÓN, April 20, 1898.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 20, 1898.

Both Houses of United States Congress have approved armed intervention, declaring Cuba free and independent. It is thought President will sign resolution to-day. Urgent to complete fitting out.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898.

If you approve going to Canaries, I beg you will send at once all the torpedoes to that point.

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[Confidential.]

HONORED SIR: For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on board the *Colón*, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and

whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances.

The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior forces—compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finishing once for all.

But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the *Alfonso XII* or the *Cristina* can be pitted against the *Iowa* or *Massachusetts*, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon overcome. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of everything that happened. Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement which reflects better than I could express them the opinions of all.

This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the meeting. Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE.

APRIL 21, 1898.

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[Document referred to.]

Capt. VICTOR M. CONCAS,

*Commander of the Battle Ship Infanta Maria Teresa:*

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the Admiral of the fleet at the council of war held on board the battle ship *Cristóbal Colón*, my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior

to our own in number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single battle ship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American Flying Squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of an easy victory. The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula—the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the *Alfonso XIII*, of very little speed, and even that not certain—are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries.

The yacht *Giralda* and the steamers *Germania* and *Normania*, of the acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject, and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations—is a strategic error, the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battle ships and the *Cristóbal Colón*, with-

out her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the responsibility must remain with the Government.

VICTOR M. CONCAS.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 20, 1898.*

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, *April 21, 1898.*

Torpedo boat *Ariete* may return to Spain, towed by *San Francisco*. Issue such instructions as you may deem necessary.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, *April 21, 1898.*

The more I think about it I am convinced<sup>1</sup> that to continue voyage to Puerto Rico will be disastrous. I can leave for the Canaries to-morrow. The coaling is proceeding slowly, there being a lack of appliances. The captains of the ships are of same opinion as I, some more emphatically. I need instructions.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, *April 21, 1898.*

As Canaries are perfectly safe, and you are aware of telegrams on impending sailing of flying squadron, you will go out with all the forces to protect Puerto Rico, which is menaced, following the route which your excellency has traced, bearing in mind the free scope which the instructions give you, and which I hereby renew. The phrase *Am going north* will advise me that you have sailed. Absolute secrecy must be maintained as to your movements.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This is the text in the pamphlet referred to, but the telegram as sent by me from Cape Verde says: "The more I think about it the more I am convinced."

<sup>2</sup>In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram has been suppressed. It says: "The nation, in these extreme moments of the declaration of war, follows your squadron in its expedition, and sends to it its enthusiastic greetings."

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

Have received cipher message concerning the *Ariete*. *San Francisco* will not finish unloading coal for at least five days. As the *Ariete* can cooperate in the defense of Canaries, I beg that you will recall the order for her to return to Spain. Her boilers would not hold out for long trips, but will do for local defense. I reiterate my request of cipher telegram for further destiny of fleet.

*Governor-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

[Extract.]

HAVANA, April 22, 1898.

Public spirit very high; great enthusiasm among all classes. But I must not conceal from your excellency that if people should become convinced that squadron is not coming, disappointment will be great, and an unpleasant reaction is possible. Beg that your excellency will advise me whether I can give them any hope of more or less immediate arrival of squadron.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

The Government is inquiring constantly about your sailing. It is absolutely necessary to go out as soon as possible. Have *Ariete* towed to Canaries by *San Francisco*.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

Have received cipher telegram with instructions to proceed to Puerto Rico. Though I persist in my opinion, which is also the opinion of the captains of the ships, I shall do all I can to hasten our departure, disclaiming all responsibility for the consequences.<sup>1</sup>

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I do not know location of hostile ships, nor on what the instructions are based. Beg your excellency to send me all possible information.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I do not know officially whether war has been declared. It is absolutely necessary that I should know in order to treat the American flag as an enemy.

<sup>1</sup> In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram is omitted, which is as follows: "We are grateful for the greeting of the nation, whose happiness is our only wish, and in the name of all I express our profound love for our country."

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

If war had been declared I should have advised you; but, as a matter of fact, a state of war exists, since the United States fleet will begin to-morrow the blockade of Cuba. The ships of the flying squadron, which I mentioned to your excellency, and about which I have had no further information, are to blockade Puerto Rico, but have not yet left Hampton Roads. The foundation of the instructions is to intrust to your excellency the naval defense of Puerto Rico. I have no special news to communicate to you to-day.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I need precise instructions by which I can shape my conduct in case war has been declared officially by the time I sail.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

Have received your second telegram. Can not give you more definite instructions than you have, leaving you free to choose the route to be followed, eluding, if possible, an encounter with the hostile fleet, and reaching some point on the coast of Puerto Rico. The *Ciudad de Cadiz* will accompany you with as much coal as possible.

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ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have not yet answered your letter of the 7th, which the *San Francisco* brought me, because, though I have written you since, I did not have it before me. It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, while in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation.

It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only the case with reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two other places. But is Graciosa Island safe, for instance? If the Yankees should take possession of it and fortify the port they would have a base for any operations they might wish to undertake against Spain, and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there. Such a thing will not be possible at present, with the squadron at the Canaries, but it will be inevitable when the squadron has been destroyed.

You talk about plans and in spite of all efforts to have some laid out, as would have been wise and prudent, my desires have been disappointed to such an extent that if the circumstances had been different I should have applied to be placed on the retired list, and I shall ask for it, if God spares my life, just as soon as the danger is over. I should

even apply for it to-day, without caring a straw for being accused of cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement would produce among the squadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of its admiral before the enemy. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for?

The *Colón* does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the exception of about 300 rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the *Colón* can not be recharged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo. There is no plan nor concert, which I so much desired and have suggested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels were only made in the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and the *Vizcaya* after they had left Spain.

In short, it is a disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful one before long. And perhaps everything could be changed yet. But I suppose it is too late now for anything that is not the ruin and desolation of our country. I can understand that your conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because you are a good man and your course is clear before you, but think of what I tell you and you will see that I am right. I assembled my captains, as you told me, and sent you by telegraph an extract of their opinions.

I have since forwarded you a copy of the proceedings, and by this mail I send you an official letter commenting thereon. I have nothing further to add. The *Vizcaya* can no longer steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet. But I will trouble you no more. I consider it an accomplished fact, and will try to find the best way out of this direful enterprise.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I beg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of honor. I beg your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and confidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my conscience.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, April 22, 1898—6 o'clock p. m.

As result of heavy seas, *Audaz* had bow bent at right angles to port as far as second bulkhead. I notify you so that you may have bows of destroyers strengthened as much as possible.



*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

PALACE, Madrid, April 23, 1898—noon.

I call meeting of general officers. Awaiting their decision. Advise me immediately whether torpedo boats are ready.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

At principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch, we should have confidential agents to give me authentic information, and credits should be opened.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

Received cipher message last evening. We are working night and day to fill bunkers. Have telegraphed already that appliances are lacking. Eight hundred tons still remain and it will take three days longer. Before sailing I must know whether war has been declared.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

Torpedo boats ready for war; destroyers likewise, except 2.95-inch guns. They carry coal instead. Guns can be mounted in a few hours.

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*Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at the ministry of marine, under the presidency of the minister of marine, Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo, on April 23, 1898.*

Present: Admiral Guillermo Chacón y Maldonado; Vice-Admirals Carlos Valcárcel, José M. Beránger, Eduardo Butler, and Fernando Martínez; Rear-Admirals Manuel Pasquín, José Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel de la Cámara, Eduardo Reinoso, and José de Guzmán; and Captains José Gómez Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquín Lazaga. Joaquín Cincúnegui, and Ramón Auñón.

The session opens at 3 o'clock p. m.

*The Minister* explains the situation of the country relative to the state of war with the United States of North America, the distribution of the Spanish ships, and the information he has concerning the enemy, and reads to them the instructions which he has issued to the admiral of the fleet for his departure from Cadiz, which instructions he did not receive until he arrived at Cape Verde, his departure having been hastened by subsequent telegraphic orders.

*Mr. Beránger* says that if the explanation made by the minister has no other object than to inform them of what has happened, he thanks him and takes notice thereof. But if the object is to ask for opinions on the subject, he should abstain from everything not conformable to discipline, reserving judgment thereon until such time when he will have a right to express it.

*The Minister* replies that so far he has simply explained the situation. But now that the general officers are acquainted with it he begs them to assist him with their advice as to what they deem most expedient for the plan of campaign to be followed.

*Mr. Pasquín* says that the members have a right, without prejudice to discipline, to express their opinions, since they have been convened for that purpose; that the question is not a technical one, but appertains to the Government, and it is for the latter to form the plans of campaign; that that is no reason why each one of them, if the minister so desires, should not express his opinion; but before doing so they should be informed whether it is the Government which convenes them as a council of war or whether the minister simply asks them as comrades for their private opinions; because in the former case each one is responsible for the opinions he expresses, while in the latter case they have no other value but that of friendly advice; and that, in any event, since they have been convened without being informed of the object of the meeting, they have not been able to prepare for setting forth plans of the importance and gravity of the one about which they are being consulted.

*The Minister* explains that the plan of the Government was to send the squadron now at Cape Verde, together with the first torpedo boat division, to Puerto Rico, and intrust to the admiral the defense of that island, which he (the minister) considers in great danger from hostile attacks, being poorly defended, having very open coasts, and inadequate garrisons in case of an uprising; that it was further intended to keep in Spain all other available ships, so as to be able to send them at the proper time wherever it might be necessary; but that the instructions issued to the admiral and received by him at Cape Verde had not yet been carried out, for the reason that the admiral made certain objections to the plan, which he did not consider expedient.

A short controversy followed between Messrs. Beránger and Butler, the former maintaining the possibility that certain opinions to which he attributes great weight might get out, and the latter asserting that the discretion of the members is a complete guaranty for the secrecy of whatever might be discussed.

*Mr. Chaón* asks whether the squadron had already received the order to start from Cape Verde, as has been reported, since, if the squadron had actually sailed, there was no need of discussing the point.

*The Minister* replies that the order to start has been issued, but has not yet been carried out, because the Admiral's remonstrances, reenforced by the opinions of the captains of the ships, has given him much to consider, and since then he has not reiterated the order, deeming it proper that the president of the council should be made acquainted with such remonstrances.

*Mr. Beránger* calls attention to the fact that they are being consulted after the breaking out of hostilities, which is hardly a time for asking advice; that he should never have advised the assembling of the squadron at Cape Verde, nor the formation of a flotilla of heterogeneous vessels, some of which impede the march of others, for which reason the destroyers can not do what they might be able to do by themselves; that he should have preferred the formation of a comparatively numerous squadron, letting the ships go separately or in small divisions, so as to enable them to operate with greater freedom in seeking or refusing battle, as may be best; that the idea of going back now could not be entertained, because the advance toward Puerto Rico could be made by the fleet either as a whole or in divisions by different routes; some of the vessels might even be sent to the Bermudas, in order to compel the enemy to divide his forces; that, whatever plan might be adopted, he harbored the hope that the victory would be on the side of Spain, owing to the good qualities of her ships, the skill of those who commanded them, and the valor of the crews, citing in support of his belief the fact that during the war of Independence of the United States it happened that eleven English ships, after maintaining a blockade for forty-two days, during which time they were constantly attacked by gunboats manned by valiant crews, had to return to England without attaining their object.

*The Minister* replies that the flotilla was formed while peace was reigning and in ample time to reach Puerto Rico, and that the stop at Cape Verde was not part of the Government's plan, but was due to subsequent unfortunate causes.

*Mr. Gómez Imaz* says that there is no use in losing time over the discussion of what has happened, or had to happen, but that a resolution should be adopted as to what the squadron is to do in the future.

*Mr. Mozo* states that when the minister convened the general officers of the ministry on Holy Thursday, April 6, for a similar purpose as the present, a majority of them expressed themselves in favor of concentration at Cape Verde; that the speaker was still of opinion that all possible forces should have been assembled and concentrated at a port in the Canaries; that the war should be carried on in the nature of an active defense, placing every available resource at the disposal of the admiral of the fleet, since it was he who would be held responsible hereafter.

*Mr. Beránger* says that his opinion is diametrically opposed to that of *Mr. Mozo*, because an unfortunate encounter of the united fleet would be the ruin of the country; that the concentration should never have taken place at any port abroad, but that since such had been the case it was imperative for the fleet to start at once for the West Indies, together with the destroyers, leaving the torpedo boats at Cape Verde to return to the Canaries.

*The Minister* says that he deems it important for the discussion to make the members acquainted with the last telegram received from the Governor-General of Cuba, stating that all the Spanish of that island were animated by the very best spirit for resistance; but that this was due to a great extent to the hope they harbored that the fleet would promptly return to Cuban waters, and if the return was delayed, or the hope lost, the Spanish population might at the same time lose the spirit animating it.

*Mr. Auñón* says that, although he is the youngest of the members and can shed no light on the discussion, he deems it nevertheless proper that he should take part in it, if not to formulate plans of campaign, which could not be done without the knowledge of further data than had so far been brought out in the discussion, yet to particularize the debate so that it might produce some good result and fix on the minds the value of the opinions expressed; that the first remarks of the minister might be divided into two parts—the exposition of what has already occurred, and a request for advice for the future.

Relative to the first, he coincided with *Mr. Beránger* in believing that they had not been consulted on what had already been done and could not be helped, bad though it might appear, and that all they could do was to take up matters from the present moment, inquiring carefully into the future, and not deny the minister nor the comrade the advice for which he asks, since anyone occupying his high position under the present circumstances would need advisers to keep up his courage and spirit to carry him through the critical period, as to which everyone would demand explanations and require responsibilities to be fixed in one manner or another.

As to the question of forming plans of campaign, though on a forced basis and under the pressure of present circumstances, it was not an easy undertaking and without a knowledge of all the antecedents which is indispensable for the purpose of formulating opinions as to possible contingencies; that the superficial knowledge of matters derived from the press, so often erroneous, can not be taken as a basis. For that purpose he wished to call upon the minister to explain to them the condition of the ships composing the nucleus assembled at Cape Verde and the time required before those still in the Peninsula would be in condition for active service.

As to the instructions to be issued to the admiral, they were probably not definite, except as to the objective which the Government had in view, leaving him free to develop the same as the circumstances of the moment might require, since instructions to be complied with two weeks after they were issued, and at a distance of 2,000 miles from where they emanated, had the disadvantage that they either must be followed blindly, or must be violated, leaving it for the outcome of events to decide whether the man following the latter course would be hailed as a hero or court-martialed for disobedience.

Finally, in view of the gravity of the situation, he called upon the esteemed admirals and comrades, if need be, to examine the future calmly and dispassionately, leaving the past out of the question, and giving the benefit of their opinions for the good of the country and the assistance of their comrades, upon whom are fixed just now the eyes of the nation, which is not well informed as to the true circumstances under which fate has driven the country into the disaster of a war so unequal, as far as material resources are concerned.

The Minister thanks Mr. Auñón for the sentiments which have inspired his words, and offers to exhibit whatever data may be necessary to found thereon an opinion as to the future. He says that the two battle ships coming from Puerto Rico carry provisions for forty-five days, and those coming from Spain for thirty days; that he had sent them 2,000 tons of coal by a trans-Atlantic steamer and instructed the admiral to get at Cape Verde whatever he might need, and that he therefore considered the battle ships in perfect condition to engage in a naval campaign; that the three destroyers were in similar condition, but of the torpedo boats only two were able to put to sea, because the *Ariete* had arrived with her boilers disabled.

The fitting out of the *Carlos V* could not be completed until the beginning of May, the *Pelayo* would be ready before that time, and the *Alfonso* was ready now, but the greater part of the supply of ammunition for the *Carlos V* was on the way and he could not tell exactly when it would arrive. The *Pelayo* had so limited a radius of action that she could hardly go from the Canaries to Puerto Rico without being embarrassed, and the speed of the *Alfonso XIII* was so low that she might prove an impediment to the movements of the fleet. As to the *Vitoria*, he did not consider her fit to join the squadron on account of her slow speed, and as to the *Numancia*, although she would return to Spanish waters in a short time, the remodeling of this ship was not completed, owing to strikes which had interrupted the work.

Mr. Pasquín asks that the communications from the admiral of the squadron, in which he speaks of the dangers he fears for the expedition to Puerto Rico, be read.

The Minister reads a telegram from the Admiral in which he expresses a desire to have it plainly understood that it is his opinion and the opinion of the captains of the ships that the voyage to Puerto Rico may mean a disaster for the future of the country; but that, obedient to instructions, he is hastening all the preparations, so as to carry out the order the moment it is received. He also reads his reply advising the Admiral that he submits the resolution to the assembly of general officers of the navy.

Mr. Berdnger states that the telegram read by the Minister is of such importance that, in his opinion, it should not have been read, but now that it is known, he insisted that the squadron at Cape Verde should at once start for the West Indies, no matter what risks it might run, the same as Tegetthoff, when he was ordered to attack a superior Austrian<sup>1</sup> squadron at Lissa.

Mr. Lazaga says that he has given some thought to the plan of campaign, and he submits his plan, such as it is, to the consideration of all. At first he was in favor of scattering the forces, but since reading the cablegram from the Governor-General he has modified his opinion. The *Carlos V* should go out immediately to join the squadron, taking workmen along to complete the electrical installation for operating the turrets. The *Pelayo* should complete the work of fitting out, working night and day, and purchasing without delay whatever might be required. At Cadiz they should join the *Alfonso XIII* and the two destroyers now in Spain and go in search of the squadron, after first agreeing on a geographical point of rendezvous 100 miles west of Cape Verde.

The united forces should then proceed to Puerto Rico and fight a battle there under regular conditions, after which they should continue their course south of Santo Domingo and Cuba, appear off Havana from the west, and enter that harbor, or, if necessary, engage in another battle with the blockading forces. The torpedo boats

<sup>1</sup> Italian.—O. N. T.

should return to the Canaries or to Spain with the transatlantic steamers. The cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should be detached and sent to the Bermudas to divert some of the hostile forces to that vicinity and prey upon the enemy's commerce.

*Mr. Cincúnegui* expresses the opinion that to compel the squadron to remain at Cape Verde or on the sea until the arrival of the ships to be concentrated at Cadiz would mean a further delay in the appearance of the Spanish naval forces in Cuba; but that the squadron now at Cape Verde could be sent to the West Indies at once and the Cadiz ships could be ordered later to the United States coasts for the purpose of causing alarm, attracting some of the hostile forces in that direction, and perhaps carrying out some bold operation on hostile cities. He adds that the departure from Cape Verde is absolutely necessary, because if the squadron should remain there any longer it would probably be requested to leave by the Portuguese Government, in virtue of the law of neutrality.

*The Minister* says that for operations on the United States coast speed is an important factor; that the *Alfonso XIII* has very little speed, the *Pelayo* a very limited radius of action, and that neither the latter vessel nor the *Carlos V* can enter and refit in the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, by reason of their draft.

*Mr. Butler* states that, while he realizes the necessity for the squadron to start at once from Cape Verde, he thinks that it should be notified of the Government's intention to reinforce it with the ships now in Spain, as an encouragement in the difficult task upon which it is about to embark; that the Admiral should be given every possible facility for shaping his actions according to circumstances; for, while it is deemed necessary for the ships to go to the West Indies, they should not be led to a useless sacrifice, especially as there are not in Puerto Rico the necessary facilities for repairing injuries.

*Mr. Chacón* speaks of the difficulty of harmonizing so many different opinions, and states that they can be only in the nature of advice and not of precepts. He believes that public opinion is greatly mistaken in its estimate of the value and efficiency of the Spanish squadron, but that it is, nevertheless, necessary to satisfy it within reasonable bounds. He deems the departure from Cape Verde necessary, not only in view of the considerations deduced from the cablegram from the Governor-General of Cuba, but also for the reason pointed out by *Mr. Cincúnegui*, namely, that the fleet can remain no longer in a neutral port; that it is reasonable to calculate that it will take from ten to fifteen days to complete fitting out the ships now in Spain, and that the departure of the squadron from Cape Verde can not be delayed so long, and therefore it should start at once for the West Indies, even at the risk of having to face the results of an unfortunate encounter. If the fleet blockading Puerto Rico should retreat or be defeated, the Spanish squadron should there await the reinforcements to be sent to it before proceeding to Cuba. As to future operations, he thinks, it is hazardous to say anything before knowing the result of the first operations.

*Mr. Valcárcel* says that, in view of the situation and the gravity of the question, he thinks that the squadron at Cape Verde should leave for the West Indies. He does not think that there is any hope of reinforcing it with the ships fitting out in Spain, since from what the minister has said they would require a number of days before they could undertake the trip.

*Mr. Auñón* wishes to state that, when the minister first spoke of the opinions expressed by the admiral of the fleet, he did not read the whole cablegram, which might cause an unfavorable impression among those present; but that from its whole context it was clear that Admiral Cervera had acted wisely in setting forth his opinion, while at the same time declaring himself ready to use all possible diligence in doing the very thing which in his conscience he believed to be prejudicial to subsequent operations; that his declaration could have no other object than to set down his opinion, fearing perhaps that in case of his death—a glorious death, no doubt—his far-seeing advice would remain forever unknown.

Relative to the answer that the minister had sent him, he believed it proper to call attention to the phrase, "submit to the resolution of an assembly," since the

assembly could not and should not adopt resolutions, but only give advice, leaving it wholly to the Government to dictate resolutions and accept the responsibility therefor, whether in conformity with the advice received or not.

*Mr. Gómez Imaz* insists on his opinion that the squadrons should be united before exposing them to an encounter, because the result of a delay of ten days could not be as serious as a possible disaster.

*The Minister*, deeming the matter sufficiently discussed, suggests that each member present express his opinion in a concise form, not in the shape of votes and resolutions, which are inherent in the Government, but by condensing their opinions for the purpose of ascertaining which is the prevailing opinion among the many expressed.

The Minister's suggestion was adopted, and the following résumé was the result: *Résumé of the opinions expressed by the general officers of the navy upon the question which the Minister addressed to them, in the nature of a consultation, on the 23d day of April, 1898, after explaining to said officers the situation of our naval forces and acquainting them with the last cablegrams from the Governor-General of Cuba and the commander in chief of the squadron at Cape Verde.*

#### QUESTION.

In view of the present state of war and the situation of our naval forces in Europe and at Cape Verde, what orders should be issued to said forces relative to their movements?

#### ANSWERS OF OFFICERS IN THE ORDER FROM THE JUNIOR TO THE SENIOR.

*Capt. Ramón Auñón y Villalón.* The four battle ships and three destroyers now at Cape Verde should start immediately for West Indian waters, and after the imperative necessity of defending the island of Puerto Rico has been pointed out to the admiral, he should be given entire freedom of action as to the route, port to be entered, and as to the cases and circumstances in which battles should be sought or eluded, according to the condition in which the ships arrive, the strength of the hostile forces, and the information which the admiral may acquire or which may be transmitted to him prior to his arrival.

The three torpedo boats now at Cape Verde should return to the Canaries when and as best they can under conditions of comparative safety. The ships *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, *Vitoria*, *Patriota*, and *Rápido*, the destroyers which are in Europe, and other available ships which may be purchased or fitted out should be concentrated at Cadiz and speedily equipped; but the final destiny of these vessels should not be determined *a priori*, but according to the situation of the war at the time when these vessels are ready.

*Capt. Joaquín Cincúnegui y Marco* expresses the same opinion as *Mr. Auñón*, adding that the cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should simultaneously be sent to the coasts of the United States in order to create alarm, call the enemy's attention to other points, compel him to divide his forces, and thereby enable the Spanish squadron to seek a port under more favorable conditions.

*Captain Joaquín Lazaga y Garay* maintains the opinion he expressed in the course of the debate; but if nevertheless the opinion in favor of the immediate departure of the squadron from Cape Verde should prevail, at least the *Alfonso XIII* and the destroyers now in Spain should be incorporated with the squadron, and simultaneously the cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should go to the United States coasts, provided they are in condition to do so.

*Capt. Antonio Terry y Rivas.* Same opinion as *Mr. Auñón*.

*Capt. José Gómez Imaz*, presents his answer in writing as follows: "The squadron assembled at Cape Verde should not go out immediately, but only when the *Carlos V*, *Pelayo*, and other available vessels are ready to reinforce the squadron, either directly or, preferably, by strategic maneuvers (similar to the one mentioned by

Captain Lazaga), so that the battle, if inevitable, may take place under more favorable circumstances. When the forces are united, Admiral Cervera should be permitted to operate with the freedom of action inherent in an admiral."

*Rear-Admiral José Guzmán y Galtier.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Rear-Admiral Eduardo Reinoso y Díez de Tejada.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Rear-Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermore.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Rear-Admiral Manuel Mozo y Díez-Robles* formulated his opinion in writing as follows: "If His Majesty's Government, for reasons of the country's highest interests, thinks best that the squadron should start immediately for Puerto Rico, the undersigned rear-admiral is of the same opinion. If not, he thinks that the squadron should be reenforced, because, like the admiral of the fleet, he is convinced that a disaster is impending, and such a disaster within sight of Puerto Rico would surely not contribute toward raising the spirits of the inhabitants of that island nor of the island of Cuba."

*Rear-Admiral Ismael Warleta y Ordovas.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Rear-Admiral Antonio de la Rocha y Aranda.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Rear-Admiral José Navarro y Fernández.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Rear Admiral Manuel Pasquín y de Juan.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Vice-Admiral Fernando Martínez de Espinosa.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Vice-Admiral Eduardo Butler y Anguita.* The four battle ships and three destroyers now at Cape Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, with instructions to accept or elude battle as may be necessary. But being convinced that in union is strength, he is of Captain Lazaga's opinion relative to the increase of the ships and reinforcement of the Cape Verde squadron by all available vessels, in such manner and at such point as the Government may deem expedient; but he believes that this can not be done without prejudice to the immediate departure for the West Indies.

*Vice-Admiral José Beránger y Ruiz de Apodaca* confirms what he has stated at the beginning of the debate, namely, that the squadron now at Cape Verde should under no circumstances return to the Canaries, and still less to Spain, but should start immediately for the West Indies, using the destroyers as scouts to procure information prior to going into port.

*Vice-Admiral Carlos Valcárcel y Ussel de Guimbarda.* Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

*Admiral Guillermo Chacón y Maldonado* thinks that the squadron now at Cape Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, before being compelled by international order to leave the neutral port where it is now. Its admiral should have full authority to proceed according to the requirements of war and the exigencies of national honor. The ships remaining in Spain should be concentrated at Cadiz and completed and equipped as speedily as possible, so as to be in readiness to comply instantly with any instructions which the Government may see fit to issue to them, as the situation of the country may demand.

In virtue whereof and by order of the minister of marine the foregoing proceedings have been drawn up and signed by the gentlemen taking part therein.

Segismundo Bermejo, Guillermo Chacón, Carlos Valcárcel, José María Beránger, Eduardo Butler, Fernando Martínez, Manuel Pasquín, José Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel de la Cámara, Eduardo Reinoso, José de Guzmán, José Gómez Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquín Lazaga, Joaquín Cincúnegui, Ramón Auñón.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 24, 1898.

Assembled general officers of the navy. Opinion is that the four battle ships and three destroyers should start immediately for West Indies. Have submitted this

opinion to His Majesty's Government, which ratifies it, ordering that your excellency be given complete freedom of action in proceeding to West Indies, trusting in your skill, knowledge, and valor. You can obtain information in West Indian waters before entering port in Puerto Rico, or in Cuba, if deemed more expedient in view of information received. You are given entire freedom of action as to route, port, and cases and circumstances in which battle should be sought or eluded. Fifteen thousand pounds are at your disposal in London. The torpedo boats are to return to Canaries with auxiliary vessels. You will prescribe their route. The United States flag is hostile.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In the pamphlet so many times referred to the last sentence of this telegram is omitted, which says: "I renew the enthusiastic greeting of the nation and Government."

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

Hope to finish coaling to-morrow. After turret *Oquendo* does not obey horizontal training. Have been trying in vain for two weeks to ascertain cause. We continue to work incessantly.

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ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE,

April 24, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The telegram ordering us to start has just arrived, and I have given orders to tranship from the *Cadiz* to these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the destroyers, which was on board the *Cadiz*. I intended to sail without finishing the provisioning of the ships, but since the *Cadiz* is to remain here I have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to sail to-morrow. As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken!

You see I was right when I told you that by the end of April the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* would not be finished; that the *Colón* would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; that we should not have the 5.5-inch ammunition for the new guns, etc. With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand the unanimous<sup>1</sup> decision of the general officers of the navy indicating disapprobation and censure of my opinions, which implies that some one of them should have relieved me.

I have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of 5,700 tons of coal for Puerto Rico, where it is expected to arrive on the 11th or 12th of May, but I am much afraid that it may fall into the hands of the enemy. It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval battle at will. The *Vizcaya*, on account of her stay in Havana and not having had her bottom cleaned for nine months, is nothing more than a buoy, and I can not abandon her.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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<sup>1</sup> At that time I thought the vote unanimous. It will be seen from the proceedings of the meeting of the general officers that this was not the case.



P. S., 27th.—I am almost in despair at the slowness of the *Cadiz*. She is well prepared for a voyage, but very poorly for loading and unloading. I think we can start to-morrow.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

Taking advantage of delay, am having boiler tubes of *Ariete* repaired. If ready shall take her along.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 24, 1898.

The Gaceta to-day publishes decree that neutral flag covers merchandise, except contraband of war. Neutral merchandise, except contraband of war, is not subject to confiscation under hostile flag. The Government reserves the right to issue letters of marque and reprisal, although for the present it will use only the auxiliary cruisers of the navy. In compliance with foregoing, warships and auxiliaries will exercise right of search on the high seas and in waters within jurisdiction of enemy.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

Have received urgent telegram ordering departure of squadron. To-morrow, after completing coaling, filling vacancies from crew of *Cadiz*, and transshipping armament of destroyers, will comply with your excellency's instructions.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 25, 1898.

Is it certain that *San Francisco* and *Amazonas* are at Madeira? Answer direct to captain of *Cadiz* in case I should start before reply is received.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 25, 1898.

The ships mentioned are at Hampton Roads. *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* believed to have sailed for Europe. I am told there are numerous spies among coal trimmers. Immediate departure imperative. Maintain absolute secrecy as to route.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 25, 1898.

Much swell prevents transshipping coal and supplies from *Cádiz* to-day.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 25, 1898.

Situation unchanged. Flying Squadron has not yet left Hampton Roads. The £15,000 will be deposited in England, and to that extent you can draw on London

for what you need. *San Juan, Puerto Rico, will be advised of signal agreed upon with pilot.*<sup>1</sup>

*The Spanish Minister at Lisbon (Ayerbe) to the Minister of State (Gullón).*

MADRID, April 26, 1898.

Minister foreign affairs asks me confidentially to inquire of your excellency whether you can state time that squadron will remain at Cape Verde. Same request made of Portuguese minister at Madrid in case United States should remonstrate, as stated in a newspaper to-day.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 26, 1898.

Work continues night and day shipping coal and cartridges of destroyers, but progresses slowly, as hatchways of trans-Atlantic do not permit rapid work; 400 tons still lacking. The battle ships have engines all ready, so as not to delay departure. Villamil follows with squadron.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 26, 1898.

In view of departure of fast hostile cruisers, of which you notify me, and slow speed of *Cadiz* and *San Francisco*, believe it expedient that you should issue instructions direct to commander of *Azor*, in charge of expedition.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 26, 1898.

Have given orders London send 5,000 tons of coal to Curaçao at disposal of your excellency and commandant of Porto Rico.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 27, 1898.

Transshipping progresses slowly. Am in despair, but impossible to work more rapidly. Three hundred tons of coal remain to be shipped.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 27, 1898.

I go out to-morrow evening. Before that I wish last reports of war and situation in Spain.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.*

MADRID, April 28, 1898.

Hope this will arrive in time. Havana and north of Cuba still blockaded. San Juan, Puerto Rico, so far free. No hostile ships in European waters. Quiet and harmony reigning in Spain. *Reiterate enthusiastic greeting of nation.*<sup>2</sup> Great activity displayed in fitting other ships.

<sup>1</sup>The sentence in *italics* is omitted in pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup>The sentence in *italics* is omitted in the pamphlet.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

In spite of every effort made working at night, can not go out until morning. Notwithstanding hard work can not do all that is desired. Turret of *Oquendo* ready.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

Am going north.<sup>1</sup>

[Confidential.]

*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).*

## CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Under date of the 20th I had the honor of sending you a report on the squadron up to that date. The unloading of the *San Francisco* was continued, working day and night, and completed on the 24th. As I told your excellency in a separate communication, the coal was 180 tons short of the 2,000 she was to bring, owing no doubt to the hurry with which the steamer shipped the coal and the loss from coal dropped in the water during the work of unloading, especially at night. This must also have been the case with the *Cadiz*. I purchased all the lubricating oil I was able to find at Cape Verde, and the ships are well supplied in that respect.

In this connection I wish to point out to your excellency the expediency of always accompanying supplies of coal with a corresponding quantity of lubricating material. On the evening of the 24th I received your telegraphic instructions to start for the West Indies and detach from the fleet the three torpedo boats and the *Ciudad de Cadiz*, and as these vessels were also short of coal, and I deemed it necessary that they should carry as large quantities as possible, I gave orders at once for them to take 625 tons of the coal on board the *Cadiz*, also engine supplies and provisions; and the 2.95-inch guns and ammunition of the three destroyers which are to follow me were transshipped.

Owing to the conditions of the hold of the *Cadiz*, the lack of transshipping appliances, and the heavy swell, this work was very arduous and slow; but I thought it was better to lose these few days than to reach our destination badly provisioned. The ships of the *Teresa* type leave with 1,080 tons each, and the *Colón* with 1,270 tons. The latter ship consumes considerably more coal than the others, owing to the type of her boilers. The destroyers carry about 140 tons each, which is 34 in excess of their bunker capacity. With this supply they have theoretically an approximate radius of action of 2,800 miles at the rate of 10 knots an hour. But I feel sure I shall have to resupply them before reaching our destination, in case the state of the sea should not permit me to tow them. The great weakness of their construction will have to be taken into consideration in this connection.

The *Vizcaya*, as I advised you, is very much fouled. During her ten days' run from Puerto Rico here she burned 200 tons more than the *Oquendo*. This is a weak point, but as I see no remedy for it at present, I contracted here for having her cleaned by divers, but this could only be done to a limited extent. I had the divers of the fleet clean her screws and sea cocks. Owing to pressure of time and lack of space on board the battle ships, already much overloaded, I left 1,500 spare boiler tubes of the destroyers with the *Cadiz*.

If your excellency thinks that the campaign will last long enough and that there will be chances for changing boiler tubes, I beg that you will send these wherever

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<sup>1</sup> The phrase agreed upon in telegram from minister dated April 21.

you may deem best. I also repeat my request for Bustamente torpedoes, which would surely be of great service. I take with me to-day the torpedoes brought by the *Ciudad de Cadiz* and *San Francisco*. The expedition, as I have already told your excellency, will go in command of the oldest lieutenant, Claudio Alvargonzález, commander of the *Azor*.

In a separate letter I confirm to your excellency the telegrams I have sent since my former communication. There only remains for me to tell you that there is nothing special to report relative to the crews of the fleet, and that they are all firmly resolved to sacrifice their lives in the fulfillment of their duty. May God grant our forces the success worthy of the justice of our cause.

On board flagship, St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 28, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).*

[Confidential.]

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Under this date I issue the following instructions to the commander of the first division of torpedo boats: "About 450 miles from the port of Fort de France, Martinique, you will, upon signal made, detach your division from the squadron, with the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*, and proceed to the last-named port, at the rate of 20 knots an hour, and will there obtain information on the points I have stated to you and return at once to communicate such information to me, bearing in mind that the squadron will run parallel to the southern point of Martinique at the rate of about 8 knots an hour. Being acquainted with my plans you will operate within the limits of the same with complete freedom of action.

"Signals of recognition during the night will be the letter R of the Morse alphabet, made with a searchlight, it being understood that the point is to be represented by maintaining the luminous ray for a certain length of time at an elevation of 45 degrees and flash it for a greater length of time at the same elevation. Between one R and the next, three horizontal movements are to be made with the luminous ray; the first, for instance, from left to right, the second from right to left, and the third again from left to right, or vice versa. The answer on the part of the flagship will be the letter A, made in the same manner, and three horizontal movements. To enable you to communicate speedily any information you may have, I inclose herewith a sheet of conventional signals to be used on this occasion only.

"You may also communicate information by using key A B O755. In the unlikely case that in the performance of this mission you should meet hostile forces, you will act as you may deem expedient, according to circumstances, bearing in mind that your principal mission is to communicate to me the information referred to." I have the honor of advising your excellency of the foregoing for your knowledge and approval.

On board *Teresa*, on the sea, May 1, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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AT SEA, May 5, 1898.

DEAR JUAN: To complete our collection of documents, I think proper that you should have the inclosed copy of a telegram from Villamil to Sagasta. I forward this letter by two destroyers, which I am sending to Martinique in search of news. All is well on board and the spirit is excellent. We shall see what God has in store for us. The final

result is not doubtful, but if we could only start with a good lucky stroke. God be with us. Good-bye. Regards to your family, etc.

PASCUAL.

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[Telegram.—To be deciphered by naval key.—Key OD 4393.]

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

PRÁXEDES SAGASTA:

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that, while as seamen we are all ready to die with honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless for the termination of the war if the representations repeatedly made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into consideration.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

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[Private.]

*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).*

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: As I had the honor of advising your excellency in my communication of the 28th ultimo, dated at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, I left that port on the day following with the four battle ships and three destroyers, leaving instructions behind for the departure of the three torpedo boats and the steamers *Cadiz* and *San Francisco*. Upon starting I issued to the second in command and the captains of the ships certain instructions, of which I herewith inclose a copy, as also of my address to the crews, which was read to them after we had left the harbor and received with great enthusiasm by all.

After mature consideration and in view of the wide scope of the instructions received and the unusual situation in which these forces will be placed, I formulated a plan (which I did not announce until after we had left) of shaping my course for Fort de France, Martinique, there to obtain information, and, if possible, coal and provisions, which would permit me greater freedom of action. To that end I shall detach to-morrow morning, about 470 miles from the port referred to, the *Terror* and *Furor*, under the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, who will take with him this letter and the following cipher telegram:

"All well in the squadron. Spirit excellent. Villaamil is to obtain information on which the future operations of the squadron will depend. Five hundred and seventy thousand pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board and those deposited in London amount to 675,000. I do not wish to exhaust resources completely. It is therefore necessary to increase credit."

In confirming this telegram I have the honor of impressing upon your excellency the necessity of increasing the credit placed at my disposal, so that these crews who have received only a small advance for their families and for messes may get their pay for May, which they would already have received if they were in Spain. So far our voyage has progressed without anything worthy of mention. We have encountered fair weather, as is usual in this season and latitude. Although with some misgivings, I had the three destroyers taken in tow the day of our departure, and started out at the rate of 10 knots an hour.

As I feared that these frail vessels might be injured by yawing, I had the speed

reduced to 7.2 knots, and we continued at that rate until yesterday, when I increased it to 8 knots. In doing this I have taken into consideration not only the trouble and delay it would cause if we had to recalc them on the sea before reaching our destination, but also the advantage of their crews arriving fresh and in condition to render services at once and the saving of coal by the battle ships at this rate of speed.

I also inclose herewith copy of a proclamation, addressed principally to the subaltern classes, and which I distribute to the ships to-day, embodying instructions which I have drawn up for the exercise of the right of search; also copy of the instructions which I gave to Villamil. I can tell nothing as yet as to my future plans. I only repeat that I place my trust in God, and being animated by the most ardent desire to serve my country I shall do so to the best of my ability and strength.

On board the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, on the sea, 14° 42' north latitude and 44° 26' west longitude, May 8, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

#### INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO.

##### CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Under date of April 27 last, I issued the following instructions to the captains of the ships of this squadron:

During the voyage the squadron will proceed in the order and at the respective distances indicated in sketch No. 1, hereto annexed.

(The sketch referred to as No. 1 shows the squadron forming a square, the length of the side of which being 5 cables, with the *Teresa* at the forward left-hand corner, the *Vizcaya* in the center of the square, the *Colón* at the forward right-hand corner. Two of the torpedo boats fill the remaining corners of the square, and the third torpedo boat is in line with them, but 5 cables on the left flank of the square. The *Oquendo's* station is on the left flank of the square midway between the *Teresa* and the third torpedo boat.)

"The above order will be adopted immediately upon starting, without further signal, but subject to the provisions of evolution No. 15 (for order with ships dispersed) of the Tactical Evolutions, which are to remain in force. This order has been adopted so that each destroyer may be in easy contact with the battle ship to which she is assigned. When so ordered (which will probably not be the case until near destination or in sight of the enemy) the formation shown in sketch No. 2 will be adopted; that is to say, the battleships in line ahead, with the *Teresa* leading and the *Vizcaya* forming the rear, at the distances indicated, and the destroyers in another line ahead, each destroyer between two battle ships, observing between themselves the same distances as the latter, and the two lines 6 cables apart, unless otherwise ordered.

(Sketch No. 2 shows the ships in double column, the left column consisting of the *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, *Colón*, and *Vizcaya*, and the right column consisting of the three torpedo boats.)

"When this order in line ahead is adopted, the commander of the division of destroyers will go on board one of them, and if it should become necessary to fight he will remove the destroyers to a distance, out of the range of hostile projectiles, if possible, closely observing the phases of the battle for the purpose of descending upon the enemy when a favorable opportunity offers.

"The commander of the division is given entire freedom of movements, as also the captains, in case for some reason or other they can not be directed by their commander in chief, who enjoins each one of them not to allow their zeal to lead them into firing before the proper time. For passing from the order of the voyage to the order of line ahead, evolutions Nos. 10 and 11 of the Instructions will be observed, it being understood that the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* will form one group and the *Colón* and *Vizcaya* another.

"The destroyers, in a countermovement, will follow the movements of the head of the line. If signal Z 96 is made (take in tow, etc.), the battle ships will gradually slow down, after hoisting pennant Z, to the slowest speed (unless otherwise instructed), and each destroyer will proceed at once to take the tow of her respective battle ship. When the flagship orders the destroyers to be supplied with provisions, she will make the signal Q 02, and the destroyers will maneuver accordingly, after hoisting pennant of execution.

"If the speed is to be moderated, it will be indicated by signals, but the captains of the battle ships are authorized to do so without signal, if, in their opinion, it should become necessary. If the destroyers themselves ask for provisions, they will make signal Q 11, and with that signal hoisted they will at once stand for their respective battle ships. If water is wanted in place of provisions, signals Q 61 and Q 65, respectively, will be made, and in case of coal the signals will be J 76 and J 84. When standing inshore, the order of occupations of the crews will be changed as follows:

"1. The reveille will be sounded early enough so that all the men can be at quarters and the ship in battle trim one hour before sunrise, and everything will remain in this condition until full daylight and until it has been ascertained, after careful reconnoitering, that a surprise is improbable.

"2. The crews will then breakfast.

"3. After breakfast such exercises will be had as may be deemed necessary for a desired length of time, and the different apparatus which it may be necessary to use in battle shall be carefully examined.

"4. The men will then rest until 10 o'clock, at which time the cleaning shall take place.

"5. After dinner the men will rest until 2 or 3, after which such work as the ship may require will be done. Supper at 6 o'clock, and immediately after supper clearing for action, everything being left in position for battle as far as it involves no risk. The partitions of the bunks shall remain in position and the bunks made up, but without the blankets, as each man will have his own, while one bunk serves for two.

"These instructions shall go into effect once for all upon signal A5 2 being made (hang out nets, etc.).

"I have the honor of advising you of the foregoing for your information and approval.

"Yours, etc.,

"PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD MARIA TERESA, *On the Sea, May 8, 1898.*"

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

MARTINIQUE, *May 12, 1898.*

Squadron arrived safely. Spirit excellent. Villamil is to obtain information on which the future operations will depend. *Five hundred and seventy thousand pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board and those deposited in London amount to 675,000. I do not wish to exhaust resources completely. It is therefore necessary to increase the credit.*<sup>1</sup>

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.*<sup>2</sup>

MADRID, *May 12, 1898.*

Government is pleased to hear of your arrival at Martinique. Nothing new in the Peninsula. Telegram received to-day announcing attack San Juan, Puerto Rico, by hostile fleet composed of *New York, Indiana, Terror, Puritan*, two cruisers, one torpedo

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<sup>1</sup>The part in *italics* is omitted in the pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup>I did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I suspected the last one at Santiago de Cuba.

boat, and two colliers. Island of Puerto Rico is watched by auxiliaries *Paris* and *New York*. Admiral at Havana says four hostile ships in sight yesterday, one at Mantanzas and several off Cienfuegos. News of bombardment of Cardenas by a battle ship, monitor, and another vessel; enemy repulsed.

Credit increased; another £15,000 on same house London. Steamer *Alicante* must have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer with 3,000 tons is to make that harbor under orders of captain of *Alicante*. Both vessels at your disposal.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.<sup>1</sup>*

MADRID, May 12, 1898.

According to late information battle ship *Oregon*, accompanied by *Marietta* and another similar ship, are on the way from Rio Janeiro to West Indies.

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*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.<sup>1</sup>*

MADRID, May 12, 1898.

Situation changed since your departure. Your instructions amplified so that if you do not believe that your squadron can operate there successfully may return to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt and indicate decision.

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PROCEEDINGS.

[Document No. 2, referred to, p. 114.]

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, being assembled in the admiral's cabin on the 12th day of May, the admiral acquainted them with the information obtained on the day previous at Fort de France by the commander of the torpedo-boat division.

Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is extremely critical, owing to the scant supply of coal, the governor of Martinique having refused to give aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there is no coal in San Juan, nor probably at Santiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of the destroyers, those of the *Terror* being practically unserviceable, so that it became necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await orders from the Government, these officers seeing no other solution—on penalty of placing the squadron in a position where it will be unable to move and will hence become an easy prey for the enemy—except to go to Curaçao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced by the minister of marine in his telegram of April 26.

In witness whereof they sign the foregoing, on the sea, off Fort de France, Martinique.

PASCUAL CERVERA.  
JOSÉ DE PAREDES.  
EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.  
JUAN B. LAZAGA.  
ANTONIO EULATE.  
VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.  
JOAQUÍN BUSTAMENTE.  
FERNANDO VILLAMIL.

A true copy:

CERVERA.

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<sup>1</sup>I did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I suspected the last one at Santiago de Cuba.



*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CURAÇAO, May 14, 1898.

After consulting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty-eight hours.

*The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).*

HAVANA, May 14, 1898.

I beg your excellency that you will tell me truly whether the squadron is coming. Telegrams denying this are arriving and I stop them on the way. I must positively know the truth, so as to be able to act accordingly. I assure your excellency that absolutely no one besides myself shall know your reply.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curaçao.<sup>1</sup>*

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

Your telegram received. Transatlantic *Alicante* anchored at Martinique (with coal)<sup>2</sup> has been ordered to leave immediately for Curaçao. If you can not wait, telegraph immediately to captain (of *Terror*) where you want the coal. In view of your going to Martinique, steamer sent to Curaçao was ordered to go to Martinique. Do not know whether latter has arrived.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curaçao.<sup>3</sup>*

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

If you can not await trans-Atlantic *Alicante* leave orders at Curaçao, so that said steamer may go immediately upon arrival wherever you order; likewise English steamer *Quickhand*, which also carries coal.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curaçao.<sup>3</sup>*

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

Our minister from Toronto communicates to-day, 15th, the following telegram: "It is reported that hostile squadron under command of Sampson was at Puerto Plata yesterday."

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the First Commandant Puerto Rico (Vallarino).*

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

Use every means possible to get to Admiral of squadron, who is at Curaçao, the

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I received it.

<sup>2</sup> The words in parentheses did not appear in the telegram as received.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I received it.

telegrams you have for him, as also information on situation hostile squadron, and arrange for immediate departure of English steamer *Roath*, if she has coal on board for squadron.<sup>1</sup>

[Confidential.]

*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON.

HONORED SIR: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on the sea, your excellency knows of the few incidents of our monotonous voyage across the Atlantic, during which I sacrificed everything in order that our frail torpedo-boat destroyers might arrive fresh and in condition to render useful service. But my efforts were in vain, for hardly had the *Furor* and *Terror* been made for twenty-four hours to maintain two-thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter became disabled, putting us to the necessity of losing still further time, and finally leaving the *Terror* in the neutral port of Fort de France in the island of Martinique.

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked "Document No. 1," will give your excellency further details as to what has occurred. It was a great and very unpleasant surprise to me when I saw our two destroyers at day-break of the 11th, the *Terror* nothing but a buoy, and the *Furor* guarding her, so that she might not be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being seen by the squadron. When we reached her I took her in tow, and we had to proceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the destroyer no longer had the protection of the swifter with which the commander of the flotilla had provided her.

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to a ship under very efficient command, and with an engineer in chief who enjoys the highest reputation. It only proves the frailness of these ships. They have another defect, almost worse, namely, the temperature which develops in them and which is unbearable for all, but especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently overcome by the heat.

The commander of the flotilla, who, as your excellency is aware, went to Martinique in search of information, went out with the *Furor* at daybreak of the 11th, and at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and, among other obstacles encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile cruiser. The commander, Captain Villamil, has once more demonstrated in this enterprise the rare intelligence, energy, and presence of mind with which he is gifted. The information he brought me, in answer to the questions I gave him upon trusting the mission to him, is as follows: That the hostile ships are blockading the western part of Cuba, from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, with the nucleus of their fleet; that just now, according to secret information which, however, is not entirely reliable, they are off San Juan de Puerto Rico, with their Admiral, and bombarded the capital on the 11th; that San Juan appears to be blockaded and Santiago free; that two of the enemy's auxiliary cruisers, the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*, are at Guadeloupe and Martinique, respectively; that the Americans have taken possession of Puerto Plata and, it is believed, also of Samana; that the war of insurrection in Cuba is still going on, and the last news is of a fierce battle at Sierra Maestra; that Spain is passing through a ministerial crisis; that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique, but that we could get provisions there; and finally, that there was no special news from the far East.

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great deal of news; among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the Philippines, which, glorious though it may be, is nevertheless a great disaster. In view of the very serious

<sup>1</sup>I did not know of this telegram until long after my return to Spain.

news, and although my opinions on the subject have been manifested (too frankly, perhaps) in my correspondence with the Government, by telegrams as well as official letters, and in my confidential communications to the minister of marine, I considered it my duty to assemble the captains and second in command of the squadron, whom I acquainted with the situation and consulted as to what, in their opinion, was best to be done.

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there was no advantage in going to Martinique, since we would gain nothing thereby and only consume coal. To go to San Juan would be madness, as we would only be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. And as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de Cuba, with the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers would probably not be able to withstand the trip, it was the unanimous opinion of the officers that we should go to Curaçao in search of the coal which was promised us by telegram of April 26. Proceedings were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which, marked "Document No. 2," accompanies this letter.<sup>1</sup> As I was of the same opinion, we proceeded to that island, adopting at first a wrong course in the direction of Santo Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique. Permit me here to make a few observations to explain and justify my operations.

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our comrades in the Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I take pleasure in expressing to them from here my enthusiasm and admiration. But is there any practical result in such sacrifice? Evidently not, and from pitting vessels like the *Castilla* and *Christina* against modern ships no other result than the one obtained can possibly be expected. The result will always be the same where there is great disparity between the opposing forces, whether in the number of ships, their efficiency, or the stores they carry.

This painful result therefore justifies the crude ideas I have expressed in my correspondence above referred to, upon which I insist no further, as I do not want to be a bore, which is always a bad thing, especially when addressing a superior. I therefore proceed with the report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Martinique to those of Curaçao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o'clock a. m. of the 14th, about 5 miles from Little Curaçao, I gave orders to the destroyers to enter the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the entrance. The *Plutón* signaled: "Awaiting permission of governor." The squadron stopped and soon after the *Plutón* signaled that only two ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by the pilot, who arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I selected the *Teresa* and *Vizcaya*, whose coal supply was lower than that of the others. I gave the information asked for, stating that each ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went back.

I gave instructions that the *Furor* should be recoaled from the *Colón*, and that the latter ship, together with the *Oquendo* and *Plutón*, should remain outside. The pilot returned, accompanied by the Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the harbor must be limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after which I had an interview with the governor, who told me that this was a necessity imposed upon his Government by both belligerents. I accepted the 600 tons of coal, which was all that could be had in the town, and ordered the purchase of provisions so as to supply each ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin boy.

At 5 o'clock p. m. I dispatched to your excellency the following cipher message, which I hereby confirm: "After consulting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must

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<sup>1</sup> The document referred to is given on a preceding page.

see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty-eight hours."

I tell your excellency nothing of my plans, as I do not wish to intrust them to paper, and furthermore, when this letter reaches you, you will certainly have received telegraphic news from me. The coaling proceeds slowly owing to lack of means for shipping it, but I intend to go out by any means this evening, no matter what quantity I may have on board, for while the question of coal is of the utmost importance to me, I do not want to spend another night with the squadron divided.

On board *Infanta Maria Teresa*, St. Ann Harbor, Curaçao, May 15, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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DOCUMENT REFERRED TO (NO. 1).

HONORED SIR: Agreeable to the orders of your excellency, we left the squadron on the morning of the 9th instant, together with the *Furor*, having on board the commander in chief of the division. We had three boilers in operation, and proceeded at the rate of 18 knots. About 1.30 several tubes of the forward boilers burst. They were therefore disconnected and the fires put out. We lighted the fourth boiler, and as soon as the injured boilers were cold we examined them and proceeded to repair No. 2, which had suffered the least.

By daylight the injured tubes had been stopped up, the fire was relighted, and by 8.30 a. m. we had steam up. By 10.30 the three boilers had neither water nor steam, the fires were put out, and we called the *Furor* to take us in tow. After reconnoitering, we commenced once more to repair No. 2, and had steam up by 7 o'clock a. m., when we stood for the squadron, which was sighted at that moment. In conformity with my duty, I have the honor of reporting the foregoing to your excellency for your information.

Yours, etc.,

FRANCISCO DE LA ROCHA.

ON BOARD *TERROR*, *On the Sea*, May 11, 1898.

A true copy.

JOAQUIN BUSTAMENTE,  
Chief of Staff.

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[Confidential.]

*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).*

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: I believe it to be my duty, in view of the change of government, to call your excellency's attention to the main deficiencies with which this squadron went out to war. The principal deficiency, not of this ship alone, but of the whole squadron, is in the lack of reliable 5.5-inch ammunition, of which all the ships together have only about 620 rounds out of the whole 3,000. Moreover, the *Vizcaya* has two 5.5-inch guns and the *Oquendo* one which can not be relied upon and which had been ordered to be changed for others. Among the fuses there are a large number which are not safe, owing to defects of original construction.

The squadron has not a single one of the 60 Bustamante torpedoes which it was to have. The *Colón* does not have her heavy guns, nor apparatus for re-forming and charging the cartridge cases of the 5.9 and 4.7 inch guns. The *Vizcaya* has not been cleaned since July, and she has consequently lost her speed to such an extent that she can not now make more than 13 or 14 knots an hour. By reason of this fact the squadron has lost the only advantage which it might have had over the hostile fleet,

for so important a ship can not be abandoned. And here I close, not because there are not many other things, but because they are of less importance in connection with the campaign, and it is not my object to trouble your excellency, but only to acquaint you with the true condition of our forces.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD TERESA, *St. Ann, Curaçao, May 15, 1898.*

*The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).*

HAVANA, *May 17, 1898.*

(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.)

Have asked commandant navy whether he has received news on situation of our squadron. He tells me received from San Juan confidential cipher message saying that telegram has been sent to commander in chief of squadron at Fort de France that his instructions are amplified, and if he can not operate there successfully may return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here would be wholly untenable, and I could not prevent bloody revolution in this capital and whole island, feelings being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of our squadron. Therefore, beg your excellency to tell me whether it is true that order has been issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, and if so does Government realize the significance of such a decision, which might be the cause of a bloody page staining our history, and of final loss of this island and the honor of Spain? If our squadron is defeated, it would increase here determination to vanquish or die; but if it flees, panic and revolution are certain.

*The Governor-General, Puerto Rico (Macías), to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).*

PUERTO RICO, *May 18, 1898.*

Order for squadron to return to Peninsula will end enthusiasm and high spirit in island. Inhabitants will say Spain abandons them and situation may become very critical. Consider it my sacred duty to tell you so.

*The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).*

HAVANA, *May 19, 1898—9 a. m.*

Our squadron has just entered Santiago de Cuba. Congratulate its Admiral on his arrival and skillful voyage.

*The Minister of State (Gullón) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).*

MINISTRY OF STATE.

HONORED SIR: The Spanish minister at Caracas, in dispatch No. 79, dated May 18, advises this ministry as follows:

"On Friday, the 13th instant, a report was circulated in this city that the Spanish squadron was in the port of Higuerote, in this Republic. The origin of the rumor could not be ascertained because, owing to the revolution which is still devastating this country, there is no telegraphic communication with that point. Troubled by this report, I received on Saturday, the 14th, a telegram from our intelligent and energetic vice-consul in charge of the Spanish consulate at Curaçao, Mr. Morris E. Curiel, telling me that the Spanish squadron, composed of six ships, was sighted in that harbor. I telegraphed immediately, asking for frequent information, and at

the same time dispatched to your excellency a cipher telegram as follows, '[Spanish] squadron [in] sight to-day [off] Curaçao,' in order that the Government might know as early as possible the whereabouts of the squadron.

Mr. Morris telegraphed me the same day, the 14th, at 6.45 p. m., that the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and *Vizcaya* had entered the harbor, the *Oquendo*, *Cristóbal Colón*, and destroyers *Plutón* and *Furor* remaining outside. Sunday, the 15th, I learned that the squadron was in search of coal, and that 500 tons, all there was in that port, had been sold it by Captain Smith, United States consul. The latter being severely reprimanded by the United States minister here, replied that the coal did not belong to him, but to a friend, upon whom he had prevailed not to sell any more than had already been shipped at the time he made complaint to him, namely, about 300 tons.

I am waiting for the mail from Curaçao to confirm or correct this and other information which I have received and from which it would appear that the squadron purchased a large amount of provisions and that the destroyers had their bunkers full of coal. I was also informed that the United States minister had telegraphed to Washington and to the American dispatch boat at St. Thomas that the United States fleet was awaiting ours in Mona Passage, between Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. I at once telegraphed to Curaçao, and the consul answered at 5.30 p. m. that he had given warning and that the squadron was going out.

"As I knew that the United States fleet was expected at Curaçao, where two telegrams have been waiting for Admiral Sampson since the 13th, and knowing further that the French Cable Company has telegraphed its agents at La Guayra, Puerto Cabello, and Curaçao, opening unlimited credits to said admiral for telegraphing purposes, I sent a trustworthy person with precise instructions to our consul at La Guayra, Mr. Perera, and urged him to have one of the pilots of the port, all of whom happened to be Spanish, in readiness in case our squadron should be sighted, to start immediately and notify Admiral Cervera of all this, as also of the fact that there is coal available in the port of Guanta, near Barcelona, in this Republic.

"By secret information I learned that same day, the 15th, that the correspondent here of the New York Herald had received a telegram from that paper asking him to telegraph whether the Spanish squadron was at Barranquilla, United States of Colombia, which shows that it is believed in the United States that our ships are off the Leeward Islands and Colon. All this strictly confidential information I have received from different persons who are desirous of proving to me their loyalty to Spain, and none of this information has cost this legation a single cent. On the 16th the consul at Curaçao telegraphed me that the Spanish vice-consul at Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo, had informed him of the arrival of the United States fleet.

"On the same day I dispatched to you a cipher telegram, saying: 'Spanish squadron composed (of) six ships has obtained (at) Curaçao only 300 tons (of) coal, weighing anchor yesterday, notified by me (that) United States fleet is awaiting (them) in Mona Passage.' 'United States fleet is in Puerto Plata (and is) expected (at) Curaçao and Venezuela. Coal available at Guanta.'

"To-day the consul at Curaçao has transmitted to me a telegram from our consul at Santo Domingo in key 74, and as I do not have this it was deciphered by the secretary of the Spanish legation, who, fortunately, has an excellent knowledge of the cipher keys of your ministry. The telegram said: 'Hostile fleet went out Saturday Samana.' I do not know whether this telegram has reference to a movement prior to the arrival of said fleet at Puerto Plata, Monday the 16th. I have also received a telegram from the Governor-General of Puerto Rico, asking me whether I had cipher key 74, and, trusting to the cryptographic knowledge of the secretary of this legation, Mr. Mariategui, I answered that I had.

"The consul at Curaçao has received and forwarded to me a telegram from the commandant-general at Havana, Rear-Admiral Manterola, and one from the commandant-general of Puerto Rico, one yesterday and the other to-day, both in the naval key, which neither he nor I have been able to make out. I have asked both

to telegraph to me in the key of the ministry of state, but have so far received no reply.

"About a week ago a United States officer arrived here as military attaché to the legation, and he and his minister are working hard, the former making frequent trips to the port of La Guaira. But I do not lose sight of them, and shall do whatever I can to frustrate their plans."

Obedient to royal order from the minister of state, I transmit the above to your excellency, for your information and to such ends as may be deemed expedient.

Palace, June 17, 1898.

L. POLO DE BERNABÉ,<sup>1</sup>  
Assistant Secretary.

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Captain of the Terror, at Martinique, and Naval Commandant at Santiago de Cuba.*<sup>2</sup>

MADRID, May 19, 1898.

If possible to communicate with Admiral our squadron, notify him that Government cancels telegram as to return to Spain.

---

*The Spanish Minister at The Hague to the Minister of State (Gullón).*<sup>3</sup>

THE HAGUE, May 19, 1898.

Minister plenipotentiary United States has called attention Dutch Government to quantity of coal furnished Spanish squadron at Curaçao, believing it to be more than 400 tons. Has insisted on the island not being converted into a base of operations.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898.

The squadron entered the harbor this morning. Imperative to clean engines and boilers, which will make it necessary for me to remain here several days. Moreover, I need more coal than I have.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898.

Have cast anchor to-day in this harbor, whence whole squadron sends you greeting, desirous of cooperating in the defense of the country.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of the Navy-Yard (Manterola).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898.

Cast anchor in this harbor this morning, and have the pleasure of placing myself at your disposal.

---

<sup>1</sup> I did not learn of this communication and three preceding telegrams until long after my return to Spain.

<sup>2</sup> I learned of this telegram at Santiago on the 20th.

<sup>3</sup> I did not know of this telegram until long after my return to Spain.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago de Cuba.*

MADRID, May 19, 1898.

Ministry congratulates your excellency and squadron on skillful maneuver. Have ordered commandant navy-yard to supply you with whatever you require. Act in cooperation with the Governor-General and give me frequent news.

*Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to General Linares, Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 19, 1898.

Kindly advise Admiral Cervera that I congratulate him on safe arrival and skillful voyage, and offer him my cooperation in everything. Need hardly tell your excellency that I am always at your service. My last information is: Sampson's fleet at Samana and Puerto Plata. Flying Squadron on the way from Charleston to Key West, where it is expected to arrive to-day.

*The Commandant Navy-Yard, Havana (Manterola), to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 19, 1898.

Your telegram received. Learning of your arrival through commandant, navy, hasten to congratulate you in name of all on safe arrival. From information received United States squadron of evolution was to sail for Key West, unite with Sampson's, and seek ours. A transport, two cruisers, and a gunboat are blockading this harbor.

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).<sup>1</sup>*

HAVANA, May 20, 1898.

As I notified your excellency, Cervera's squadron arrived at Santiago minus *Terror*, which was left at Martinique with *Alicante*, both blockaded by hostile ships. Squadron without provisions and coal. Taking coal at Santiago where it can not remain long; danger of being blockaded and entirely cut off; resources of place limited. If *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, and torpedo-boat flotilla had come with them might attempt some action and lend powerful assistance in defense of islands. But reduced as it is, squadron must elude encounter and confine itself to maneuvers which will not compromise it and which can not have great results. Has brought no transports with coal and provisions which would have helped so much, nor weapons and ammunition.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 20, 1898.

Intend to refit ships in shortest possible time, because, in my opinion, Santiago will soon be in difficult situation if it does not receive aid.

<sup>1</sup> I learned of this telegram long after my return to Spain.



*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 20, 1898.

It is reported that island of Cuba will be invaded latter part of next week by 28,000 men. Hostile ships stationed south of Santiago and St. Thomas and near Martinique to capture *Terror* and *Alicante*. (The enemy supposes defensive power of Puerto Rico very slight.)<sup>1</sup>

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*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 20, 1898.

Necessary to notify admiral of squadron that English steamer with 3,000 Cardiff coal leaves for Curaçao to-day, by superior order, carrying urgent telegram from minister marine. Consul St. Thomas says hostile squadron, reenforced by another Key West, has gone out to meet ours in direction Martinique.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 20, 1898.

These ships must have engines repaired. I do not know composition of hostile squadrons nor distribution of their other naval forces. Would be grateful to you for this information. Also beg you will advise me whether 5.5-inch ammunition and other stores have been received for this squadron, and whether Oienfuegos has resources and communication by land with Havana. Deem it absolutely necessary to send coal and large quantity provisions here at once. We are very grateful to your excellency and personnel of navy-yard for congratulations.

---

*The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

FORT DE FRANCE, May 20, 1898.

Repair of boilers completed.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of the Terror.*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 20, 1898.

Congratulate you on repairing boilers. When you can proceed to Puerto Rico in comparative safety, start. But I understand at present hostile ships stationed at St. Thomas to capture you and *Alicante*. Notify *Alicante*.

---

<sup>1</sup> The sentence in parentheses was not transmitted to Santiago.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Your telegram received. Advise me whether you have received sufficient coal *and whether you have news of Terror*.<sup>1</sup> Thirty thousand pounds at your disposal in London.

---

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Our transports in Martinique and Puerto Rico are urged to carry coal to you and to the naval officer assigned to Kingston, Jamaica, who is instructed to place himself under your orders.

---

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Received information that Sampson's fleet left Key West last night.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898.

Congratulate your excellency on elevation to ministry, of which we hope great results. Santiago de Cuba very short of provisions, and if it does not receive any it must succumb. As this squadron is greatly inferior to American, we can not accept decisive battle, which would mean certain defeat, and if we are blockaded before we finish taking coal, which is (scarce) *difficult*,<sup>2</sup> we shall succumb with the city. If provisions are received, resistance will be possible as long as they last.

---

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Her Majesty charges me to congratulate your excellency in her name on your skill and sends greeting to crews of squadron, whose movements she follows with interest.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898.

Received telegram from *Terror* yesterday, notifying me boilers repaired. Have instructed her to go to Puerto Rico if opportunity offers, notifying her that enemies are at present watching for her.

---

<sup>1</sup> The part in *italics* omitted in pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup> In the pamphlet the word in *italics* is omitted and the word in parentheses, which does not occur in the original, is inserted.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898.

Beg your excellency will express to Her Majesty our profound gratitude and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction shown us.

---

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

Tell Admiral Cervera that English ship with coal has left Curaçao for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions.

---

*Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

Guantanamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have Bustamente torpedoes; latter place doubtful. Cienfuegos and Havana, electric torpedoes.

---

*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

Cienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

---

*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Minneapolis*, *Columbia*, *New York*, *Indiana*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon*. Two of 6,000 tons, *Texas* and *Puritan*, expected in the near future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted off Havana and Cienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and transports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are off the harbor cruiser *New York*, *Indiana*, *Puritan*, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats. Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-inch guns, twenty-five rounds for 11-inch, three boxes fuses for *Vizcaya*. On April 1 I reported to minister

in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty-five vessels composing this fleet thirty-two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless.

"Engines of *Alfonso XII* totally disabled. *Reina Mercedes*, seven of the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of *Marqués de la Enseñada*, *Isabel II*, and *Venadito*, the latter is the only one in condition to put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. *Magallanes* can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which constitutes their principal defense. Transport *Legazpi*, highest speed 7 knots. Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the *Reina Mercedes* will give an idea of what my forces are. *Infanta Isabel* and *Marqués de la Enseñada* will soon be ready. Torpedo gunboats *Martín A. Pinzón*, *Nueva España*, *Marqués de Molins*, and *Vicente Y. Pinzón* can be used, or at least are able to move. Provisions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency's command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores probably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and torpedo-boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have, we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private, and the fastest one we have, the *Santo Domingo*, is in dock. I await your answer.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898.

Have been compelled to engage firemen to increase complements inadequate for this service.

---

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 22, 1898

I repeat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche, £15,000.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898.

We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely necessary. We are taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers;

but if collier arrives from Curaçao we can refill, and there will be some left over. Sent you information about *Terror* by telegraph yesterday.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898.

Have received your cipher telegram advising me of pitiful condition of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, as none were available except *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and a few destroyers and torpedo boats. *Pelayo* has not, I believe, her secondary battery installed. Possibly some of the trans-Atlantics purchased may come with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming here has been somewhat fortuitous; according to instructions I was to go to Puerto Rico. Do not believe convoys have been thought of at all, since I have always been told that I should find everything here. These ideas may perhaps have changed with ministerial crisis.

---

*Captain of Alicante (Genis) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

FORT DE FRANCE, May 22, 1898.

Marquis Comillas tells me to go to Santiago and leave coal. Captain of destroyer advises on the part of your excellency that hostile ships are stationed to capture me. Beg that you will give me instructions.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of Alicante (Genis).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898.

Do not go out for the present.

---

*The Commandant-General of Puerto Rico (Villarino) to the Commandant, Navy, Santiago de Cuba.*

SAN JUAN, May 22, 1898.

English steamer *Restormel*, 3,000 tons Cardiff coal for squadron, left Curaçao yesterday for Santiago. Speed, 7 knots.

---

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 23, 1898.

I approve increase of firemen. Coal left San Juan for Santiago. There are 3,000 tons at Cienfuegos. Hostile squadron, Admiral Schley, left Key West for south Cuba on night 20th, and afterwards Sampson's. It is believed [4] monitors and several cruisers watching Yucatan Channel. If trans-Atlantic *Alfonso XIII*, armed,

arrives with coal and provisions, you may, if desired, incorporate her in squadron. I notify commandant-general of navy-yard. If impossible to pass through channels, may go roundabout way or create diversion on hostile coast, but not considered necessary.

---

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Yesterday enemy reenforced blockading line to 21 vessels, among them 3 battle ships; to-day there are only 6; 3 battle ships off Cienfuegos.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

To-day 12 hostile ships off Cienfuegos.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Of the ships off Havana yesterday, the battle ship *Indiana*, cruiser *New York*, cruiser *Montgomery*, dispatch boat *Dolphin*, large gunboat *Wilmington*, and other cruisers have gone to windward.

---

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Since 10 o'clock this morning almost the entire horizon Havana free from hostile ships, only four insignificant gunboats remaining to windward. The others have gone out with course to windward.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Secret information from Montreal that Schley's fleet goes to south of Cuba (afterwards Sampson's), and that four monitors and several cruisers are watching Yucatan Channel. Nothing new from Puerto Rico. English cruiser with coal sailed yesterday from Curaçao for Santiago. Have already advised you of ships off Havana this evening.

---

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant Puerto Rico (Villarino).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 23, 1898.

The trans-Atlantic steamer is not to go out for the present.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 24, 1898.

Squadron being ready to leave anchorage in search of stores it needs, have assembled captains of ships, which are *unanimously*<sup>1</sup> of following opinion: In view maximum speed this squadron reduced to 14 knots, account of *Vizcaya* bottom fouled, lack of coal, location of hostile fleets, and condition of harbor, certain danger of sortie greater than advantages gained by reaching San Juan, *only* (near) harbor where we could go. Proceedings drawn up signed by me. Shall await more favorable opportunity. Meanwhile will get all possible supplies, and in conjunction with commander in chief of army *division* aid in defense of harbor and city. To supply city, necessary to run blockade with fast vessels 20 knots *at night*, after agreeing on day and hour to send (a boat) out of harbor (with) pilot and keep channel clear. Have instructed trans-Atlantic steamers Havana and Martinique not to go out because (according to information) would *certainly* be captured.

## PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo boat division having been convened by the admiral, assembled in the latter's cabin on the 24th day of May, 1898.

The Admiral acquainted the officers present with the information received since the preceding evening, from the Governor-General of the island, the commandant-general of the navy-yard, and Her Majesty's Government, to the effect that Admiral Schley's fleet had left Key West on the 20th instant, bound for the south of the island of Cuba, and that Admiral Sampson's fleet had been sighted off Cienfuegos yesterday. As these forces are each far superior to this squadron, and as the truth of such information was confirmed by the fact that four ships remained in front of the harbor entrance all day yesterday, the Admiral desired to hear the opinions of said officers as to what was best to be done by the squadron under the circumstances.

It had been decided yesterday that the best plan was to start at day-break for San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the necessary telegrams had been sent to detain there the collier and the trans-Atlantic steamer *Alfonso XIII*, which the Government had, by telegraph, placed at the disposal of the squadron.

Owing to the location of the hostile forces and their number and strength, it was unanimously considered impossible to carry out said plan, as the maximum speed of this squadron is calculated to be 14 knots, which is the speed of the *Vizcaya* as the result of the fouled condition of her bottom. Taking into consideration that the ships had not been able to get more than one-third of their coal supply, that the conditions of the harbor make it necessary for the sortie to be effected by the ships one by one, at slow speed, which might make it necessary for the first ship, or ships, that go out to return, though only for the

<sup>1</sup> Words and praises in *italics* are omitted in the pamphlet; those in parentheses were not in the telegram as dispatched.

purpose of reconnoitering, with a consequent loss of moral strength, all the officers present were of opinion that the certain danger of the squadron was much greater than the few advantages which might be derived from reaching the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico, and that it was therefore necessary to abandon this plan and remain at Santiago, refit as far as possible from the stores to be had here, and take advantage of the first good opportunity for leaving the harbor, at present blockaded by superior forces.

All the officers present were also of opinion that the present situation of the squadron compels it to remain in this harbor.

Pascual Cervera, José de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Víctor M. Concas, Fernando Villamil, Joaquín Bustamente, Antonio Eulate, Emelio Díaz Moreu.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 24, 1898.

Oregon has reached Key West. Flying Squadron proceeding to Santiago, where Sampson also intends to arrive to-morrow, unless notified of departure of Cervera's squadron. If latter does not go out, may be closed in.

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*The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera).*

FORT DE FRANCE, May 24, 1898.

I go out early to-morrow morning.

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[Private.]

ADVISORY BOARD (CENTRO CONSULTIVO) OF THE NAVY,  
Madrid, May 24, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I send you these few lines to express to you my best wishes on your arrival in Santiago Harbor with the squadron under your able command. I assure you I was very happy to know of your safety, as I had thought it unavoidable that you would meet one of the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, and as each of them is superior in strength to the squadron under your command, it was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be defeated and destroyed.

Thanks to your skillful seamanship and efficient management, and above all to Divine Providence, we do not have to lament to-day the lives of many victims and the loss of the best ships of our small navy.



Upon this I congratulate you with all my heart, as also the crews under your orders, and I pray that God may further be with you.

Keep well; give my love to your son Angel, and believe always in the affection of your devoted friend,

ANTONIO DE LA ROCHA.

MADRID (LA CONCEPCIÓN), *November 16, 1898.*

His Excellency ANTONIO DE LA ROCHA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Upon my return from the island of Cuba I received day before yesterday your affectionate letter of May 24, which I appreciate very much, and which has given me a great deal of pleasure, as it is a document of value to myself, first of all, but also to you and all the officers who at the meeting of general officers voted in favor of the squadron going to the West Indies.

I went to the ministry yesterday to thank you and talk with you of these matters, but did not find you and was sorry to hear of the cause of your absence. I therefore write to you, as it will be impossible for me to go to your house either to-day or to-morrow to express my sympathy and tell you what I think of your letter and what I expect to do with it. The letter is of the greatest importance to me, because your saying that you had thought it unavoidable that I would meet one of the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, and as each of them was far superior in strength to the squadron under my command, it was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be defeated and destroyed, shows that it was not my opinion alone, but that of my comrades, and it removes all doubt of the fact that we were forced on to certain destruction, and it is of the greatest importance to me to make this point clear.

For yourself and the comrades who voted with you the letter is of importance because, in showing that in spite of your belief that the squadron was going out to defeat, you voted that it should go out, it demonstrates that it was neither ignorance nor lack of consideration, but much higher motives that impelled you, and although I believe that such motives should not have altered your opinions, it is comforting to see in the service that spirit of sacrifice, even though the sacrifice had to be made by others than those who did the voting.

I have not told you what I intend to do; simply this, I am going to preserve your letter like a precious jewel and let its contents appear in my statement.

Reiterating to you my sympathy, I remain your affectionate friend and comrade,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

We are blockaded. I qualified our coming here as disastrous for interests of country. Events begin to show I was right. With disparity of forces any effective operation absolutely impossible. We have provisions for one month.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*MADRID, *May 25, 1898.*

Received your message A D 0391. I approve your determination and reiterate your freedom of action as well as confidence of Government. Squadron must not be sacrificed in vain. Am studying to attract hostile ships to their own coasts. We have no vessels 20 knots, but if you know of any you are authorized to take any steps to carry out operation you propose. Do you know whereabouts of destroyer *Furor*?<sup>1</sup>

[Urgent.]

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*HAVANA, *May 25, 1898.*

Private telegrams from the United States say it is intended to close in squadron Santiago. Entrance should be watched to prevent carrying out of this plan.

[Confidential.]

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army, Division of Santiago (Linares).*

HONORED SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hostile fleets, for which I thank you very much. It is much to be regretted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the fires lighted. But information received from the Government confirmed the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on the night of the 20th and that Sampson was following with his fleet, and for that reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously of opinion that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out.

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they would not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially in view

<sup>1</sup>This telegram, which is an answer to mine of the 24th, was completely omitted in the pamphlet.

of the rapid consumption of coal. For these reasons there is no other course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed yesterday, to defend the harbor and city in case an attempt should be made to force the entrance. The *Colón* is already at her post and the *Teresa* will be there shortly; the others will not be there until to-night or to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If another opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage of it, but as I can not hope with these scant forces to attempt any definite operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbor for another where we would also be blockaded.

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbor, which is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference because, not having been blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only effective service that can be expected of this small and poorly equipped squadron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his excellency the Captain-General, as the highest representative of the nation in this island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent inaction.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

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[Confidential.]

*The Commander in Chief of the Army division (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: I am in receipt of your favor in which you acknowledge the receipt of my former two letters and express the desire that his excellency the Captain-General of the island should be advised of the reasons which have kept your excellency from weighing anchor from this harbor with the squadron under your efficient command. I have transmitted this information to the Captain-General by cable, making accurate extracts from your letter. I have the honor of forwarding you herewith a copy of the telegram dispatched.

Yours, etc.

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

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[Copy of cablegram referred to.]

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

The CAPTAIN-GENERAL, *Havana:*

Have transmitted to Cervera information from your excellency of yesterday and this morning relative to location United States fleets.

His official answer for your information is, in substance, as follows: Regrets extremely not having gone out early yesterday morning. Opinion unanimous to remain, owing to direct information from Government that Schley's fleet had gone out night of 20th for Santiago, followed by Sampson. Scarcity of coal made it necessary to put out three-fifths of boilers. Lighting fires again and taking water would not permit going out before night, which he considers too late.

Decided to remain here for the present, changing anchoring place, putting ships in position to repulse enemy if he attempts to force entrance. Regrets bad luck brought him to this harbor lacking everything necessary, which he selected account of not being blockaded, believing abundantly supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Though subsequently blockaded, flattered himself with keeping busy greater part hostile fleet, only effective service he can render with small and poorly equipped squadron. Adds he will try to take advantage of opportunity for sortie, if possible, changing for another harbor where he will also be blockaded, being unable to attempt any other kind of operations. He makes the above explanations to you as the highest representative of nation, so that you may know causes of apparent inaction.

LINARES.

The above is a copy.

LINARES.

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[Extract.]

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, May 26, 1898.

An English steamer carrying coal our squadron appears to have been captured near Santiago yesterday. *Terror* eluded American ships at Martinique. Is now at San Juan.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, May 26, 1898.

Admiral Cervera decided to remain in Santiago for present, in view superiority enemy, lack of coal, and inadequate armament of ships. Report of another squadron fitting at Cadiz. If true, absolutely necessary to be accompanied by transports with provisions and coal, and the guns, small arms, and ammunition requested of your excellency.

---

*The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

MADRID, May 26, 1898.

Kindly transmit to commander army, Santiago (Linares), following telegram from minister war: "Advise me for how long you have provisions and whether you can receive any by land, indicating in that case to what nearest port they can be sent. Have asked Captain-General

whether city blockaded by land also, but he has not answered. I must know to take measures for provisioning. Let me know whether you have received war key to communicate with this ministry. Answer in that or through commander in chief squadron if you do not have key."

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunón).*

SANTIAGO, May 26, 1898.

Kindly transmit the following to the minister of war: "Santiago can hold out until middle July. Three hundred and fifty thousand rations used by personnel per month; 20,000 corn, 5 pounds each, for horses and mules. Guantanamo brigade provisioned until middle June; uses 200,000 rations for personnel, 9,000 corn for horses and cattle. Baracoa and Sagua Tanamo, ports northern coast, provisioned until end August, have garrisons 900 and 700 respectively; no horses or mules; also need drugs for hospitals, especially quinine and bismuth; men received April pay last year in January this year.

"Generals, captains, regular officers, nine months' pay due with extra allowances, three in one consignment received in bills not current here. Blockade by land broken by troops every time they go out, but rations can only be received at ports referred to for respective forces. Have not received key to communicate with your excellency. Making efforts to get for Santiago and Guantánamo two months' provisions from Halifax, Canada, and cattle from South American republics. Have no hopes they will succeed running blockade; very strict since arrival of squadron. Absolutely necessary to send sandals, 1,800 pair Baracoa, 1,400 Sagua Tanamo, 24,000 Santiago, and 16,000 Guantánamo.

"LINARES."

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.*

HAVANA, May 26, 1898.

Communicate to Admiral Cervera: "Have received your communication through General Linares. Thank you very much for your courtesy. It seems to me if I had been permitted assistance in case of such importance result might have been better, as no one better than I could have given you information on condition of island and location hostile fleets daily, which might have been of great service to you in carrying out your plans. But no one notified me of your route and points to be touched, and I could not communicate with your excellency, although I tried the 13th at San Juan de Puerto Rico, in case you should touch there, advising you of position hostile ships, as I have done since your arrival at Santiago.

"Regret with your excellency that these causes and inadequate armament ships have placed you in unenviable position. Great pity

you were not accompanied by fast trans-Atlantics with provisions and coal, which in my opinion you need most, since without them it will be impossible for you to attempt any operation, which your well-known skill and valor must surely make you wish for. Report of another squadron being ready at Cadiz, which might solve problem, but I doubt it, and if it also comes without coal and provisions better it should not come. In any event I have great confidence in you, and hope everything from your ability and patriotism. Your task, like mine, is very difficult, as we have to do it all with scant means. Always count on me and Linares, who is very efficient, and let us trust in God. Have received information arrival *Terror* at San Juan, eluding every difficulty."

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 26, 1898.

Kindly transmit minister war following: "In addition to former cable, I beg you will send 12,000 cotton suits Santiago, 7,000 Guan-tanamo, 1,000 Sagua Tanamo, with necessary underwear, shirts and drawers.

"LINARES."

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#### PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat flotilla, being convened by the Admiral, assembled in his cabin on the 26th day of May, 1898.

The Admiral acquainted the officers with recent information received relative to the movements of the hostile fleets, and asked for their opinions as to the expediency of going out that day, taking advantage of the bad weather prevailing. It was unanimously decided that the squadron should proceed to San Juan, and orders were issued to spread the fires of all the boilers and be ready by 5 o'clock p. m.

At 2 o'clock the semaphore signaled the presence of three hostile ships. In view of this fact, in connection with the circumstance that the weather was clearing, the admiral again convened the officers aforesaid. Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the going out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meeting in the morning.

To settle this question, Pilot Miguel was called, who had piloted in the flagship, and who, in the opinion of the captain of the harbor, is the most intelligent of the pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot, who is ill).

Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there would be no trouble whatever about taking out the *Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*

any time, day or night, their draft being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but that the going out of the *Colón*, whose draft is 24.9 feet, might present difficulties on account of a flat rock in the water off Point Morrillo, where the water is only 27½ English feet deep.

The pilot was sent to the harbor entrance to form a more exact opinion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very probable that, owing to the swell, the *Colón* might touch bottom on the flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the admiral propounded the following question, on the assumption that the whole squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat destroyers in the harbor: Is it expedient to risk the *Colón* being injured, or should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favorable circumstances?

The question being put in this form, Captains Concas and Bustamente were in favor of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and all the other officers were in favor of not going out, with the exception of the admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the foregoing proceedings were drawn up.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.  
ANTONIO EULATE.  
JUAN B. LAZAGA.  
EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.  
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

#### SEPARATE OPINIONS.

My reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as follows: My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squadrons is the same as that formulated by the admiral. To-day we are certain that they are not off this harbor; they are almost sure to be there to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe well founded, I reason as follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, has very little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable in my opinion, and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships.

To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman, because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a month from now or little more, we shall find ourselves without provisions, since we are completely cut off by land and sea. This last solution is to my mind even more inadmissible than any of the former.

This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron at the present time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favor of saving three of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety, and so do hydrographers. The *Colón's* draft, according to her captain,

is 7.60 meters, that is to say, 24.93 English feet. The rock, according to the pilot, has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent (he says considerably less than the width of the admiral's cabin. Hence there would be a margin of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  English feet, and the swell did not seem excessive to me this morning, when I was at the mouth of the harbor and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. Moreover, the *Colón* might pass over the rock without being struck by any sea, and even if she should be struck it would not be at all certain that the resulting injury would disable her from continuing the voyage.

Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it preferable for the *Colón* (which, in my mind, should be the last to go out) to remain disabled at the harbor entrance than for us to await what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I can not hold it back.

JOAQUÍN BUSTAMENTE.

Concurring entirely in the opinion of Captain Bustamante, I wish to add that the hostile squadron which is coming from Cienfuegos and which we expected this morning, having probably been detained by the storm, may be here at daybreak, and the blockade we should have to run in that case would be immensely superior even without counting the other squadron which is reported to be coming by way of the Old Channel.

In order to realize the seriousness of the situation of the city, it should be remembered that eleven months' pay is due the army as well as the navy; that the army owes for its provisions for almost the same length of time, and that commercial enterprise does not care to increase the debt, there being back in the minds of all the thought that with the autonomy of the island the treasury will pass out of our hands. Consequently the city of Santiago de Cuba, being blockaded by land and sea, is besieged by itself, which is the most effective kind of blockade, for there are no provisions and no one is doing anything to supply any. Therefore the capitulation will become necessary in a very short space of time, and will drag the squadron along with it.

The same as Captain Bustamante, I do not believe the loss of the *Cristóbal Colón* at all probable, and while under ordinary circumstances we should not go out and probably should not have entered, to-day circumstances demand our running the risk even of total loss, which I consider very remote, however. A delay of twenty or twenty-five days, which is all that remains to us, is not sufficient to warrant a hope of a favorable opportunity or a change of circumstances.

Santiago de Cuba, May 26, 1898.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it necessary to risk the loss of the *Colón* at the rock where the *Gerona*, of less



draft than the former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that the sea will calm down and that another opportunity will present itself the sortie is deferred.

CERVERA.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 27, 1898.

I intended yesterday to run the blockade, taking advantage of storm, but the best pilot was of opinion that *Colón* would run great risk of touching bottom on a rock in the entrance of the harbor where *Gerona* lost false keel. Do not feel justified in running this risk and deferred sortie, second in command and captains being of same opinion except chief of staff and captain of *Infanta Maria Teresa*, who were of the contrary opinion. There are not at this harbor sufficiently fast vessels to run the blockade.

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, May 28, 1898.

Your telegram of 27th received.<sup>1</sup> Notify you that enemy intends to sink hulks in entrance to harbor.

[Extract.]

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, May 28, 1898.

Although your excellency already has direct news from Santiago de Cuba, believe proper to tell you that that province is the one I have tried to make best provisions for on account of distance Havana and probable attack or blockade Americans and insurgents. Have reenforced it to 4 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 Krupp mountain battery, 4 companies engineers, 10 field guns, 47 siege guns and corresponding auxiliary troops. Besides provisions paid for here by drafts on ministry have sent there 166,000 pesetas gold, 10,000 silver, 100,000 notes, and placed 100,000 pesos at Madrid and £10,000 at Birmingham. Of all this and other details referring to defense I send your excellency detailed official statement.<sup>2</sup>

Where provisions are most needed is at Gibara and Nuevitas. Appearance Cervera's squadron much impression on Americans, who have stationed 7 ships off Santiago de Cuba.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, May 28, 1898.

General Linares says twelve hostile ships arrived off Santiago yesterday, about 15 miles, disappearing to westward except one.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 28, 1898.

The harbor is blockaded by hostile squadron more powerful than ours, and we are on lookout for opportunity to run the blockade. Meanwhile we are vigilant to

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<sup>1</sup>The words in *italics* are omitted in the pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup>It is certain that very much less than stated in this telegram reached Santiago.

frustrate enemy's plans. Under these conditions the battle would be unequal. Shall therefore try to elude it if possible. Coal is being shipped slowly.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Division at Santiago (Linares).*

HONORED SIR: I am in receipt of your official letter of the 26th, in which you transmit to me the ideas of the Captain-General, to whom I beg you will extend in my name many thanks for everything. I must try to get out of this dilemma, but am in despair over the slowness of coaling, and without a reasonable amount of coal nothing can be attempted. We are constantly watching the mouth of the harbor and I believe any enterprise against us will be prevented by your dispositions and our cooperation. If we only had what we need.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 28, 1898.

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*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, May 29, 1898.

According to information brought by exchanged prisoners, arrival our squadron at Santiago de Cuba has caused sensation. United States and their admirals are being charged with lack of ability. Twelve vessels off Santiago yesterday; this morning the majority have disappeared in a westerly direction.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 31, 1898.

Hostile ships have fired about 60 shots, apparently for purpose of reconnoitering. Firing was done by *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Amazonas*, and auxiliary cruiser. Batteries and *Cristóbal Colón* answered. Auxiliary cruiser retreated, probably with injuries. From shore it seems two projectiles were seen hitting the *Iowa*. Nothing new from squadron.

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*The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, May 31, 1898.

Deputies, senators, and officers, Andalusia ask me to send your excellency and squadron affectionate greeting.<sup>1</sup>

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 1, 1898.

Blockading fleet has received large reinforcements. To make successful running of blockade possible attempt should be made to draw off armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*, calling their attention somewhere else.

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram is suppressed in the pamphlet.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, June 2, 1898.

"Received B C 5448 (telegram May 31). Her majesty bids me congratulate your excellency and combatants of squadron; Government also congratulates you. Report current of intention of landing near Santiago."<sup>1</sup>

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO, June 2, 1898.

I beg Your Excellency to extend our deep gratitude to Her Majesty. Blockading fleet has 21 ships, 6 of them armored. The city lacks modern artillery; have therefore offered two 2.95-inch guns which *Terror* has on board.<sup>2</sup>

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 3, 1898.

Early this morning a battle ship and merchant steamer tried to force harbor entrance. Destroyers and scouts which are at mouth of harbor opened fire, followed by *Reina Mercedes* and batteries of Socapa where guns of said vessel have been mounted. Merchant steamer was sunk; battle ship repulsed. A lieutenant and 6 sailors taken prisoners. No casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight injuries to installations of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers.

*The Minister of War (Correa) to the Governor-General (Blanco).*

MADRID, June 3, 1898.

Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reinforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present only two warships there and one of them I believe can not pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding, the Government wishes to know your opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reenforced.<sup>3</sup>

*The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, June 4, 1898.

I would be failing in my duty if I concealed from your excellency that departure of Cervera's squadron at this time would be of fatal effect on public opinion. Doubt

<sup>1</sup> The part in *italics* does not appear in the pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup> The part in *italics* omitted in pamphlet.

<sup>3</sup> The wording of this telegram is not literal, as I do not have the original; but it has been published and has appeared in the *Diario de Sesiones*.

whether the situation that would surely result could be controlled. Volunteers already much exercised over inadequacy Cervera's squadron, and only kept up from one moment to another by hope arrival second squadron. Would rise in body upon learning that instead of reinforcements the few ships here are withdrawing. The repression would necessarily be bloody. Attitude of army in that case doubtful. Loss of island certain, in view of horrible conflagration it would kindle here.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón)*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 6, 1898.

Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbor for three hours, being answered by batteries at mouth of harbor, among which are guns of *Reina Mercedes*. Our casualties: Killed, executive officer *Reina Mercedes* and 5 other (sailors); wounded, Ensign Molins (and) 11 other (sailors) and 5 bruised. Army has 1 dead; wounded, a colonel (of artillery), 4 officers and 17 privates. I do not know loss of enemy. *Reina Mercedes* has suffered much. *Vizcaya* received two shells, *Furor* one shell (in the) bunker without serious injury. Works of defense have suffered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bombarded other points on coast.<sup>1</sup>

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO, June 6, 1898.

Fear enemy will succeed in obstructing harbor entrance. We can not prevent them with their great superiority. Beg your excellency to give me instructions.

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*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, June 6, 1898.

Received from minister marine following cablegram: "Received telegrams. Her Majesty bids me in her royal name to congratulate defenders Santiago de Cuba."

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, June 8, 1898.

As it is impossible to foresee and properly solve from here all cases that may arise in the campaign, the Government, which knows the means at your disposal, your own high qualities, and the wide scope given you, is confident that you will make of them best possible use in every case, and will consider that you have fulfilled your difficult mission if you satisfy the letter and spirit of our ordinances.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Words and phrases in parentheses are not in the original; those in *italics* occur in the original, but were omitted in the pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup> General Ordinances of the Navy, part 3, Chap. I, art. 153: "You will fight as far as lies in your power against any superior forces, so that, even though necessary to surrender, your defense will be considered honorable by the enemy. If possible, you will run your ship aground on own or hostile coast rather than surrender, if there is no immediate risk of the crew perishing in the shipwreck; and even after running aground, it will be your duty to defend the ship and finally burn it, if there is no other way of preventing the enemy from taking possession of it."

## PROCEEDINGS.

On the 8th day of June the Admiral convened in his cabin the captains of the squadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so in the following order and manner:

*Bustamente*, taking into account all the circumstances of the existence of provisions, error in superiority of hostile forces, etc., is of opinion that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark of the moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the hostile fleet at night and the difficulties of the sortie make it impossible for the squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected as follows: The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping their course to the south and passing at their utmost speed by the *Texas* and the three large battle ships.

Shortly after the *Colón*, the fastest of the four ships, should go out with a west-southwesterly course, heading straight for the *Brooklyn*, whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then should follow the *Teresa* to the east-southeast, and finally the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*. He believes that this would create confusion in the hostile fleet and permit us to save at least 50 per cent of our squadron, which solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solution which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possible, namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender from lack of provisions.

He is also of opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step by resting a few days, especially the destroyers, upon whose crews such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear out the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the searchlights, which explore the vicinity of the harbor entrance during the hours of darkness. And finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the admiral, he is of opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he suggests, the Government should be given an accurate idea of the very serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer if the squadron went out in a body.

*Captain Concas* is of opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, *Brooklyn* or *New York*, should at any time disappear, the sortie should be attempted immediately; if not it should be attempted about the time of the new moon; but in that event with the whole squadron united and all the ships following the same course provided the nucleus of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, 5 or 6 miles from the harbor entrance.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet

approaches to within a mile of the harbor entrance, counting on the inadequate defenses of the harbor, and in view of the present conditions of the harbor, the sortie having been rendered more difficult by the position of the *Merrimac*, so that it would require a certain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie, are of opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means should be used to reenforce the defenses at the harbor entrance, so as to guard against an attack of torpedo boats and small craft which might appear in the entrance protected by one or more battle ships, the squadron in this harbor making the best possible resistance, keeping in front of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being the most important service the squadron can render toward the general defense of the island.

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroyers, not only to permit them to rest their crews, but also to prevent their being boarded by a coup de main in a night attack by small craft.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.  
JUAN B. LAZAGA.  
VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.  
EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.  
ANTONIO EULATE.  
FERNANDO VILLAMIL.  
JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 9, 1898.

I called a meeting of captains for the purpose of hearing their opinions on future operations. Second in command, captains of *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and commander of torpedo division were of opinion that we should not go out, owing to superior forces blockading fleet. Captain *Teresa* was of the opinion that, in case of detachment or withdrawal of the *Brooklyn* and *New York*, we should go out immediately, and, in any event, at the new moon, even though hostile fleet should remain together. Chief of staff was in favor of effecting sortie immediately, scattering our squadron. The fires of the ships remained lighted so as to take advantage of first opportunity, but as the blockade is very strict and the hostile fleet four times superior, I doubt (much)<sup>1</sup> that opportunity will present itself.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares).*

HONORED SIR: Last evening I made personal observations from the high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron, and

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<sup>1</sup> The word much is omitted in the pamphlet.

have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for the squadron under my command to go out without being seen, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defenses do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their electric searchlights.

Santiago de Cuba, June 11, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

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*The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago de Cuba (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: Since you made personal observations last night on the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the harbor without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defenses do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their search lights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the 6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns installed in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high battery of the Socapa.

But as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are our means of defense and attack in case we should not succeed in facilitating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your excellency, in order that you may take this fact into account, if you deem proper, that the rays of the search lights are clearly seen over the city, and it would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the United States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which separates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 miles, the total being the distance to which the squadron would have to retreat in order that its search lights may no longer illuminate the harbor entrance.

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 11, 1898.

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*The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: The Captain-General, in a cablegram dated to-day at 11.25 a. m., says:

I remind your excellency that in case of an attack on land you may find a powerful auxiliary for repulsing the enemy in the landing companies of the squadron with their excellent field guns, which Admiral Cervera would no doubt be willing to fur-

nish for the defense, which I am sure will be glorious, and the army and navy united will triumph over Americans.

The foregoing telegram I transmit to your excellency for your information, advising you that I have answered the Captain-General that your excellency had already offered the landing forces. At the same time I beg your excellency, if the case should arise, to permit that one landing company be stationed at the Socapa, one at Punta Gorda, another at Las Cruces Pier, and the remaining one at Punta Blanca, all with such number of suitable guns as you may deem necessary.

Santiago de Cuba, June 12, 1898.

ARSENIO LINARES.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares).*

HONORED SIR: I am in receipt of your communication dated yesterday relative to the landing columns of this squadron, and I take pleasure in again assuring your excellency of my entire willingness to lend whatever aid may be necessary for the defense of the city.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 13, 1898.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 14, 1898.

The enemy fired several shots last night. This morning they again bombarded the defenses at harbor entrance for thirty minutes. Ensign Bruquetas and two others in Socapa battery slightly wounded. *Viscaya* hit by shell without serious results. *Army has three slightly wounded.*<sup>1</sup>

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898.

During night projectile, apparently dynamite, burst on the water near *Plutón*, causing injuries which are being examined. At daybreak the enemy kept up galling fire for an hour and slower fire thirty minutes, then withdrawing. Ensign Bruquetas and 8 men wounded, 2 killed; army, 1 officer and 8 men wounded, 1 killed. *Vesuvius* fired during night. Eight ships in sight this morning.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898.

I have a suspicion that the enemy has planted torpedoes in (this) *the entrance to the harbor.*<sup>2</sup> Have therefore ordered careful investigation in charge of Bustamante. Have purchased provisions, though expensive and bad, which will last until end of July at least.

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<sup>1</sup>The words in *italics* were omitted in the pamphlet.

<sup>2</sup>The word in parentheses was not in original; the words in *italics* were suppressed in the pamphlet.



*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

It is to be regretted independence which Cervera's squadron enjoys has prevented me from aiding in his operations, although the results are weighing on my mind, because the entrance and stay of the squadron at Santiago has completely changed the objective and aspect of the campaign, the existence of provisions and coal, and provisioning of certain places. If an attempt had at least been made of consulting with me, General Linares, and the commandant-general of the navy-yard, perhaps between us we might in the beginning have found a better solution than those now awaiting the squadron, namely, either to await the result of unequal battle in the harbor, or break hostile line to go to some other harbor, Haiti or Jamaica, where it would again be closed in. It would perhaps be preferable to go to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is still possible; or, if not, reinforce and proceed to Spain, which would be the best; anything rather than remain closed in at Santiago with the prospect of having to surrender from starvation.

The situation is extremely serious, and I have no doubt that the Government under these critical circumstances would order what is best for the good of the country and the honor of our arms. I therefore respectfully suggest the expediency of uniting military action in the present war under one head, ordering that I be invested with the command in chief of all the land and naval forces assigned to these waters.

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

I am much troubled, as your excellency may imagine, over situation of division Santiago, against which is principally directed action of enemy, attracted to that harbor by presence Cervera's squadron, whose sortie it is intended to prevent. It is there that is engaged honor of our arms and fate of our best ships, which must be saved at any price. To counteract their efforts, have prepared for every possible aid. Have organized convoy of ammunition to Manzanillo, where every imaginable effort will be made to get it to Santiago. I reinforce Linares by brigade from this province, which will march through interior in conjunction with forces of said convoy of provisions and ammunition, forming with both divisions Fourth Army Corps, under the command of said general, who will thus have 19 battalions, 5 squadrons, 7 companies engineers, mounted artillery, mobilized guerrillas, and other factors, to be used as the general deems best against enemy within and without. Hope by these measures to sustain war successfully in that region without stripping Center, Matanzas, and West, which are also constantly menaced.<sup>1</sup>

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

Seventy American vessels with landing corps off Santiago. General Linares states if Government does not have means to help them by sending a squadron against United States coasts, object to draw off part of United States fleet which attacks them, so that our squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from Spain run the blockade in cooperation with Cervera's sortie, circumstances will take care of solv-

<sup>1</sup> It should not be forgotten that Santiago received no aid whatever from the outside except Escario's column, which arrived without provisions.

ing conflict. I have done and shall do everything within human power to aid him—a difficult undertaking, on account of his being entirely cut off, enemy being in complete control of the sea.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 20, 1898.

Lookout advises me there are 70 hostile vessels in sight, among them 7 modern battle ships.

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*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, June 22, 1898.

The minister tells me to order ammunition by number, class, and caliber. I advise you so that you may let me know what you require.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant of Navy-Yard (Manterola).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898.

The squadron being blockaded and the city invested, it is too late to order ammunition, for which I have sent many requests to Spain. It can not arrive in time, since the question must be solved within next few days. Six-sevenths of the 5.5-inch ammunition is useless, the fuses not reliable, and we have no torpedoes. These are the main deficiencies. If the Government could send supplies so that they could arrive this week, it might still be time.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898.

The enemy (has landed)<sup>1</sup> *is landing* at Punta Berracos. As the question is to be decided on land, I am going to send ashore *the* crews of *the* squadron *as far as the rifles will hold out*. The situation is very critical.

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, June 23, 1898.

Upon return from departamentos received D C 8041, D C 9948, C D 4892, C D 4890.<sup>2</sup> The Government approves plan of sortie (taking advantage) of *first* favorable opportunity which presents itself. Provisions have reached Cienfuegos. Expedition to be sent overland to Santiago, and auxiliary cruisers will be sent to hostile coast.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Words in parentheses did not occur in the original text, while those in *italics* did.

<sup>2</sup> The four telegrams referred to are the four preceding ones, but it will be noted that no news had been received from Madrid since June 8.

<sup>3</sup> The auxiliary cruisers never went to the hostile coast.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 23, 1898.

The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city (from catastrophe).

*As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape* (doubting if squadron can go out) under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme. Although others are responsible for this untenable situation into which we were forced in spite of my opposition, it is very painful to be a (shackled) actor therein.<sup>1</sup>

*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, June 23, 1898.

Captain-General states that your squadron and the city are very short of provisions, the rations of sailors being reduced to hard-tack and those of soldiers to rice, and even this for only short time longer. This being the case, the serious situation might become even worse in case city should surrender from lack of provisions or the garrisons abandon it and go west, in which case your squadron, being without provisions, the harbor blockaded, and the city in hands of enemy, your situation would be extremely grave.

In view of this I wanted to understand situation blockade at night and inquired of commandant navy. Have learned it to be so strict that I see but one chance in a hundred to elude vigilance, but something must be done. Intend to send three or four small vessels, hoping one or other may succeed. But, as you must see matters more clearly than I, do not want to act without consulting you. In case you should know of anything else to be done to change situation, beg you will let me know your opinion.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

Believe it impossible for any vessel to run present blockade of this harbor. With provisions we have can hold out until end of July, but believe the siege will be terminated before that time. Bustamente torpedoes have been planted, but entrance west of Cay Smith is free. We congratulate on brilliant battle *Isabel II*.

<sup>1</sup>The original text does not contain the words in parentheses, but, on the other hand, does contain those in *italics*, which considerably change the meaning.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

Received C D 4898 (of 23d). Immediately convened second in command, captains battle ships, and commander torpedo division, to ask their opinions on what could be done under circumstances. Opinion unanimous that sortie has not been and is not now possible. I then read *them* my telegram of yesterday, in which they concurred and which I hereby confirm. Have little news of enemy, but our forces continue to fall back upon city.<sup>1</sup>

## PROCEEDINGS.

On the 24th day of June in the Admiral's cabin assembled the second in command of the squadron and the undersigned captains. The chief of staff was not present, being ashore with landing forces. The admiral read a telegram from the minister of marine dated yesterday (received to-day) in which he says that the Government approves of plan of sortie at the first opportunity. When each officer had stated his opinion on the present situation, it was unanimously agreed that the sortie is now, and has been ever since the 8th instant, absolutely impossible.

The Admiral then read the telegram which he dispatched yesterday to the minister, notifying him of the above fact and of the possibility of its becoming necessary in a very few days to destroy the ships, in which all present concurred as being an accurate expression of the painful situation in which these forces are placed.

In virtue whereof they signed the foregoing proceedings on board the cruiser *Infanta Maria Teresa*.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

FERNANDO VILLAMIL.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

ANTONIO EULATE.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS,

*Secretary, Acting Chief of Staff.*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

*The Minister of War (Correa) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco).*

MADRID, June 24, 1898.

With consent of Government, minister marine will notify Admiral Cervera that squadron under his command, hitherto without definite destination, will cooperate in that island to its defense, and in that case your excellency will exercise over it, as over the other naval forces operating in the territory under your command, the powers with which you are invested by the ordinances of the army and navy, confirmed by royal order of October 29, 1872.

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<sup>1</sup> The words in *italics* were suppressed in the pamphlet.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, June 24, 1898.

To give perfect unity to conduct of war in island, your excellency, while operating in Cuban waters, will consider yourself commander in chief of the squadron of operations, and in your relations with the Captain-General you will observe royal order of November 13, 1872, dictated by this ministry, and the articles of ordinance therein referred to. You may at once enter into direct communication with the Captain-General and cooperate with the squadron toward the execution of his plans.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Although I have always considered myself under the orders of the Captain-General, I thank your excellency for instructions which give legal force to the relations already established, and by giving unity to the military operations (relieve me) *will relieve me* from taking on my own responsibility extreme measures of the utmost importance.<sup>1</sup>

*The Commander in Chief of the Army (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera)*

HONORED SIR: I have returned to the city. Numerous American troops, in conjunction with rebel parties, attacked the column under my orders twice yesterday and once this morning with artillery, and were repulsed with many casualties, as we could see, since they were unprotected. We had 7 killed, 20 seriously wounded, among them 3 officers, and several slightly wounded and bruised. We took possession of ammunition and a cloth cape with metal button with eagle. On the march to-day they did not trouble us, in spite of good positions they might have occupied. By reason of the rain and the troops being wholly without shelter, there is much sickness among them, and as it is impossible to assume the offensive until reenforcements arrive, I have decided to have the defense fall back on the outer precinct of the city.

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Minister of marine commands me to place myself under orders of your excellency in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest pleasure. I believe it my duty to set forth condition of squadron. Out of 3,000 rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only 620 reliable, rest have been pronounced useless, and were not replaced by others for lack of stores when we left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of *Viscaya* and one of *Oquendo* defective, and had been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses not serviceable. We lack

<sup>1</sup> The original text contains the words in *italics* but not those in parentheses.

Bustamente torpedoes. *Colón* is without heavy armament. *Vizcaya* is badly fouled and has lost her speed. *Teresa* does not have landing guns, and those of *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are unserviceable. We have little coal; provisions enough for month of July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would be positively certain destruction.

I have a number of men ashore reenforcing garrison, of which I consider myself a part. Believe it my duty to tell your excellency that on the 23d I addressed to Government the following telegram: "The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time, agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city. As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme." The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the ships. I await instructions from your excellency.

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THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
OF THE ARMY OF SANTIAGO,

June 25, 1898.

His Excellency PASOUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In a cipher cable received last night the Captain-General says, among other things, as follows: "I beg that your excellency will tell Admiral Cervera that I should like to know his opinion and plans. It is my opinion that he should go out from Santiago as early as possible whenever he may deem best, for the situation in that harbor is, in my judgment, the most dangerous of all. Last night there were only 7 warships there, 3 at Cienfuegos, and 9 here, yet the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* had no trouble in running the blockade, going out at 2 o'clock a. m. If we should lose the squadron without fighting, the moral effect would be terrible, both in Spain and abroad."

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

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SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

His Excellency ARSENIO LINARES.

MY DEAR GENERAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your interesting letter of this date, which I hasten to answer. The Captain-General is kind enough to want to know my opinion, and I am going to give it as explicitly as I ought to, but will confine myself to the squadron, as I believe that is what he asks for. I have considered the squadron lost ever since it left Capè Verde, for to think anything else seems madness to me, in view of the enormous disparity which exists between our own forces and those of the enemy. For that reason I energetically opposed the sailing of the squadron from Cape Verde, and I even thought that I would be relieved by some one of those whose opinions were opposed to mine.

I did not ask to be relieved, because it seems to me that no military man should do so when he receives instructions to march against the enemy. You are familiar with the history of the squadron since its arrival here. If I had gone to San Juan de Puerto Rico when a telegram from the Government caused me to change, my situation would be the same, only the scene would have been a different one and the avalanche which has fallen upon this island would have come down upon Puerto Rico instead. I believe the mistake was made in sending the squadron out at all. The Captain-General says that the blockade at Havana has been run, and I will add that I myself with a 7-knot vessel entered Escombreras and remained there an hour and a half, although it was occupied by the provincial (cantonal) squadron.

But is there any similarity to the present situation? Certainly not. The sortie from here must be made by the ships, one by one. There is no possibility of stratagem nor disguise, and the absolutely certain result will be the ruin of each and all of the ships and the death of the greater part of their crews. If I had thought there was even the remotest chance of success I should have made the attempt, although, as I have said before, it would only have amounted to a change of the scene of action unless we had gone to Havana, where things might, perhaps, have been different. For these reasons, and in order that my forces might make themselves useful in some manner, I proposed to you to send them ashore, just at the time when the Captain-General made the same suggestion.

To-day I consider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, after having contributed to its defense, or whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of their cooperation, thereby precipitating its fall. What is best to be done? I, who am a man without ambitions, without mad passions, believe that whatever is most expedient should be done, and I state most emphatically that I shall *never* be the one to decree the horrible and useless hecatomb which will be the only possible result of the sortie from here by main force, for I should consider myself responsible before God and history for the lives sacrificed on the altar of vanity, and not in the true defense of the country.

As far as I am concerned, the situation has been changed to-day from a moral standpoint, for I received a telegram this morning which places me under the orders of the Captain-General in everything relating to the operations of the war. It is therefore for him to decide whether I am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those 2,000 sons of Spain. I believe I have answered your letter, and trust you will see in this letter only the true and loyal expression of the opinion of an honorable old man who for forty-six years has served his country to the best of his ability.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Since dispatching my last telegram received letter General Linares transmitting telegram from your excellency wanting to know my opinion. Have already expressed it in former telegram and give it more fully to-day. It is incorrect that the blockading fleet has ever been reduced to seven vessels. The six principal ships alone represent more than three times the power of my four. On account of the lack of batteries to keep the hostile squadron at a distance, it remains constantly near harbor entrance, illuminating it, which makes any sortie except by main force altogether impossible.

In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of the squadron and majority of its crews. I shall never take this step on my own account, but if your excellency so orders I shall carry it out. The loss of the squadron was, in my judgment, decreed when it was ordered to come here. Therefore its painful situation is not a surprise to me. Your excellency will give instructions whether we are to go out to this sacrifice, which I believe fruitless.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, June 26, 1898.

Your two telegrams received. I thank you for the satisfaction you express over being under my orders. I consider myself greatly honored thereby and trust that you will see in me a comrade rather than a superior. It seems to me you somewhat exaggerate difficulties of sortie. It is not a question of fighting, but of escaping from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe it impossible, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances in dark night and bad weather, to elude enemy's vigilance and escape in whichever direction you deem best. Even in case you are discovered, fire is very uncertain at night, and although it may cause injuries it would mean nothing compared with safety of the ships.

You say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case you would destroy ships, and this is an additional reason for attempting the sortie, since it is preferable for the honor of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety. Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for the same thing might happen that occurred at Havana last century when the English included in the capitulation the surrender of the squadron which was inclosed in the harbor.

For my part, I repeat I do not believe that the hostile fleet, no matter how strong, can do so very much damage if our squadron, choosing a dark night and favorable opportunity while part of enemy's ships are withdrawn, steams out at full power in a direction agreed upon, even if discovered. This is shown by the running out of the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* from this harbor with nine ships in the blockading line, the *Purísima* from Casilda with three, and the entering of the *Reina Cristina* into Cienfuegos, also blockaded by three ships. I am very well aware that the situation of your squadron is a very difficult one. Still, the preceding cases bear comparison.

If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago Harbor, the effect in the whole world will be disastrous and the war may be considered terminated in favor of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on which the honor of our country depends, as I am sure your excellency realizes. The Government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the success.

I leave entirely to the discretion of your excellency, who are so highly gifted, the route to be followed and the decision as to whether any of the ships should be left behind on account of slow speed. As a favorable item, I will tell your excellency that the captain of German cruiser *Geier* has expressed the opinion that the sortie of the squadron can be effected without running great risks.



*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, June 26, 1898.

Government thinks in extreme case referred to in cablegram of the 23d, before ourselves destroying our squadron in harbor, should attempt to save it, in whole or part, by sortie at night, as was opinion of some of the officers of your squadron in meeting May 26 and June 10,<sup>1</sup> and as you stated on May 28. Advise me whether landing of crews was at request military authority and whether they were reembarked after rendering assistance.

The object of my cablegram of the 24th, for which you thanked me, is not personal consideration, but the best service of the nation. Avoid comments (which cause) *to which are attributed*<sup>2</sup> unfavorable interpretations.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898.

Have received C D 4097 (preceding telegram). Very sorry I incurred displeasure of Government by opinion expressed long time ago, and to your excellency in cipher telegram dated May 21. With the harbor entrance blockaded, as it now is, the sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being closer inshore.

Landing of crews was at request of military authority, through Captain-General. I have asked for reembarkation, but doubt much if it can be effected before reenforcements arrive. Your A D 0491 (telegram of the 24th), the same as all acts of your excellency, have for object the best service, but inure, nevertheless, to my benefit, because (it will not be to me that will be due) *I will not be the one to decide upon the useless hecatomb which is being prepared.*<sup>3</sup>

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898.

I am in receipt of your cable, and thank your excellency very much for kind words in my behalf. I have to respect your excellency's opinions without discussing them, especially after having given you my own opinion formed after mature consideration. I have always believed that there are many sailors more able than I am, and it is a pity that one of them can not come to take command of the squadron, and under whose orders I would be placed. I construe your excellency's telegram as an order to go out, and therefore ask General Linares for reembarkation of forces which were landed at your excellency's suggestion. I beg that you will confirm the order of sortie, because it is not explicit, and I should feel very sorry if I did not interpret your excellency's orders correctly.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of the Army at Santiago (Linares).*

[Extract.]

HAVANA, June 27, 1898.

Tell me candidly your opinion on squadron, whether you believe it can go out and what solution seems best to you.

<sup>1</sup> Although June 10 is the date as it appears in the original telegram, it refers to the meeting of the 8th, as no meeting was held on the 10th.

<sup>2</sup> The words in parentheses are not in the original; in place thereof the words in *italics* occur.

<sup>3</sup> The words and phrases in *italics* are the ones that occur in the original text; those in parentheses do not.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 28, 1898.

General Linares answers me that it is not possible to reembark my forces until troops arrive from Manzanillo.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

[Personal and confidential.]

HAVANA, June 28, 1898.

Your telegram received last evening. Being desirous of improving as much as possible situation Santiago, am making every effort to forward rations to you. If I succeed (and can send) *I shall be able to send*<sup>1</sup> more reenforcements, thus prolonging the defense, perhaps raising siege, salvation squadron. If I do not succeed it is necessary, as you will realize, for squadron to leave that harbor in spite of difficulties, which I appreciate.

Therefore my plan, which I desire your excellency to carry out, is as follows: The squadron will remain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy. Acknowledge receipt.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 29, 1898.

Your telegram received. Beg for repetition from the words "become aggravated" to the end of sentence, this being unintelligible. The rest I shall carry out as far as possible, the scant supply of coal rendering it difficult. It takes these ships twelve hours to get up steam, and if the fires are kept going and the ships in readiness to take advantage of opportunity each uses 15 tons a day. But I think I understand meaning your order: If favorable opportunity presents itself, to avail ourselves of it; and if not, to go out at the last hour, even though loss of squadron be certain. Difficulties might also arise by enemy taking possession of harbor entrance.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).*

HAVANA, June 30, 1898.

In conformity with terms of your excellency's telegram of 24th instant have dictated to admiral the following instructions: "The squadron will remain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy." I tell your excellency of this for your information, and beg that you will advise me whether the foregoing instructions meet with Government's approval.

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<sup>1</sup> The telegram as received contains the words in *italics* and not those in parentheses.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).*

MADRID, July 1, 1898.

Advise Captain-General that Government approves his instructions to Admiral Cervera.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Lieutenant-General, Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Linares)*<sup>1</sup>.

HONORED SIR: I have the honor of notifying your excellency of a cablegram which I have received from the Captain-General and which is as follows: "Your telegram received last night. Being desirous of improving as much as possible situation Santiago \* \* \* will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy." I therefore beg that, if at any time you think that the unfortunate situation referred to in the telegram may arise, you will kindly advise me in time, so that I may be able to reembark the men I have ashore and put to sea, in compliance with the instructions.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 30, 1898.

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*The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: In reply to your official favor transmitting to me a cable from his excellency the Captain-General, in virtue of which you ask me to advise you when the city may be in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, I have the honor to state that this being an open city, for whose defense earthworks have been thrown up on the heights and lines of trenches dug along its wire inclosure, it is not possible to determine the moment when to notify your excellency, for as soon as an attack is commenced there is danger that the powerful column will break through the outer line, along which all my scant forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the points which may be threatened the most. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to keep your excellency posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reembarkation of your forces.

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

In addition to my cablegram of yesterday I advise your excellency that General Linares replies that, as the city is open, having only earthworks and wire inclosure,

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<sup>1</sup>This new title was conferred upon General Linares about that time.

it will not be possible to determine the moment for notifying me, as there is danger of the powerful column breaking the line along which all his scant forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the most advanced points, but that he will, nevertheless, keep me posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reembarkation of my forces. As these ships can not go out without the forces, since they must expect a fierce battle at the sortie, and will, in my judgment, be destroyed or captured, as I have already advised you, the case might arise that I could not carry out your orders. I therefore notify you accordingly and beg for instructions.

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PROCEEDINGS.

The undersigned officers being convened by the Admiral on the 1st day of July, at 7 o'clock p. m., said Admiral read to them the telegrams exchanged with the Captain-General at Havana, in which the latter states, in spite of the observations made as to the disaster awaiting the squadron at the harbor entrance, that the sortie should be effected by main force, especially if the loss of Santiago de Cuba is impending. The admiral then gave an account of the military operations that have taken place this day, in which the enemy took possession of the town of El Caney and San Juan Hill.

Upon being asked for their opinions as to whether they thought that the case had arisen in which the Captain-General had ordered the sortie, the officers assembled stated unanimously that they thought the case had arisen in which the Captain-General ordered the sortie, but that it is absolutely impossible to effect it without the reembarkation of the men now ashore for the defense of the city, being at present more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squadron, and that at the same time the chief of the army corps, in an official communication, has stated that he can not do without their aid, being absolutely without reserves and forces with which to relieve the men on the extensive lines to be defended. As the result of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the undersigned that, in order to cooperate in the most effective manner and with some prospect of success in the defense of the city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbor entrance.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.  
JUAN B. LAZAGA.  
FERNANDO VILLAMIL.  
VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.  
ANTONIO EULATE.  
EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898—*At night.*

Through General Toral your excellency knows of the events of this day. He believes it certain that the withdrawal of my landing forces will entail the imme-

diate loss of the city. Without them the sortie can not be attempted. My opinion is the same as Toral's, and our sortie would look like flight, which is repugnant to all. My captains are of the same opinion. I entreat you will send instructions I have asked for.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

The enemy to-day made fierce attack on city with overwhelming forces. Has not accomplished much, as the defense has been brilliant. But we have 600 casualties, among them commander in chief army seriously wounded, and general of brigade killed; captain of navy, Bustamente, seriously wounded. Crews have not been reembarked because it would entail immediate loss of city. Have asked Captain-General for instructions.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

[Very urgent.—Key L.]

HAVANA, July 1, 1898—10.30 p. m.

In view of hostile progress in spite of heroic defense garrison, and in conformity with opinion Government, you will reembark crews, take advantage of first opportunity, and go out with the ships of your squadron, following route you deem best. You are authorized to leave behind any which on account of slow speed or circumstances have no chance of escaping. I will tell your excellency for your information only, not in the nature of instructions, that there are only three ships at Cienfuegos and nine here, none of them of great power.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

[Urgent.—Key O.]

HAVANA, July 1, 1898—10.45 p. m.

In addition to my former telegram of this evening, ask you to hasten sortie from harbor as much as possible before enemy can take possession of entrance.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of Army at Santiago (Toral).*

[Extract.]

HAVANA, July 1, 1898—10.55 p. m.

It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong defense as much as possible, by every means preventing enemy from taking possession of harbor entrance before sortie of squadron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not to have to surrender nor destroy ships.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, July 1, 1898.

Admiral Cervera is troubled about leaving the harbor, fearing squadron will be destroyed in the operation, and asks for new instructions. Have answered, in conformity with your excellency's telegram No. 90, that he is to leave the harbor, taking advantage of first opportunity before enemy occupies entrance.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, July 1, 1898.

Notify you that our colliers *Alicante* and *Remembrance* are at Martinique; *Marie* and *Burton* at Guadeloupe.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

[Urgent.]

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898 (at daybreak).

Your urgent telegrams of last night received. Have sent my chief of staff to show them to General Toral, and have given orders to light fires, so as to go out as soon as my forces are reembarked.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.*

[Very urgent.]

HAVANA, July 2, 1898—5.10 a. m.

In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, your excellency will reembark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go out immediately.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Acting Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Toral).*

HONORED SIR: Since the receipt of the telegrams from his excellency the Captain-General, which my chief of staff showed you this morning, I have received the following:

"In view of exhausted condition \* \* \* go out immediately."

I notify your excellency of this in order that you may give the necessary orders for immediately carrying out the instructions of the Captain-General.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898.

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*The Acting Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps (Toral) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: Upon being informed of the cablegram from the Captain-General to your excellency, ordering the reembarkation of the forces of the squadron, I immediately issued instructions for the company at San Miguel de Parada to proceed to San José for reembarkation; the company at Mazamorra to go to the Socapa; that at Las Cruces to the pier of that name; the company between the forts of the gasometer and furnaces to go to Punta Blanca, and the remainder of

the landed naval forces to the Royal Pier. I have the honor of advising you of the foregoing for your information and in order that measures be taken for the reembarkation of the companies referred to.

Yours, etc.,

JOSÉ TORAL.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Corps of Santiago (Torál).*

HAVANA, July 2, 1898.

Your cablegram of 1.30 a. m. received, and I reiterate the instructions which I gave your excellency in my last telegram of this morning. It is absolutely necessary to concentrate the forces and prolong the defense as much as possible, preventing the enemy from taking possession of the harbor entrance before sortie of squadron, for which orders have been issued to Admiral Cervera, in view situation of city as reported by you, to obviate surrender or destruction of ships.

If your excellency and valiant troops can hold out until arrival of Escario or Pareja brigade, situation would be much improved; but if it is so critical as to make continuation of defense impossible, you will gather all troops and loyal citizens, try to open a path, and fall back upon Holguin or Manzanillo, destroying what can not be taken along and burning everything left behind, so that not the least trophy of victory will fall into the enemy's hands. At all events, I trust to your excellency to adapt compliance with my instructions to condition, city, and forces.

*The Commander in Chief of Army Corps Santiago (Torál) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898.

At daybreak the enemy renewed attack upon city, which is still going on, simultaneously with attacks upon Cuebitas, railroad line, and El Cobre, the latter being made to believe that Escario's column has been held up by landing forces at Aserradero. At request Admiral Cervera have ordered immediate reembarkation troops of squadron, thereby weakening defense by 1,000 men, as Asia battalion, arrived this morning, and remnant of Battalion Constitución are hardly sufficient to fill places of killed and wounded yesterday. Situation becoming more and more untenable.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Torál).*

HAVANA, July 2, 1898.

Your telegram of 1.30 a. m. received. I understand situation difficult, but not desperate. Would be much improved by incorporation Escario or Pareja. In any event maintain city at any price, and before capitulation make attempt to join either of said forces, leaving wounded and sick at hospitals with assistance Red Cross. City must not be destroyed, in spite of what I said last night. Main thing is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it Spain will be morally defeated and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can be recovered; the loss of the squadron under these circumstances is final, and can not be recovered. Be sure to telegraph and keep me advised of events and your opinions.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

[Extract.]

HAVANA, July 2, 1898.

Have ordered immediate sortie of squadron, for if enemy takes possession of harbor entrance it is lost.

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*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Aunón).*

HAVANA, July 3, 1898.

Commandant-general navy, Santiago, telegraphs: "Our squadron went out, keeping up galling fire, which could hardly be heard for hostile fire. Has apparently succeeded in running blockade, taking westerly course."

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*The Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Torál), to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898.

Escario column arrived last night. Enemy attacked our forces several times this morning, killing Ramón Escobar, captain Asia Brigade, and wounding 7 men. Several shipwrecked from destroyers and a sailor from *Maria Teresa*, appearing at Socapa this morning, stated that latter ship was lost when out of sight of harbor, and that *Oquendo* was on fire. Other men from *Maria Teresa* have since arrived. Whereabouts of Admiral Cervera unknown. Will give your excellency further details as soon as I ascertain.

According to torpedo officer, the electric torpedoes of the first line do not work, and only four of the second line, and as two of the seven Bustamente torpedoes have become unserviceable and two others are defective, he thinks it will be easy for enemy to force the harbor entrance and close it, as I told your excellency. Commandant navy states that no merchant vessel could enter, and advises sinking of cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, though he says it will not obstruct navigation for ships 9 to 13 feet draft. I consult your excellency whether operation may be effected.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).<sup>1</sup>*

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 4, 1898.

In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, and after an unequal battle against forces more than three times as large as mine my whole squadron was destroyed. *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore. *Colón*, according to information from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered. The destroyers were sunk. Do not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of *Vizcaya* was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villamil, and, I believe, *Lazaga*; *Concas* and *Eulate* wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds.

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<sup>1</sup> I sent this telegram through Admiral Sampson, begging him to dispatch it, and for this reason it was not received by the Captain-General until the day following.



*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, July 5, 1898.

Admiral Cervera under this date telegraphs as follows from Playa del Este: "I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, etc. (see foregoing telegram)."

*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).*

HAVANA, July 5, 1898.

At last report transmitted commandant navy, Santiago, news was uncertain. This morning I received the following two items: Sailors from *Maria Teresa* are arriving, and report that said ship and *Oquendo*, *Plutón*, and *Furor* ran aground with fire on board; that *Colón* and *Viscaya* were lost from sight without being pursued by enemy. So far 108 have arrived from *Plutón*, *Furor*, and *Teresa*, among them officers; no captain. Do not have certain information concerning admiral; have asked for it, but so far not received. Was advised unofficially last night that he was prisoner on board hostile ship. Shall transmit as usual whatever official information I receive.

*The Commandant-General Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).*

HAVANA, July 6, 1898.

No communication with Santiago. Last cables received are the two forwarded yesterday. By request, Captain-General gave me the following, with proviso that he did not order Cervera to go out of Santiago at 9.45 a. m., the time when he effected the sortie. In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning, etc. (The balance of telegram has already been given.)

*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).*

HAVANA, July 8, 1898.

Commandant navy, Santiago, states as follows: "According to apparently trustworthy information the four battle ships and two torpedo boats succumbed in battle of 3d. Killed, captain of *Oquendo*, sailors, and soldiers; wounded, captain of *Teresa* and officers; slightly wounded, both commanders in chief; many prisoners; latter all on the way to United States. It is believed enemy will use *Colón*. This city threatened with immediate bombardment by land and sea unless it capitulates. Enemy has cut our aqueduct.

I am told that, while we shall not be very short of provisions, we shall be of ammunition. Families are fleeing; city deserted. We are surrounded by land and sea. I think decisive events, serious and bloody, must soon follow. Joaquín Bustamante much better.<sup>1</sup> Twenty-four hostile ships. Total of crews squadron hitherto arrived, 153, among them Manuel Bustamante and José Caballero, only officers; Midshipman Ramón Navia. *Furor* was sunk; the other ships ran ashore with fire on board, caused probably by hostile shell. Cable communication was interrupted—reason for my not sending more news. Shall communicate all information as I receive it.

<sup>1</sup> Capt. Joaquín Bustamante, chief of staff of the squadron, was in charge of the naval forces that went ashore to assist in the defense of Santiago de Cuba. In the battle of July 1 he was at the head of his forces, when his horse was killed under him; on foot he continued his command with a spirit and heroism extolled by all, until he was struck in the abdomen by a bullet. He died on July 19 at the Santiago hospital. His remains were buried in the Panteón de Marinos Ilustres at San Fernando.

## REPORT OF THE BATTLE.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

HONORED SIR: In compliance with your excellency's orders, aware of what had to happen, as I had so many times told you, I went out from Santiago Harbor with the whole squadron under my command on the morning of the 3d day of July.

The instructions given for the sortie were as follows: The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, my flagship, was to go out first, followed by the *Viscaya*, *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and destroyers, in the order named. The ships had all their fires spread and steam up. Upon going out the *Teresa* was to engage the nearest hostile ship and the vessels following were to take a westerly course at full speed, with the *Viscaya* at their head. The torpedo-boat destroyers were to keep out of the fire as much as possible, watching for a favorable opportunity, acting if it presented itself, and try to escape at their highest speed if the battle was against us. The ships left the harbor in such perfect order as to surprise our enemy, from whom we have since received many enthusiastic compliments on this point.

As soon as the *Teresa* went out, at 9.35, she opened fire on the nearest hostile ship, but shaping her course straight for the *Brooklyn*, which was to the southwest, for it was of the utmost importance to us to place this ship in a condition where she would not be able to make use of her superior speed. The rest of our ships engaged in battle with the other hostile ships, which at once came from the different points where they were stationed. The hostile squadron that day was composed of the following ships off Santiago Harbor: The *New York*, Admiral Sampson's flagship; the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship; the *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *Indiana*, *Texas*, and other smaller ships, or rather transatlantic steamers and converted yachts.

Immediately after leaving the harbor entrance the squadron took the course prescribed and a general battle ensued, in which we were at a great disadvantage, not only owing to our inferior number, but to the condition of our armament and 5.5-inch ammunition, of which I notified your excellency in the telegram I sent you when placing myself under your orders. There was no doubt in my mind as to the outcome, although I did not think that our destruction would be so sudden.

One of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe on board the *Maria Teresa*. A great deal of steam escaped, which made us lose the speed on which we had counted. About the same time another shell burst one of the fire mains. The ship made a valiant defense against the galling hostile fire. Among the first wounded was our gallant commander, Capt. Victor M. Concas, who had to withdraw, and as we could not afford to lose a single moment, I myself took direct command of the ship, waiting for an opportunity when the executive officer could be called. But this opportunity never arrived, as the battle became more and more fierce and the dead and wounded fell all around us, and all we could think of was to fire as much as possible.

In this critical situation fire broke out in my cabin, where some of the 2.24-inch projectiles stored there must have exploded. At the same time I was informed that the after deck and chart house were burning, while the fire that had commenced in my cabin was spreading with great rapidity to the center of the ship, and, as we had no water, it made rapid headway, and we were powerless to fight it. I realized that the ship was doomed, and cast about for a place where I could run her aground without losing many lives and continue the battle as long as possible.

Unfortunately the fire was gaining ground with great rapidity and voracity. I therefore sent one of my aides with instructions to flood the after magazines, but it was found impossible to penetrate into the passages owing to the dense clouds of smoke and on account of the steam escaping from the engine hatch, and it was impossible to breathe in that suffocating atmosphere. I therefore steered for a small beach west of Punta Cabrera, where we ran aground just as the engines stopped. It was impossible to get down the ammunition and other things below the armored deck, especially aft of the boilers, and under these circumstances all we could do was

to save as many as possible of the crew. This was also the opinion of the officers whom I was able to convene, and who, when I asked them whether they thought the battle could be continued, answered no.

In this painful situation, when explosions commenced to be heard in the ammunition rooms, I gave orders to lower the flag and flood all the magazines. The first order could not be carried out on account of the terrible conflagration on the poop, which was soon completely burned. The fire was gaining rapidly. When it had reached the forward deck we hardly had time to leave the burning ship, assisted by two United States boats, which arrived about three-quarters of an hour after we had run ashore.

Among the wounded are Lieut. Antonio López Cerón and Ensign Angel Carrasco. The following are missing: Higinio Rodríguez, captain of naval artillery, who is believed to have been killed by a projectile; Ensign Francisco Linares; Second Surgeon Julio Díaz de Rio; Chief Machinist (first class) Juan Montero, and Machinist (second class) José Melgares, whose body has been washed up on the beach. The rescue had been effected by those who could swim jumping into the water and trying three times to carry a line ashore, succeeding only at the last moment, assisted by the two United States boats above mentioned.

We had lowered a boat that was apparently in good condition, but it sank at once. A steam launch was then lowered, but it was able to make only one trip; when it attempted to return to the ship a second time it sank, as the result of injuries received. Of the three or four men on board, one saved his life by swimming and the others were picked up by one of the United States boats.

The captain of the *Vizcaya*, assisted by two good swimmers, had gone ashore. The executive and third officers were directing the rescue from on board ship, and as it was also necessary to direct it from the shore after the United States boats had arrived, I swam ashore with the assistance of two seamen, Juan Llorea and André Sequeiro, and my son and aide, Lieut. Angel Cervera.

When all the men had been landed I was notified by the United States officer who was in command of the boats to follow him to his ship, which was the converted yacht *Gloucester*. I was accompanied by my flag captain, who was wounded, my son and aide, and the executive officer of the ship, who had been the last one to leave her.

During this time the burning ship offered an awe-inspiring aspect. The explosions following each other in rapid succession were enough to appall even the calmest soul. I do not believe it will be possible to save a single thing from the ship. We have lost everything, the majority of us reaching the shore absolutely naked. A few minutes after the *Teresa*, the *Oquendo* ran aground on a beach about half a league farther west, with fire on board similar to that of the *Teresa*, and the *Vizcaya* and *Colón* disappeared from sight to the westward pursued by the hostile fleet. From the paymaster of the *Oquendo*, the only one of her officers on board the same ship with me, I have since learned the history of that ill-fated ship and her heroic crew. This history, which may perhaps be corrected as to some details but not as to the main facts, is as follows:

The unequal and deadly battle sustained by the *Oquendo* became even more unequal when shortly after it had commenced a hostile projectile entered the forward turret, killing the whole personnel of the same with the exception of one gunner, who was badly wounded. The 5.5-inch battery, which had been swept by the hostile fire from the beginning, had only two serviceable guns left, with which the defense was continued with incomparable energy. The after turret also lost its captain who was killed by a hostile shell that struck him as he opened the door of the turret, almost asphyxiated by the stifling air within. The paymaster does not know the history of the rapid-fire battery; he only knows that it kept firing the same as the rest of the valiant crew. There were two conflagrations—the first, which was controlled, occurred in the forward hold; the other, which originated aft, could not

be controlled as the pumps were unable to furnish water, probably for the same reasons as on board the *Teresa*.

The 5.5-inch ammunition hoists refused to work from the very beginning, but there was no lack of ammunition in the battery while the fight could be continued, as extra stores had been put on board all the ships as a precautionary measure. When the valiant captain of the *Oquendo* saw that he could not control the fire, and when he found that he did not have a single serviceable gun left, he decided to run aground, after first issuing orders to discharge all the torpedoes, except the two after ones, in case any hostile ship should approach before the last moment arrived. He also ordered the flag to be lowered a few minutes after the *Teresa* did, and after consultation with the officers who were present. The executive and third officers and three lieutenants had been killed.

The rescue of the survivors was organized by her captain, who lost his life in saving those of his subordinates. They made a raft and lowered two launches, the only serviceable boats they had left, and were finally assisted by United States boats, and, according to the statement of an insurgent with whom I talked on the beach, also by an insurgent boat. It was a sublime spectacle that these two ships presented. The explosions that followed each other incessantly did not frighten those valiant sailors, who defended their ship to such an extent that not even a single enemy has been able to set his foot on her.

When I was asked by the United States officer to follow him, as stated above, I first gave instructions for the reembarkation to the third officer, Juan Aznar, whom I have not seen since. When the United States ship, the converted yacht *Gloucester*, arrived I found on board about 20 wounded men belonging mostly to the destroyers, the captains of the latter, three officers of the *Teresa*, and the paymaster of the *Oquendo*. There were in all 93 men belonging to the crews of the squadron.

The captain and officers of the yacht received us with great courtesy, vying with each other in supplying our wants, which were manifold, for we arrived absolutely naked and half starved. The captain said to me that as his ship was so small he could not receive so many and he was going to look for a larger ship to take us. The insurgents with whom I had talked had told me that they had 200 men, among whom there were five or six wounded, and added, on the part of their captain, that if we wanted to go with them we should follow them and they would help us as best they could. I told them to thank their captain for us, and tell him that we had surrendered to the Americans; but if they had a surgeon I should be grateful to them if they would look after some of our wounded on the beach, some of whom were very seriously wounded.

I told the captain of the yacht of this conversation with the insurgents and begged him to reclaim our men, which he promised to do, and he at once sent out a detachment with a flag. He also sent some provisions; of which those on the beach were so much in need.

We then started westerly and met the nucleus of the squadron, from which the auxiliary cruiser *Paris* was detached, and our yacht proceeded until we were off Santiago, where we received instructions, according to which some were transhipped to the *Iowa* and the rest to other vessels, while the wounded were taken to the hospital ship.

During my stay on board the yacht I inquired of the captains of the destroyers as to the fate of their ships, as I was anxious to hear of their sad end. The history of the *Furor* your excellency will learn in detail from the inclosed copy of her captain's report. Capt. Fernando Villamil met a glorious death, and the number of casualties on board bear testimony to the valiant conduct of this little ship, whose captain also was slightly wounded.

I likewise inclose to your excellency a copy of the report from the captain of the *Plutón*, who was also slightly wounded, and whose ship has as glorious a history as her companion.

When I reached the *Iowa*, where I was received with all manner of honors and marks of respect, I had the pleasure of seeing on the gangway the gallant captain of the *Vizcaya*, who came out and greeted me, wearing his sword, which the captain of the *Iowa* did not want him to give up, in testimony of his brilliant defense. A copy of his report is also inclosed, from which your excellency will see that the history of the *Vizcaya* is very similar to that of her sister ships, the *Teresa* and the *Oquendo*, which proves that the same defects had produced the same unfortunate results, and that it was all but a question of time.

I remained on board the *Iowa* until 4 o'clock p. m., when I was transferred to the *St. Louis*, where I met the second in command of the squadron and the captain of the *Colón*.

While still on board the *Iowa*, Admiral Sampson came up, and I asked him for permission to telegraph to your excellency, which I did, as follows:

"In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, and, after an unequal battle against forces more than three times as large as mine, my whole squadron was destroyed. *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore; *Colón*, according to information from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered; the destroyers were sunk. Do not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of *Vizcaya* was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villamil and, I believe, Lazaga; Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds. Cervera. July 4, 1898."

I wish to make a correction as to the fate of the *Plutón*, which was not sunk, but which, unable to maintain herself afloat, succeeded in running ashore, as your excellency will see from the report of her gallant captain.

On board the *St. Louis* the second in command of the squadron and the captain of the *Colón* told me of that ship's sad fate, the former handing me a report, a copy of which is inclosed. I refrain from any comments on a report by this distinguished officer on events of which he was an eyewitness.

In order to complete the outline of the history of this mournful day, there only remains for me to tell your excellency that our enemies have treated and are treating us with the utmost chivalry and kindness. They have clothed us as best they could, giving us not only articles furnished by the Government, but their own personal property. They have even suppressed almost entirely the usual hurrahs out of respect for our bitter grief. We have been and are still receiving enthusiastic congratulations upon our action, and all are vying in making our captivity as light as possible.

I do not yet know our loss of men, being distributed to the different ships, but it is in the neighborhood of my estimates stated in the cablegram despatched to you.

To sum up, the 3d of July has been an appalling disaster, as I had foreseen. The number of dead, however, is less than I feared. Our country has been defended with honor, and the satisfaction of duty well done leaves our consciences clear, though we bitterly mourn the loss of our beloved companions and the misfortunes of our country.

On board this ship there are, besides the second in command of the squadron and myself, with our aides, 1 captain, 4 officers, and 32 men from the *Infanta María Teresa*; the paymaster and 35 men from the *Oquendo*; the 3 commanding officers, 14 other officers, and 191 men from the *Colón*; the captain, chief engineer, and 10 men from the *Furor*; the captain, 1 officer, and 19 men from the *Plutón*, and Lieut. Enrique Capriles, whom I took on board the *Vizcaya* as a passenger from Santiago.

Of all of these I send your excellency a list and shall send further lists as I receive news of the others.

I also send your excellency a list of the captains, officers, and midshipmen who were killed or wounded or who are missing, as also a list of all the wounded other than officers who are on board this ship. The majority of the wounded are on board the hospital ship *Solace*.

As I realize that your excellency might have difficulties in forwarding this communication, I take the liberty of sending a copy of the same to his excellency the minister of marine.

Of special facts worthy of mention which do not affect the general action I shall send separate reports as I learn of them.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, July 9, 1898.

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#### REPORT OF THE COLÓN.

##### *The Second in Command of the Squadron (Paredes) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: I have the honor of submitting to your excellency a report on the battle and the fate of the battle ship *Colón* on the 3d instant, as communicated to me by her gallant captain, as follows:

"In compliance with orders received, I went out of Santiago Harbor with the ship under my command, taking the position assigned to her. At 9.45 o'clock a. m., when abreast of the Morrillo, I opened fire on the *Iowa*, which was the nearest ship at the moment of the sortie.

"Five minutes later, when the *Brooklyn* was at the head of the hostile line, I gave orders to concentrate all the fire upon her and so far as possible upon the *Oregon*, which was on the port quarter, and to which we could not give special attention for lack of bow and stern guns. Our ship fired 184 rounds with 5.9-inch guns and 117 rounds with the 4.7-inch battery, 10 per cent of which are believed to have hit the target. I saw at once that neither the *Brooklyn* nor the *Oregon*, which were chasing the *Colón*, could overtake us, the former falling behind more than the latter, and I proceeded, shaping my course for Cape Cruz, hugging the shore.

"At 1 o'clock p. m. the pressure in the boilers began to go down, decreasing the revolutions from 85 to 80, and the *Oregon* commenced to gain on us, and soon after opened fire with her heavy bow guns, which I could answer only with gun No. 2 of the battery, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. In view of this fact, and the absolute certainty of being captured by the enemy, I acted with your excellency's sanction, as it was not expedient to call any of the officers from their posts, which, in view of the structure and arrangement of the hatchways, would have meant a loss of very precious time.

"Animated by the desire to take advantage to the last moment of any opportunity to fire that might present itself, and in order to obviate being captured, I decided to run ashore and lose the ship rather than sacrifice in vain the lives of all these men who, as your excellency is aware, had fought with brilliant heroism and great discipline and coolness. I therefore shaped our course for the mouth of the Tarquino River and ran aground on the beach at 2 o'clock p. m., at a speed of 13 knots. After the ship had been beached I convened the officers, all of whom expressed themselves satisfied with the course taken, realizing that if we had kept on even for a few minutes longer we should have been in the greatest danger of falling into the hands of the enemy and becoming a trophy of victory, which was to be avoided at any cost.

"Soon after we became prisoners of war on the *Brooklyn*, whose captain came on board shortly after. During the battle we had one man killed and twenty-five wounded. I herewith inclose a list of these casualties. Though a great many of the enemy's projectiles struck us, they did not cause much damage in the protected part of the ship.

"The foregoing I have the honor of submitting to your excellency for your information, expressing at the same time my conviction that each and all did their duty under the difficult circumstances under which the sortie was effected and the disadvantages of the battle, owing to the superiority of the enemy and the great deficiencies of our means of attack."

As a witness of what occurred, I wish to state to your excellency that, in the midst of our sorrow over the loss of the ship and the gallant and heroic men, I feel great satisfaction in knowing that all have done their sacred duty in the defense of their flag and their country, proving once more that the Spanish navy may be defeated, but never with dishonor.

All on board the *Colón* have shown themselves worthy of their ancestors. It is hardly possible to recommend any one of her noble crew in particular, as all have distinguished themselves alike by their heroism. But I should be failing in a sacred duty if I did not tell your excellency that her valiant captain rose to a height which words can not express; I can only say that he is an honor to the corps in which he serves.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, July 6, 1898.

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#### REPORT OF THE OQUEENDO.

*Lieutenant Calandria to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: The officer who has the honor of addressing your excellency is the senior officer of the battle ship *Almirante Oquendo* who survived the battle of July 3, and he therefore considers it his duty to give your excellency an account of what occurred on said ship during the battle.

When the signal for battle was given, the undersigned officer went to occupy his post, which was the conning tower of the after deck, from where I observed the movements of the hostile fleet, which, as this ship came out of the harbor, was steering in a westerly direction in line ahead, with the cruiser *Brooklyn* in the lead. As soon as we had cleared the channel we followed in the wake of the ship ahead of us and opened fire on the port side while constantly fired upon by the hostile ships, especially the battle ship *Iowa* and cruiser *Brooklyn*, and it was on these two that we mainly concentrated our fire; passing, in the opinion of the undersigned, at a distance of less than 3,826 yards from them.

We continued to steam until we left the *Iowa* somewhat behind on the port quarter, but within range of her artillery, while the *Brooklyn* was on the bow of the same side and the other ships at a distance astern of the *Iowa*. This was the situation of the hostile fleet when I was notified through the speaking tube that fire had broken out in the after torpedo rooms, and as I came out I saw flames issuing forth from the officers' hatchway in the poop. Realizing at once that it would be impossible to control the fire, owing to the proportions it had assumed, I went to the forward deck to report to the captain, and found him preparing to beach the ship with the helm to starboard.

As I was afraid that the bow torpedoes might explode when the ship ran aground in case there should be a violent shock, these torpedoes being all ready to be launched the same as the other torpedoes, I suggested to the captain the expediency of discharging them, and this was done in the forward torpedo room by Ensign Alfredo Nardiz and the personnel under his orders.

At the moment when the ship ran ashore, enveloped in flames, her deck covered with dead and wounded, her guns disabled, the captain gave the undersigned the order to lower the flag, but owing partly to the listlessness with which the order was given and partly to the natural vacillation of those who were to fulfill it, the

distressing order was not carried out. The fire, which by this time had assumed gigantic proportions, caught the lanyard and the flag fell into the flames.

The foregoing is all that the undersigned had a chance to witness of the battle, as he was isolated from the rest of the ship. The details which follow have been compiled from information and data acquired subsequently.

The orders given the two batteries and turrets were to set the sights for distances varying from 2,625 to 3,496 yards. At the fourth round of gun No. 6 (5.5-inch) the breech burst, killing and wounding the crew and blinding the gunner. By this time there were so many casualties in the upper battery—among them the captain of the same, Lieutenant Enrique Marra-López, and Ensign Juan Díaz Escribano, both wounded—that there was only personnel enough left to serve guns Nos. 2 and 4, which continued to fire until both the ammunition hoists broke; and as it was impossible to bring up projectiles, owing to the fires that had broken out in the central ammunition rooms both forward and aft, the firing was continued with the projectiles that were on deck, which, for lack of other means, were carried to the guns by Lieutenant Enrique Marra-López, Midshipman Quirino Gutiérrez, and Third Gunner Antonio Serrano Facio.

The greater part of the rapid-fire battery had been destroyed, several guns having been dismounted, and nearly all the personnel killed or wounded, among them the executive and third officers.

When the third round was about to be fired in the forward turret a projectile entered between the gun and gun port, tearing a piece from the upper edge of the latter and killing the captain of the turret, Eugenio Rodríguez Bárcena, and Third Gunner Francisco García Pueyo, and badly wounding First-class Gunner José Arenosa Sixto, also breaking the tubing and apparatus. In the after turret the captain of the same, Lieutenant Alfonso Polanco y Navarro, was also killed by a fragment. A shell which entered the after torpedo room put the whole personnel of the same out of action. A few moments later another shell, exploding in the central room aft, killed and wounded a number of men, among them Ensign Emilio Pascual del Pobil, who was wounded.

When the captain gave instructions to flood the magazines on account of the fires, the order was transmitted by Lieut. Tomás Calvar to First Machinist Juan Pantín, who went to the central compartment forward for that purpose, where the men's lockers were burning, and succeeded in flooding the forward compartment, but was unable, on account of the furious fire, to flood the after compartments; and the officers' mess room and cabins and the pantries became a prey of the flames. The fire spread to the after deck as the result of burning wood from the officers' mess room falling through the hatch of the ammunition hoist. This would have caused the explosion of the 5.5-inch ammunition room if Third Gunner Germán Montero and Sailor Luis Díaz had not stopped up the hatches, first with wooden gratings and then with wet bedding, and as, in spite of their efforts, they did not succeed in dismounting the hoist to lower the cover of the hatch, they left the deck when it became impossible for them to remain there, after first closing up the 11-inch ammunition rooms.

After beaching the ship, the engines were stopped by orders of the captain, the safety valves were opened, and the engines and boilers dismounted. The work of rescue was then commenced. We had to give up the large boats, as the fire made it impossible to lower them, and some of them were disabled. We succeeded in lowering the yawl, but it sank. The two launches were used successfully. Great acts of heroism were performed in the work of rescue as well as in the battle. Of these I give your excellency a separate account.

When the undersigned jumped into the water there were left on the forecastle the captain, Ensign Alfredo Nardiz, several men, First Boatswain Luis Rodríguez, and First Machinist Juan Pantín. The latter told me that after I had gone the captain, who refused to leave, fell suddenly to the deck, raising his hands to his breast, taken



apparently with an attack of heart failure. They attended him, and when they knew that he was dead, covered his body with a flag. This I learned on board the *Harvard*.

The ship was beached about 10 or 12 miles from the entrance of Santiago harbor.

In the fulfillment of my duty, I submit the foregoing for your excellency's information.

ADOLFO CALANDRIA.

CAMP LONG, PORTSMOUTH NAVY-YARD, July 20, 1898.

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THE REPORT OF THE VIZCAYA.

*The Captain (Eulate) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: In compliance with the instructions received from your excellency, I got my ship ready on the morning of the 2d instant, to go out at 4 p. m. But as the reembarkation of the first company did not begin until that time, it was 6.30 p. m. before the ship was ready to put to sea. At that moment the battle flag was hoisted by the officers, whom I addressed, reminding them of the obligations imposed upon them by the Ordinances, and the heroic deeds of our ancestors in our honorable career. After a prayer, we received, kneeling, the benediction of the chaplain.

With the flag hoisted we were awaiting your excellency's last orders, and at 9 o'clock a. m. of the day following, July 3, the ship was ready to follow in the wake of the flagship. At 9 o'clock (true time) she started up, following the *Teresa*, and at 9.30, after passing Punta Socapa, we went full speed ahead, steering in conformity with the instructions previously issued by your excellency. At the same moment we opened fire on the hostile ships, very heavy at first, but gradually decreasing in the 5.5-inch battery, owing to the defects of the guns and ammunition, of which your excellency is aware.

In spite of these defects, the enthusiasm and intelligence of the officers in charge of the battery and the excellent discipline of their crews made it possible to fire during the battle, which lasted two hours and a half, 150 rounds with the port battery, one of the guns alone firing 40 rounds, the others 25 and above, with the exception of one, which only fired 8 rounds. The deficiencies of these guns were numerous, chief among them, as you already know, the fact that the breech could not be closed, the projectiles jammed, and the firing pins failed to act.

One of the guns had to try seven shells before a serviceable one could be found, another gun even eight, and it was only by dint of hard work that this latter gun could be brought into firing position. In the lower battery the firing was very heavy during the first two hours; after that the number of hostile shells striking and injuring the port guns was such as to disable every one of them and dismount the majority.

In the high battery there were so many casualties that, although there was but one gun left that could be fired, there were not men enough to serve it. In the lower battery there were no men left either to serve the guns or to conduct the firing. It therefore became necessary to decrease the crew assigned to extinguishing the fires that were constantly breaking out everywhere, and as a result of this fact, in conjunction with the circumstance that the fire mains had become useless through hostile fire, the conflagration increased to such an extent that it was no longer possible to control it. It is safe to say that the number of victims in the two batteries two hours after the beginning of the battle was between 70 and 80, most of them killed, among them the captain of the lower battery, Lieut. Julián Ristory y Torres, who for his gallantry deserves a place of honor in the annals of the history of our navy.

Owing to the valiant attack which the flagship made on the enemy at the beginning of the battle, we did not at first have so much to suffer from hostile projectiles,

as only two battle ships were firing upon us. But during the second hour we were the target of four, the *Brooklyn* to port, the *Oregon* on the port quarter, the *Iowa* on the stern, and the *New York* on the starboard quarter, but the last two very close, so that only the after 11-inch gun could answer the fire of the *Iowa* and *New York*. The guns of the starboard turrets forward and aft were able to fire four or five rounds against the *New York*, but the fire was very uncertain because the latter ship, after firing from her port broadside, yawed at the stern.

It was at 9.35 o'clock, after we had come out of the harbor and were shaping our course for Punta Cabrera, that we first received the enemy's fire, and at 11.50, when we could no longer fire with a single gun, I wanted to try whether we could ram the *Brooklyn*, which was the ship that harassed us most on the port side and which was nearest to us. To that end I put to port, but the *Brooklyn* did the same, indicating that she was going to use only her guns. The undersigned, with his head and shoulder wounded, was obliged to withdraw to have his wounds dressed. Almost faint from the loss of blood, he resigned his command for the time being to the executive officer, with clear and positive instructions not to surrender the ship, but rather beach or burn her. In the sick bay I met Ensign Luis Fajardo, who was having a very serious wound in one of his arms dressed. When I asked him what was the matter with him he answered that they had wounded him in one arm, but that he still had one left for his country.

When the flow of blood of my wounds had been checked, I went back on deck and saw that the executive officer had issued orders to steer for the coast in order to run ashore, for we had no serviceable guns left and the fire at the stern had assumed such dimensions that it was utterly impossible to control it. This sad situation was still further complicated by a fire breaking out on the forward deck as the result of the bursting of a steam pipe and the explosion of one or more boilers of the forward group. Although the executive officer, Commander Manuel Roldán y Torres, had acted in accordance with instructions, without exceeding them, I immediately convened the officers who were nearest, among them Lieut. Commander Enrique Capriles, and asked them whether there was anyone among them who thought we could do anything more in the defense of our country and our honor, and the unanimous reply was that nothing more could be done.

In order that the battle flag might not become a trophy of the enemy, I at once gave orders to Ensign Luis Castro to hoist another and lower the former and burn it, which order was promptly carried out. At 12.15, under the galling fire of the four battle ships mentioned above, the cruiser *Vizcaya* ran ashore on the shoals of Aserradero under circumstances which made it impossible to save the ship, not only on account of her position on the shoals and the nature of the latter, but also because I knew that all the magazines must necessarily explode, though there would be time for the rescue, and that was indeed what occurred.

As soon as the ship had been beached, the executive officer gave instructions to make all arrangements for the immediate rescue of the crews. Attempts were at once made to lower the boats. When I found that only one was in serviceable condition, I ordered that it be used mainly for the transportation of the wounded, and I authorized all those who could swim or who had life-preservers or anything else sufficiently buoyant to keep them above water to jump in and try to gain the reefs of the shoal, which was about 98 yards from the bow.

The rescue was effected in perfect order, in spite of the awe-inspiring aspect of the ship on fire, with the ammunition rooms exploding, the flames rising above the fighting tops and smokestacks, and with the side armor red-hot. I was taken ashore by the officers in the last boat that carried wounded, and was subsequently picked up by a United States boat, which carried me to the *Iowa*. The executive officer told me afterwards that only the dead were left on board, as he had at the last moment directed the rescue of those who had taken refuge aft, and whom he had ordered to jump into the water and hold on to ropes which had previously been made fast, and there he and the others waited until they were picked up by our

boat. The conduct of the captain, officers, and crew of the *Iowa*, the ship to which the United States boats carried us, was extremely considerate. I was received with the guard drawn up. When I wanted to surrender my sword and revolver to the captain, he refused to receive them, saying that I had not surrendered to his ship, but to four battle ships, and that he had no right to accept them.

The conduct of our officers and crew has been truly brilliant, and many deeds of heroism which have been recorded will in due season form the subject of a special recommendation, if your excellency should so order.

Of the wounded taken to the *Iowa* five died soon after arriving there, and were buried with the same honors with which the Americans bury their own dead, with the guard drawn up and with the discharge of three volleys of musketry. All the prisoners were present at these ceremonies, which were conducted by the chaplain of the late *Vizcaya*.

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency upon the loss of my ship in a battle against four far superior ships without striking her colors nor permitting the enemy to set foot upon her deck, not even for the rescue. There are 98 men missing of her crew.

ANTONIO EULATE  
(Prisoner of war).

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE AUXILIARY CRUISER ST. LOUIS,  
July 6, 1898.

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#### REPORT OF THE FUROR.

*Lieut. Commander Carlier to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: At half past 9 o'clock on the morning of July 3, upon orders received from the commander in chief of the torpedo boat flotilla, who came on board this ship, we sheered off from Las Cruces Pier, Santiago, and followed in the wake of the *Oquendo*. Before reaching Punta Gorda we commenced to hear the fire of the battle between the vanguard of our squadron and the enemy, and several shells struck near us.

Soon after, in the harbor entrance, the commander gave orders to put to starboard and follow at full speed in the wake of the squadron in a westerly direction, opening fire upon the enemy. From the very first we received an enormous amount of fire from the majority of the hostile ships and were struck by shells of every caliber.

We soon commenced to have casualties from the galling fire and many injuries to the ship, which occurred in the following order: Bursting of the steam pipe of the engine; destruction of the starboard intermediate cylinder; flooding and submersion of the stern; bursting of a boiler; further injuries to the engine; destruction of the three remaining boilers; fires in different parts of the ship, one of great intensity in the engine room, below which was the shell room, and finally, breaking of the servomotor of the helm and tiller. All these accidents occurred one after another in a very short space of time, but we never ceased firing, although the deck was already strewn with a large number of wounded and some dead.

About 10.45 the commander of the flotilla, in view of the foregoing facts, which he had either witnessed or which had been reported to him, gave orders to run ashore, which could not be carried out. As the ship was known to be doomed, having neither rudder nor engine left, the fire, no longer controllable, having invaded the stern and waist, and more than one-half of the crew having been put out of action, the commander ordered the flag and the boats to be lowered, and the men who could do so to get ashore in the boats or with the assistance of life-preservers. I transmitted this order to the executive officer. Several projectiles struck the men who were swimming ashore.

When the hostile fire had ceased, two United States boats came alongside, and

the few of us who still remained on board got in. The enemy did no more than just step on deck, and upon realizing the situation, returned hastily to the boats, fearing an explosion, which, indeed, occurred soon after we had sheered off from the ship, and she sank about a mile from the shore.

Of the crew, which was composed of 75 men, 11 are unhurt; 8 of the dead have been identified; 10 of the wounded have been picked up; the remaining 45 figure in the list as missing, though some of them were left on deck dead and could not be identified; others were drowned, but I have hopes, which I trust I may see fulfilled, that some of these 45 men have gained the shore.

It is with deep sorrow that I have to report to your excellency that among the dead who were identified is our worthy chief, the noble and brilliant Capt. Fernando Villaamil.

All of the foregoing I report to your excellency for your information, in compliance with my duty.

DIEGO CARLIER.

ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, *July 8, 1898.*

#### REPORT OF THE PLUTÓN.

*Lieutenant-Commander Vázquez to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONORED SIR: In compliance with the orders received from the commander in chief of the torpedo-boat division, I sheered off from Las Cruces pier at 9.30 in the morning of the 3d instant and steered straight toward the entrance of Santiago Harbor.

I was off the little town of Cinco Reales when I commenced to notice the falling of shells, the natural result of the battle that was being fought between the vanguard of our squadron and the Americans. I followed closely in the wake of the *Furor*, according to instructions received, and when about to leave the harbor entrance I opened fire upon the nearest hostile ship and went ahead at full speed. After I emerged from the harbor steering in a westerly direction I was greeted by a hail of projectiles. This was the beginning of the battle, and the fire increased as I advanced and got into the midst of the hostile fleet.

About 10.45 a large caliber shell entered the orlop, which rapidly filled with water and the ship pitched forward. Almost at the same time other projectiles hit the forward boilers, which burst. Another entered the ammunition room of my cabin, and besides causing a leak, started a fire in that quarter.

But we steamed on, though at a slower speed, and constantly fired upon by the Americans, whose fire we kept answering. But when I saw that the ship commenced to sink, owing to the water entering at the bow, in the boiler room, and my cabin, I concluded that she could not remain afloat much longer, and tried to run ashore on a small beach near by. I ordered the helm to be put to starboard (port?—O. N. T.) but the rudder no longer responded, the servomotor having been disabled, and one of the tiller ropes broken. The ship was still going ahead and struck on the rocks, completely destroying her bow. Upon instructions from me part of the crew jumped to the ground, others into the water to starboard, some of them gaining the shore.

I then left the deck, went to my cabin, took the package of confidential letters received from your excellency and the commander in chief of the torpedo-boat division, and threw it into the water, together with signal code No. 32 and the Perea signal code and key. I then lowered the flag. After that I went forward, but it was no longer possible to gain the shore from there, as the ship had changed her position. I therefore hailed the boat which had gone ashore with some of the men and, entering it, I was able to gain the rocks. Soon after I heard an explosion and the ship went down as far as the deck.

The hostile fire having ceased, I had a white flag hoisted. A United States boat then came to pick us up and took us to one of their ships.

There were 21 of the crew left, among them 5 wounded; the rest are comprised in the list of dead and missing which I had the honor of handing to your excellency.

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency for your information, in compliance with my duty.

PEDRO VÁZQUEZ.

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS,

July 6, 1898.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

[Received at Portsmouth, N. H., 1.52 p. m., July 11, 1898. Dated Washington, D. C.]

Admiral CERVERA, *Portsmouth, N. H.*:

The following telegram has been received for you from the Captain-General of Cuba:

Being very desirous of alleviating the lot of those heroic defenders of our country who so valiantly succumbed in unequal battle, and to whom, as to yourself, I offer a tribute of admiration, I beg that you will advise me of the amount you require and where you wish it placed. In order to gain time I also address the French consul at New York on this subject.

The following is a copy of the first part of the manifesto in this connection which I addressed to the people of Cuba on the 4th day of July: "Inhabitants of the island of Cuba: Fortune does not always favor the brave. The Spanish squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral Cervera, has just performed the greatest deed of heroism that is perhaps recorded in the annals of the navy in the present century, fighting American forces three times as large. It succumbed gloriously, just when we considered it safe from the peril threatening it within the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. It is a hard blow, but it would be unworthy of Spanish hearts to despair," etc. BLANCO.

LONG, *Secretary of the Navy.*

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

PORTSMOUTH, N. H., *July 11, 1898.*

Your excellency's cable received, for which we are very grateful. The men will remain here where they were landed, having with them 5 army officers, 2 surgeons, 2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman. We officers are to go to Annapolis, where we shall all be together. As we have lost absolutely everything, we need about \$70,000 gold for the present.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).*

HAVANA, *July 11, 1898.*

The consul of Jamaica says that your excellency is waiting for particulars of loss of squadron. In cablegram dated 3d instant I told your excellency and minister war of its sortie from Santiago in same terms in which it was reported to me by commander of navy and general of division. Subsequently, on the 5th, I forwarded to minister war communication from Rear-Admiral Cervera, of same date, reporting destruction squadron. Have received no further official information on this unfortunate event, which saddens the heart of every good Spaniard, and am therefore

unable to give your excellency the particulars you desire. I do not believe that the reports circulating through the American press are trustworthy. Everything indicates, however, that the disaster has not been as great as at first supposed as far as casualties are concerned, especially as to the number of killed.

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Vard (Manterola).*

MADRID, July 11, 1898.

To clear up doubts, examine and transmit literally first few words of telegram addressed by Admiral Cervera to Captain-General from Playa del Este.

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*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

[From Playa del Este to Admiral Cervera, care of commandant naval station, Portsmouth, N. H.]

FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

Off Santiago, July 12, 1898.

The following telegram was received from General Blanco for you:

Am deeply impressed by your excellency's telegram of yesterday and greatly admire conduct of commanders, officers, and crews. Perhaps if another time had been chosen for sortie result would have been different. Sampson states in his report he sustained only three casualties. Is that possible? Advise me how much money is required and where to place it, and I beg that you and all officers and men under your orders will believe in my deepest interest and a desire to better their situation as much as lies in my power.

BLANCO.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON.<sup>1</sup>

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

PORTSMOUTH, N. H., July 13, 1898.

I am in receipt of telegram which your excellency sent me at Playa del Este, from where it was forwarded to me here. Am deeply grieved that all my actions meet with your excellency's censure. Trust I may be able to justify them when time comes, as the facts have taken care of showing that there was no exaggeration in my opinions expressed to your excellency, which you also censured. The sortie at night would not have obviated loss of squadron, and surely the number of dead would have been tripled, provided the sortie could have been effected at all, which pilots doubted. Many thanks for your offers. In my former telegram I have already asked for \$70,000 gold.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., July 16, 1898.

Have just arrived here, second in command of squadron and total of 43 captains, officers, and midshipmen. Petty officers and men, with 4 army officers, 2 surgeons, 2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman, remain at Portsmouth. At the Norfolk hospital there are 48 wounded.

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram was to have been sent from Havana on the 5th or 6th.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, July 18, 1898.

The minister of marine sends respectful greeting to Spanish prisoners. Money sent you from Havana.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 12, 1898.<sup>1</sup>

Presume when peace protocol is signed we shall at once be restored to liberty. If we do not previously receive instructions I intend to contract for passage, drawing for necessary funds upon your excellency or London committee.

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*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).*

HAVANA, August 17, 1898.

In compliance (with) orders (from) your excellency. In reply to your cable (of July 11).

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, August 17, 1898.

If prisoners are granted unconditional liberty you may contract for passage home, preferring, terms being equal, national flag. If possible one ship bound for Ferrol and one for Cadiz and Cartagena. Draw for necessary funds.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 18, 1898.

Días Moreu has obtained permission from United States Government and leaves for Madrid; also Surgeon Jurado, seriously ill, accompanied by Chaplain Riera.

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*The United States Admiral (McNair) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

NAVAL ACADEMY, Annapolis, Md., August 20, 1898.

REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA.

SIR: I have the honor of advising you that the Government of the United States will grant Admiral Cervera and the officers under his orders their liberty upon condition that they pledge their word of honor in the usual form. The admiral's word will suffice as to the troops and crews. Liberty can be granted on this condition only. I call your excellency's attention to the fact that upon pledging their word in the manner indicated about 20,000 men have been restored to liberty, some of whom have already returned to Spain. This was the mode of procedure followed by the commander in chief of the United States troops which operated in Santiago de Cuba.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the United States Admiral (McNair).*

HONORED SIR: The penal code of the Spanish navy defines as crime and provides penalties for the acceptance of liberty upon promise not to take up arms during the

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<sup>1</sup> Received at Madrid the 16th.

continuation of the war. We can, therefore, not accept, and I have the honor of so informing your excellency.

I report the matter to my Government.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ANNAPOLIS, August 20, 1898.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 20, 1898.

I have been officially advised that the United States Government will grant us liberty if we pledge our word not to take up arms during the continuation of the war, as the 20,000 men of Santiago have done. Have replied that we can not do so, because our penal code considers such action criminal. I beg your excellency for instructions.

*Lieutenant-Commander Capriles to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 20, 1898.

I shall not accept liberty upon word of honor, even if authorized by your excellency.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, August 23, 1898.

I approve refusal of officers prisoners to accept liberty upon promise not to take up arms. Advise Lieutenant-Commander Capriles that although his intention may be different, it is considered disrespect on his part to admit possibility of Government authorizing what the penal code forbids.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, August 23, 1898.

Advise me on what terms Díaz Moreu, Jurado, and Riera are returning.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 29, 1898.

Jurado returns sick; Riera to take care of him. *Particulare official letter 12th instant.*<sup>1</sup> I did not mediate in Moreu's liberty.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 31, 1898.

United States Government grants us unconditional liberty. Shall at once look for transport in compliance with your excellency's instructions.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, September 1, 1898.

You may contract for steamers necessary for return prisoners. But for sanitary reasons, if only one ship, to go to Santander; if two, one to Santander and one to Vigo.

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<sup>1</sup>The sentence in *italics* is not in the pamphlet.



*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

ANNAPOLIS, MD., September 3, 1898.

Committee I sent to New York has contracted for transportation of men for £11,185, payable at sight in London, order Krajewski, Pesant & Co. Draft upon committee navy. Will notify of departure.

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*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

MADRID, September 4, 1898.

I approve of arrangements. There being only one ship, go to Santander and notify me of departure.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

NEW YORK, September 8, 1898.

Wounded (from) Norfolk have arrived (in) *City (of) Rome*. To-morrow officers from Annapolis will arrive. The day after steamer leaves for Portsmouth to embark nucleus of men. I leave now to arrange for embarkation.<sup>1</sup>

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*

PORTSMOUTH, September 12, 1898.

We are about to leave. Probable arrival 21st. I beg that commandant navy be instructed to issue passports to captains and officers for respective homes, except those mentioned by me, in immediate charge of expedition.

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*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

PORTSMOUTH, N. H., September 12, 1898.

We are about to leave for Spain.

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*The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).*

HONORED SIR: As I tread once more the soil of our beloved country I deem it my duty to give you in the shortest possible form an account of events from the day of the disaster of July 3 to the present date. I will not weary your excellency with the many transfers we had to make during the first few days, and will confine myself to stating that all the prisoners were divided into three groups. The one to which I belonged was assigned to the auxiliary cruiser *St. Louis*; another, the most numerous, to the auxiliary cruiser *Harvard*, and a third, the least numerous, but composed of the most seriously wounded and sick, to the hospital ship *Solace*.

In my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3, I had the honor of telling your excellency of the kindness and courtesy with which we were treated by the enemy, with the exception of one unfortunate incident which occurred on board the *Har-*

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<sup>1</sup> Words in parentheses were not in the original, but appeared in the pamphlet; those in *italics* vice versa.

ward, and of which I shall speak in a separate letter,<sup>1</sup> and some friction at Portsmouth, N. H., which does not deserve special mention.

The United States Government had prepared on Seavey Island a camp composed of wooden barracks for the petty officers, crews, and troops; that is to say, for all except the active officers, who were assigned to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., with the exception of the seriously wounded and sick, who were sent to the Naval Hospital at Norfolk, Va. The first expedition to arrive was that of the *St. Louis*, of which I formed part. We were landed at Portsmouth, N. H., on July 10, at which time I learned of the different points to which we had been assigned.

I requested Captain Goodrich of the *St. Louis* that a few officers be permitted to remain with the men who were to camp at Seavey Island, and that we be allowed to take with us to Annapolis a few sailors in the capacity of servants, which was granted by the United States Government. I therefore appointed Lieuts. Antonio Magaz, formerly of the crew of the *Vizcaya*, Fernando Bruquetas, of the *Teresa*, Adolfo Calandria, of the *Oquendo*, and Antonio Cal, of the *Colón*; Ensign Carlos Boado, of the *Plutón*; and Midshipman Enrique Morris to serve as interpreter on account of his knowledge of English. All these officers remained at Portsmouth with the exception of Calandria, who was not on the *St. Louis*, but on the *Harvard*. Surgs. Salvador Guinea and Alejandro Lallemand, Assistant Gabriel Montesinos, and Chaplains Matías Biesa and Antonio Granero also remained to attend to the many sick and to the spiritual welfare of all.

During our stay at Portsmouth we received a visit from the bishop of Portland and the curate of Portsmouth. Words fail me to give an idea of their kindness. We remained at Portsmouth until the 14th, when we left for Annapolis, where we arrived on the 16th. The same day the *Solace* arrived at Norfolk and landed the sick and wounded, a list of whom I sent your excellency by cable. During the night of July 4, there occurred on board the *Harvard* the incident above referred to. This latter vessel reached Portsmouth on the 15th, landing Lieutenant Calandria, Surg. Adolfo Núñez and the men, and on the evening of the 20th she arrived at Annapolis, where the captains and officers were landed.

At Annapolis I was received with the honors due my rank. I was given a well-furnished house, where I remained during the whole time of our captivity with Capt. José de Paredes and one of my aides and a sufficient number of servants to make us very comfortable. The captains and officers were also given comfortable quarters and were always treated with the greatest courtesy. The United States Government was kind enough to appoint Rear-Admiral McNair, superintendent of the Naval Academy, so that I might not be under the orders of an officer of inferior rank to mine. In a word, we were treated at Annapolis with a kindness and courtesy that have probably no equal in history in the treatment of prisoners.

When we were settled and I had the necessary clothes, I wanted to visit our men at Norfolk. I asked the United States Government for permission to do so, which was granted, and left Annapolis on August 4, arriving at Norfolk on the morning of the 5th, where I was received with the greatest courtesy, by express orders, I believe, of the United States Government. I spent the day with the sick and wounded and went back at night, reaching Annapolis the next morning. At the hospital I found every one well treated and carefully attended, and had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Arthur C. Humphreys, who was our vice-consul until the war broke out, and who has been a friend and comfort to our wounded. He has since rendered us great service in the transportation of the sick to New York, to embark them on the *City of Rome*, which was accomplished by his disinterested efforts in a

<sup>1</sup> The letter referred to is omitted, as I do not deem it necessary. It is contained in the pamphlet mentioned. The incident to which reference is had was the death of six sailors and the wounding of many others, some of whom have subsequently died, caused by the United States watch at daybreak of July 5.

more economical manner than I would have thought possible. I recommend him especially to your excellency.

While yet at Annapolis I asked for permission to go to Portsmouth, and the Government hastened to grant it and to issue instructions accordingly. I left Annapolis on August 12, arriving at Portsmouth at 11 o'clock a. m. of the 13th. I was met at the station by a naval lieutenant by orders of Mr. C. A. Carpenter, superintendent of the navy-yard, who invited me to his house, together with my aide, a paymaster whom I had taken along to distribute a month's pay, and Ensign Narciso Díez, who had gone with me to relieve Carlos Boado, whose health was very delicate.

I found conditions different here from what they were at Annapolis. There was not the same material comfort nor the same courtesy; on the contrary, it was noticeable at once that there was a lack of material welfare, and in the relations with our enemies I thought I could see friction, and on the part of some of them a desire to make especially the officers feel that they were prisoners, and make them suffer the bitterness of their sad lot. While it never came to open insults, there is no doubt that the people there did not act according to the desires and certainly not the spirit that prevailed in the higher Government spheres.

As to the material care I will state that for lodging the men ten barracks had been built, each 100 feet long and 15 feet wide, so that the ground covered was 15,000 square feet. As we had over 1,500 men, 150 had to be put into each barrack, which gave each man only 10 square feet of space. The officers had only one barrack, the dimensions of which I do not remember, but it had all along the walls miserable cots (I could not call them beds) and in the middle was a table lengthened by boards and disreputable looking remnants of chairs. As politely as I knew how, I commented on this to Admiral Carpenter, and in honor to truth I must say that when I left Portsmouth two days later the officers had chairs and another barrack was being built for a dining room, and instructions had been issued to stop up every crack of the old barrack.

I left Portsmouth on August 16, arriving at Annapolis on the evening of the next day. On August 20 Admiral McNair handed me the letter which I inclose to your excellency, marked No. 1, as also my reply thereto, marked No. 2. I notified you of the substance of these letters by telegram, and your excellency approved of my reply. In view of the decision of the United States Government that we should promise not again to take up arms and the fact that we could not do so under our laws, I deemed it necessary to write Admiral McNair letters Nos. 3 and 4,<sup>1</sup> of which I inclose a rough draft, referring respectively to the invalids and the firemen engaged in Cuba entitled to be sent back.

Admiral McNair also advised me, in letter marked No. 5, that we were to be prepared to leave the academy. Aside from the above there were no further incidents, except the deaths which have occurred since we landed, of which I sent you a list, and the return to Spain of Capt. Emilio Díaz Moreu, Surg. Antonio Jurado, and Chaplain José Riera, of which I notified your excellency at the time. On August 31 Admiral McNair wrote me a letter stating that the United States Government granted us unconditional liberty, and I at once appointed a committee, composed of Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster Eduardo Urdapilleta, to go to New York and make arrangements for passage, in accordance with your excellency's instructions; and I also sent a surgeon to New York to purchase such medicines as the steamer did not carry and as might be needed, and I and my aides got ready to go at the last hour to settle minor difficulties that might present themselves.

Before proceeding, I wish to state that wherever we went there were demonstrations of the greatest sympathy with our misfortune. I have received many visits and many kind services from prominent people, some of very high rank, and at Annapolis the whole population was very kind toward us. Admiral McNair and the whole

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<sup>1</sup>Some of the documents referred to have not been included in this collection because it was not deemed necessary.

personnel under his orders have distinguished themselves by their exquisite courtesy, for which I considered it my duty to thank him in a letter of which I inclose memorandum. To take charge of the expedition I appointed Lieut. Commanders Juan B. Aznar and Carlos González Llanos, Lieuts. José Butrón and Lorenzo Milá, Captain of Artillery Manuel Hermida, Ensign Enrique de la Cierva, and Midshipman Juan Munoz, and Raimundo Torres. I have granted permission to all the other captains and officers who have asked to be allowed to return to Spain, without giving them any further assistance. I inclose a list of these.

When everything was in readiness at Annapolis, I thought it best to take a trip to Norfolk, New York, and Portsmouth, before the steamer was ready, and I am glad I did so, as I had a chance to settle several small difficulties which might perhaps have delayed the steamer, which would have increased the expense. Of the firemen engaged in Cuba, 20 asked for permission to go with us, and only the 19 mentioned in the inclosed list took passage for Havana, and I wrote to the commandant-general of the navy-yard, asking him to send them on to Santiago.

We had with us 29 prisoners of the army, among them 8 officers. I asked the Captain-General for instructions relative to these, and in accordance with his orders have gone to Havana, while the others have come with us. All of them have received some aid, of which they stood much in need. I was obliged to leave Seaman José Maria Vilar Toinil at Portsmouth, as the physicians stated that it would endanger his life to take him on board. I left with Commodore George C. Remey \$50 for his expenses and a letter, of which I inclose memorandum.

The committee appointed to charter the steamer did so on the terms stated in the contract, of which I forward a copy to your excellency. In accordance with the terms provided, with the efficient assistance of the United States authorities, the whole embarkation was accomplished without trouble of any kind; no one was absent, and by noon of the 12th we were on our way home, and every face on board expressed the joy that filled every heart. The trip was made with the most beautiful weather and has benefited everyone, especially the sick. There were 300 when I went to Portsmouth, but their number has been reduced to 180, and even these are much improved, so that very few will have to be carried out on stretchers, and I am happy to say no death occurred while we were on the sea; nor has there been any disaster, and it has not been necessary to admonish a single man. Four members of the Red Cross Society came with us, and their conduct has been of the very best. Their names are given in the inclosed report.

I also inclose a list of all the personnel that came home with me, amounting in all to 2 flag officers, 8 captains, 70 officers and midshipmen, and 1,574 petty officers, sailors, and naval troops, and 2 officers and 21 men belonging to the army.

Before closing this long history permit me to say that the officers who were at Portsmouth, with the men, have conducted themselves with the greatest tact, patience, and prudence. In my official letter of August 11 I have already told your excellency of the merits of the medical corps and chaplains, which I hereby confirm. As to the special merits of some of the others your excellency will be advised by the inclosed copy of the official letter from Lieut. Antonio Magaz, who was the oldest officer there. Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster Eduardo Urdapilleta accomplished their mission of chartering the steamer in the best possible manner, taking into account the state of the market. Paymaster Urdapilleta has shown himself to be one of the best officers of the service, which I take great pleasure in stating.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTANDER, September 20, 1898.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).<sup>1</sup>*

## ARMY OF OPERATIONS IN CUBA, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: I am just in receipt of the report which you were kind enough to address to me, dated on the sea, July 9 last, on the battle sustained by the squadron under your orders in the waters of Santiago de Cuba, on July 3, against the United States naval forces. I transmit the report to-day to the minister of war for the information of the Government, accompanied by the following letter:

"HONORED SIR: I have to-day received from Admiral Pascual Cervera the official report, of which I inclose a copy to your excellency, on the battle he sustained in the waters of Santiago de Cuba on July 3 last, said report being dated on the sea, July 9. If the accounts published as to this event should not be sufficient to make you appreciate the gallant conduct of our sailors on that day, the reading of this document will certainly suffice to make anyone realize the valor, presence of mind, and self-sacrifice shown in this fierce battle against far superior forces, not only by the flag-officers, captains, and officers, but also by the crews of the ships. Though victory has not crowned their gallant efforts, they have demonstrated once more the military virtues that grace the Spanish navy by giving the noblest example of heroism. In view of these facts, it is my opinion that Rear-Admiral Cervera, the captains of the ships composing the squadron, and all those who took part in the battle are entitled to signal rewards for their valiant conduct, and I beg your excellency to use your best endeavors with Her Majesty the Queen to grant them such reward."

I have nothing to add to the foregoing, except again to express my admiration for the gallant conduct of your excellency and the squadron under your command, and to lament with the army here and the whole nation the sacrifice of so many lives on the altar of the nation's honor. But, as in the first paragraph of your report you expressed an idea upon which I can not help but comment, though only in a few words, I wish to state that, if it is intended thereby to make me responsible for the results of that ill-fated operation, I accept beforehand every responsibility that can be laid to me as the result of the orders which, guided by the most patriotic intentions, I deemed expedient to dictate to your excellency, since I had the honor of having the squadron under your worthy command placed under my orders.

RAMÓN BLANCO.

His Excellency Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA.

HAVANA, August 7, 1898.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*

HONORED SIR: Not until this morning did I receive your excellency's letter dated August 7, which, though not signed, I know to be

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<sup>1</sup> This letter was received by me at Madrid shortly after my return from the United States.

genuine, as it came to me with your confidential letter of September 15, in which you notify me that you sent it in case your former letter sent to the United States had been lost.

I thank your excellency many times, not in my name alone, but in the name of those who were under my orders, for the kind words which you addressed to the minister of war in our behalf when you sent him my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3.

Relative to the matter that concerns me alone, I wish to explain to your excellency the object and motives that impelled me to place at the beginning of my report the words that gave rise to your remarks. Permit me first of all to say that it was not my desire to incriminate anyone, nor to throw responsibility upon anyone, but simply to disclaim any responsibility which a priori might be laid to me and which does not belong to me.

It is certain that we accepted a war with the United States for which we were not prepared, as we had no fleet such as would have been necessary to defend the colonies. This matter was the subject of an interesting correspondence, both official and confidential, which I had with the Government before the war became inevitable.

It is also certain that when this war did become inevitable I wanted to formulate a plan of campaign and the Government refused me permission to go to Madrid with that end in view.

My ideas on this subject were that we should have to lose Cuba in any event, and if my squadron, the only naval forces of any value that we possessed, were destroyed, that a humiliating peace entailing many other losses was sure to follow the destruction of my squadron. Subsequent events have shown that I was right on this point.

In order to save the squadron it would have been necessary to draw the enemy away from their base of operations to some point where they would not be able to take all their forces. We should have had all of ours united where we had better resources. But I never could make these ideas clear, which explains why I was so energetically and obstinately opposed to the squadron going to the West Indies.

It was this departure for the West Indies that was the signal for our loss, as I had the honor of telling your excellency in a telegram. After that nothing that happened could surprise me. Hence the introductory words of my report.

Perhaps if I had not gone out Shafter would have reembarked his forces. I was told so in the United States, and I believed it then, although this would only have prolonged the agony of Santiago de Cuba for a few days; for I considered the city lost from the moment when I arrived there, and told the Government so in my telegram of May 21, two days after I entered.

Having explained to you that it was not the object of the introduction to my report to throw responsibilities upon anyone, but simply to disclaim such responsibility as does not belong to me, there only remains

for me to reiterate to your excellency my thanks for the kind words addressed to us all.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

His excellency the CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF OPERATIONS IN CUBA, *Havana*.

MADRID, *October 8, 1898.*

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*The Captain-General of the Army of the Island of Cuba.*

[Private.]

HAVANA, *September 15, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR SIR AND HONORED ADMIRAL: As soon as I received your telegram advising me that you were about to leave Portsmouth, I replied, wishing you a safe voyage. But you had already embarked, as you will see from the inclosed dispatch,<sup>1</sup> and I, therefore, take the liberty of writing to you to fulfill that duty of courtesy.

I do not know whether you will finally receive my communication dated August 7, in which I acknowledge the receipt of the report you were kind enough to address to me on the 9th of July. In case you should not receive it, I send you herewith a copy of the communication referred to.

And while I hold the pen in my hand, permit me also to answer a remark which occurred in one of your telegrams and which I thought better not to answer by telegram, especially at that time.

You said that your actions met with nothing but censure on my part. I have never censured you, my dear Admiral; on the contrary, I have always been lavish with praise, as you deserve, both before and after your arrival in Santiago. You will remember that as soon as you arrived I congratulated you on your skillful seamanship. Since then there may have been differences of opinion between us, but never censure, at least not on my part, for I can not believe that you would so construe a phrase in one of my letters, written in a moment of the greatest bitterness I have ever experienced in my life, under the impression of that great national misfortune, and in which I only expressed doubt.<sup>2</sup>

In any event, although you do not need my support, which moreover could not be of any help to you, as the blow has struck me harder than you, be sure that I shall always be on your side and on the side of the navy, whatever may be the vicissitudes of these unhappy times through which we are passing, and the attitude which you assume toward me.

Wishing you sincerely all manner of happiness, I remain as ever, yours, etc.,

RAMÓN BLANCO.

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<sup>1</sup>THE INTERNATIONAL OCEAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

HON. GENERAL BLANCO:

*September 12, 1898.*

We are advised from Portsmouth that your telegram of this date to Admiral Cervera could not be delivered, the person addressed having left for Europe on the steamer *City of Rome* before the receipt of the cable.

<sup>2</sup>The letter referred to never reached me.

MADRID, October 7, 1898.

His Excellency RAMÓN BLANCO.

MY DEAR FRIEND AND RESPECTED GENERAL: Last evening I received your favor of September 15, together with the official letter of August 7, which, probably through an oversight, had not been submitted to your excellency for signature. To-day I answer both.

It was not necessary for you to forward to me the note from the International Ocean Telegraph Company, for how could I ever doubt your exquisite courtesy? That would not be possible.

I am not the only one who has seen censure in some of your telegrams, especially the one you sent to Santiago, and which I do not have before me, as I have not yet received the documents which, in anticipation of the disaster, I left in that city. In this telegram you said that you believed I exaggerated, and other things which I do not wish to repeat from memory and in order not to make this letter too long; but I regret I shall not be able to make it short, though I do not wish to trouble you.

You will remember that I answered that I had to respect your opinions and not discuss them, because to my mind that is all a subaltern should do, and if I subsequently pointed out to you in another telegram the impossibility of going out at night, it was only by way of information, which I must now give you more in full.

As Santiago was short of artillery in the modern sense of the word (for, aside from the guns of the *Mercedes*, which were mounted at the Socapa and Punta Gorda, there were only two 3.54-inch Krupp guns, which were of no use against the ships, and some howitzers and absolutely useless guns), the enemy was not afraid to approach the harbor entrance, especially at night, when they remained in the immediate vicinity of the same.

At night they always had one ship, relieved every three or four hours, less than a mile from the harbor entrance, maintaining the latter constantly illuminated, and, as though this were not enough, they had other smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats close to the headlands of the entrance. Once in a while these latter boats would exchange musketry fire with our forces.

Under these circumstances it was absolutely impossible to go out at night, because in this narrow channel, illuminated by a dazzling light, we could not have followed the channel and would have lost the ships, some by running aground, others by colliding with their own companions.

But even supposing that we had succeeded in going out, before the first ship was outside we should have been seen and covered from the very first with the concentrated fire of the whole squadron. Of the efficiency of that fire an idea may be gained from what happened to the *Reina Mercedes* during the night of July 3.

In daytime, on the other hand, the hostile squadron was more scattered and some of the ships were usually absent, as was the case with the *Massachusetts* on July 3.



Feeling sure, as I did, that the disaster was inevitable, all I could do was to see that we had the least possible number of men killed and to prevent the ships from falling into the enemy's hands, thereby complying, as we literally did comply, with an article of the Ordinances of the Navy which the minister of marine cited in a cablegram to me.

If Santiago de Cuba had been even reasonably well armed, the hostile ships would always have kept at a distance of five or six miles at least, in which case they could not have lighted up the harbor entrance so effectively, and we could then have maneuvered with some remote prospect of success.

In your letter you alluded to a phrase from another letter of yours which I never received, and my telegram from Portsmouth was only in answer to the one which you sent me in reply to mine of July 4. In this telegram you say about as follows:

If the sortie had been made at another time, perhaps the result would have been different.

I repeat that I do not have the telegram before me and shall correct such words as may not have been employed.

I confess that I saw in this sentence another censure, and I am glad to see from your letter that such was not your intention, although it was so construed by the very few persons whom I consulted.

I thank you very much for the support you offer me and still more for the generous terms in which you couch the offer. Although my attitude has already been defined in an official letter, I believe it my duty to speak of it more fully.

I never have held, nor do I hold now, any grudge against anyone, least of all against you: Hence it is not my intention to attack anyone, but I must defend myself from the many things that have been said against me here; and if in doing so I should indirectly attack anyone I shall feel very sorry.

If I were the only one concerned I should make an end of it right here and ask for my retirement, as I have been wanting to do for some time. But when I returned to Spain I found part of the nation led astray in its judgment of these matters in their relations to the future, and the navy made the subject of unjust attacks, and looking upon me as embodying in my conduct its spotted honor; and I can not betray the navy, and still less my country.

Therefore, as soon as judgment has been passed upon my conduct or the case dismissed, I shall publish my whole correspondence, and, unless my strength shall fail me, subject everything that has happened to a critical examination without going into personalities, inspired only by the interests of our country and the dangers which I see ahead for the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and Ceuta. If anything personal should result from this (which I hope not), it will not be my fault.

In closing this letter, permit me to assure you of my profound respect, and to remain as ever, yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

## APPENDIXES

Which in Themselves Justify Many of the Statements Contained in the Text.

### I.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION OF THE SQUADRON OF RESERVE  
TO THE UNITED STATES COASTS (MAY 27).

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cámara).*

HONORED SIR: The equipment of the squadron under your excellency's worthy command having been completed and the ships supplied with provisions and coal, you will arrange for its immediate departure for the harbor of Las Palmas, where without loss of time you will replenish the coal consumed and take whatever quantity of provisions you may deem necessary, according to the respective purposes for which the different units are intended. At Las Palmas you will form three divisions of the squadron.

The first,<sup>1</sup> composed of the battle ship *Carlos V*, cruisers *Rápido*, *Patriota*, and *Meteoro*, and dispatch boat *Giralda*, will remain under

<sup>1</sup> Description of first division.

Name of ship.	Coal capacity.	Daily coal consumption—	
		At 11.22 knots.	At 15 knots.
	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>
Carlos V .....	2,000	70	169
Rápido .....	2,362	66	158
Patriota .....	2,749	(a)	(a)
Meteoro .....	1,945	99	236
Giralda .....	436	23	48

a Not known.

your excellency's immediate command. The second division, composed of the battle ships *Pelayo* and *Vitoria*, and destroyers *Osado*, *Audaz*, and *Proserpina*, will be placed under the orders of the oldest captain, being the commander of the *Pelayo*, Capt. José Ferrándiz y Niño. The third division, of which the auxiliary cruisers *Buenos Aires*, *Antonio López*, and *Alfonso XII* will form part, will be commanded by Capt. José Barrasa y Fernández de Castro.

The squadron will leave the harbor mentioned united, and in order that its subsequent movements may not be surprised it will shape its

course for the West Indies until at a sufficient distance from the Canaries and from the course most frequented by the ships crossing those waters; or the whole squadron will perform evolutions within sight of said islands, simulating tactical exercises while waiting for nightfall, when each of the divisions, upon previous orders to be issued by your excellency, will proceed in the proper direction for the purposes hereinafter set forth.

The first division under the command of your excellency will shape its course for the Bermudas, and at a proper distance from those islands you will detach a fast vessel to acquire at Hamilton all possible information, besides such as the Government will communicate to you through our consul, José García Acuña, a resident of said port, as to the location, number, and quality of the hostile forces distributed along the Atlantic coast, it being understood that the communication with the Bermudas must be confined to the one vessel referred to and only for a length of time absolutely necessary for the purpose indicated, the rest of the division to pass out of sight of the islands, so that its presence in said waters may not become known.

Taking into account the information you may acquire, and eluding an encounter with superior forces, your excellency will choose such point on the United States coasts as you may deem best adapted—Charleston, if possible—to carry out in the direction from south to north a series of hostile acts, in the energy of which you will be guided by circumstances, against fortified positions as well as against such places as, owing to their industrial, military, or commercial importance, will justify the operation and make it worth while. I call your excellency's attention to the expediency of your course along the coast being from south to north as indicated. Key West being the enemy's principal base of operations, the forces detached to oppose your operations will follow you instead of going to meet you, as would otherwise be the case.

Your excellency will determine to what point the hostilities should be carried, remembering that the object of these hostilities is not only to make reprisals for the enemy's unjustified acts on our own coasts, but principally to call his attention toward the north, dividing his forces and thus facilitating the movements of the third division and at the same time those of Admiral Cervera's squadron. You might find it expedient (but this is not imposed upon you as a duty) to go up north as far as to permit you to detach a cruiser to Halifax, in order that Lieut. Ramón Carranza, who is assigned to Canada, may give you such information as he may have acquired beforehand. Having accomplished on the United States coasts the object indicated, and following the route which offers the greatest security, you will try, unless reasons of greater importance should prevent, to pass north of the island of Mariguana, or Turks Island, and collect at the latter the information which the Government will take care to forward to you there.

From that favorable position you may proceed at your discretion to the southern coast of Cuba, around Cape Maysi, and enter Santiago Harbor; or, following said coast, enter Havana Harbor, or passing north of the Keys, enter the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico. Any prizes you may be able to capture during this expedition, if the conditions of the vessel or the nature of the cargo make it worth while, you will dispatch to the Peninsula, with a suitable prize crew on board, or incorporate in your division, as the case may be. If the services such prizes can render do not compensate for the trouble they require, it will be better to get rid of them by sinking them or setting them on fire, after transshipping whatever you may deem serviceable, in any event the personnel and flags, the portable armament, and the ship's papers.

As to the second division, in order that its separation from the rest of the squadron may remain unknown as long as possible, and also in order that it may be in a position to reach speedily, if need be, any given point of the Peninsula or the Canaries, where its defensive action may be required, will cruise between parallels 30 and 36 north latitude, the ninth meridian west, and the coast of Africa, for ten or twelve days from the date when it begins to maneuver independently, which is probably the time it will take your excellency to reach the United States coast, after which the second division will proceed to Cadiz to receive further orders.

The third division, upon leaving your excellency's flagship, will proceed to the latitude of Cape St. Roque, to cut off the route of the vessels plying between the eastern coast of the United States and South America or the Pacific. It will remain on this route, cruising as far as the tenth degree north latitude, as long as its radius of action (calculated by that of the ship having the smallest radius) will permit, including the return. The object of this expedition will be to capture the greatest possible number of prizes, concerning which the commander of the division will observe what I have previously stated relative to the prizes which your excellency may take.

In case of injury or any other unfortunate circumstance making it necessary for any of the ships of this division to seek a port, you will see, provided there is a possibility of choice, that preference be given to the French colonies. With the necessary prudence, the commander of these forces will detach one of his ships to Fort de France, Martinique, where it will receive orders from the Government and acquire such information as may be of importance to him. But if from unforeseen causes he should not find upon his arrival the orders referred to, it will be understood that the division is to return to the harbor of Las Palmas, following the shortest route and carefully eluding the hostile forces, if the power of the latter renders this necessary.

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the commanders of the second and third divisions, when navigating independently, will proceed within the scope of the general outline traced

above, but with all the liberty of action that may be necessary to insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that he who causes the greatest amount of damages to the enemy without endangering his own forces will best fulfill his mission. If the vicissitudes of the voyage give your excellency an opportunity to join Admiral Cervera's squadron, you will do so at once, and the forces will remain united until the Government decides that it is expedient to separate them again, or until both commanders in chief, or in case of difference of opinion, the eldest commander, should deem such separation necessary.

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that may be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere to the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for claims on the part of neutral powers. The Queen and the Government are confident that this expedition, intrusted to the zeal of your excellency and your subordinates, will be carried out in such manner as to earn the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may be accomplished, in spite of the scarcity of resources, by energy, intelligence, and good will placed at the service of the King and the country.

MADRID, May 27, 1898.

## II.

*The Admiral (Cámara) to the Minister (Auñón).*

CADIZ, June 15, 1898.

I can assure your excellency that all are cooperating with me for immediate departure, and if we do not sail as speedily as desired it is owing to difficulties impossible to overcome, in spite of the most earnest desire. I repeat that the utmost coal capacity of the *Rápido* and *Patriota* is only 3,000 tons. *Carlos V* will refill bunkers as far as possible while the 3.94-inch armament is being completed, having until now been busy with speed trials. I shall confer with the Captain-General of the Departamento, after inspecting the ships, in order to settle any difficulties that may present themselves, and to fulfill your wishes, which are my own as well. I hope to be ready next week.

## III.

*The minister of war (Correa) to the minister of marine (Auñón), Cadiz.*

MADRID (not dated—about middle of June).

The military governor of Cadiz transmitted to the minister of marine the following telegram from the minister of war:

(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.) Kindly advise minister marine, in strict confidence, that I have received very serious news from the Philippines and that the Government considers it necessary for the squadron fitted out, or part of same, to leave immediately in order to calm anxiety of public opinion and raise spirit of fighting forces through knowledge that reinforcements are coming.

## IV.

*The minister of marine (Auñón) to the commander in chief of the squadron of reserve (Cámara).*

JUNE 15, 1898.

HONORED SIR: The equipment of the squadron under your excellency's worthy command having been completed, the ships provisioned and coaled, the necessary papers issued, and the troops and supplies having been embarked in the transports mentioned in the inclosed memorandum, you will arrange for the immediate departure of the squadron in a southwesterly direction, timing yourself so that you will be near the Strait of Gibraltar by nightfall. After nightfall you will dismiss the trans-Atlantic steamers *Alfonso XII* and *Antonio López* to carry out independently their respective orders from the ministry of war. With the remainder of the squadron and the convoy you will pass through the Strait of Gibraltar at the necessary speed, so that by daybreak you will be in the Mediterranean and out of sight of the lookouts of that place.

When this has been accomplished you will dismiss those of the colliers whose rate of speed will not permit them to follow the speed of the squadron, and will shape your course for Suez, avoiding as much as possible passing within sight of land. The coal consumption of the deep-draft ships should be proportioned methodically, so that upon arrival at Suez they may be as nearly alike as possible, so as to facilitate the passage through the canal under statutory conditions without the necessity, or with the least possible necessity, of transshipping or unshipping anything.

Upon arrival at Port Said, and upon notifying this ministry by cable of the condition in which the expedition reaches that city, and the facilities or difficulties that may present themselves for passing through the canal and the means to be employed for overcoming such difficulties, if any there be, you will receive orders to continue or modify your course. In the former case, or in case you should not be able to communicate with the Government, you will replenish the destroyers with the necessary coal to enable them to return to Mahon, and will instruct them to proceed to that place either directly or with such stops as you may consider necessary.

Thereupon the remaining ships will pass through the Suez Canal, and take on board pilots and such Arabic personnel as you may deem necessary to lighten the arduous work of the firemen in the Red Sea. You will choose a point on the Red Sea or on the Island of Socotra, or any other point you may deem suitable for the purpose, and there provision and coal the ships, taking the coal from the slow colliers, provided they have rejoined the squadron, leaving these vessels enough coal for the homeward voyage and dispatching them back to Cartagena.

If the slow colliers have not rejoined the squadron and you have no

news of them, you may take coal from the colliers accompanying the squadron and continue the voyage, leaving behind for the former, if possible without endangering the necessary secrecy, instructions to rejoin the squadron, or stay at Suez, or return to Spain, as you may think best. From Socotra you will proceed to the Laccadive Islands, in one of which you may perhaps have a chance to complete the coaling of the squadron, and from there, unless it should be necessary for any of the ships to touch or be detached, to a port in Ceylon, you will continue your voyage in the manner hereinafter indicated.

From any point where the colliers of the squadron may lighten their cargo you may dispatch them back to the Peninsula, or the nearest place where they can renew their cargo, giving them instructions in the latter case as to where to rejoin the squadron. From the Laccadives you may choose your route according to circumstances, either passing from the north through the Strait of Malacca and coaling again at some anchoring place on the northern coast of Sumatra; or, passing through the Strait of Sunda, touching at Singapore or Batavia if deemed necessary, and proceeding thence to Labuan, Borneo; or, finally, passing south of Sumatra and Java and through the Strait of Lombok, going thence directly to Mindanao, without stopping at Labuan.

If either of the first two routes is adopted, you can communicate at Labuan with Madrid, stating the condition in which the ships arrive, and receive the confirmation or modification of these instructions, after which you may proceed with the united squadron, or detach ships, as in your judgment may be most effective, to Balabac, Jolo, Basilan, or Zamboanga, reenforce the detachments with the landing troops, or, if possible, enter into communication with the authorities at Manila for the purpose of cooperating in the future.

As it is the main object of the expedition to assert our sovereignty in the Philippine Archipelago, and as it is impossible to tell what will be the condition of the islands at the comparatively remote date of your arrival at Mindanao, you will from that time on make your own plans and take such steps as will lead to the attainment of the total or partial success of this enterprise, according to circumstances, either assisting the Bisayas, or running along the eastern coast of the archipelago to effect a landing of the forces on the opposite coast of Luzon, provided the conditions of the territory in the part nearest the lagoon and Manila admit of doing so; or passing around the north of said island to operate upon Subic or Manila, if the information you may acquire as to the hostile forces will permit you to meet them without signal inferiority on your side, and even detaching the convoy of troops, with more or less escort, or without it, if deemed expedient, in order to facilitate movements or conceal the true object.

If you succeed in communicating with the Governor-General of the Philippines, you will consult with him and proceed, within the means at his disposal, to do anything that may lead to the defense or reconquest of the archipelago, but always trying to operate carefully, as the

ordinance prescribes, so as to obviate all encounters that have no prospect of success, considering it an essential point to avoid the useless sacrifice of the squadron, and under all circumstances to save the honor of arms.

The Government, which realizes the difficulty of the mission intrusted to you and the deficiency of means which it has been possible to furnish you, traces these general outlines to show the final object it seeks to attain; but at the same time you are fully authorized to depart therefrom whenever circumstances promise greater chance of success by following a different course.

If in the course of your voyage you should find it necessary to enter any port on account of injuries or from other causes, you will remember the expediency of preferring French colonies or the territory of the Kingdom of Siam. Any prizes which you may be able to capture during the expedition you will manage properly, incorporate them in the squadron, and send them to a Spanish port, or destroy them by fire or sink them, according to circumstances and the services they may render or the impediment they may represent, first transshipping to the vessels of the squadron everything considered serviceable, in any event the personnel and flags, portable arms, and the ship's papers.

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the captains of the ships or groups of ships, who may on certain occasions operate independently, will proceed within the scope of the general outlines traced above, but with all the liberty of action that may be necessary to insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that he who causes the greatest amount of damage to the enemy without endangering his own forces will best fulfill his mission, and that Her Majesty, the Government, the nation, and his own conscience, will be satisfied if each one in his sphere follows in all of his actions the letter and spirit of our ordinances.

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that may be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere to the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for claims on the part of neutral powers.

A few days after the departure of the squadron there will be dispatched to join the squadron at Suez the trans-Atlantic steamer *Isla de Luzon* with provisions, coal, lubricating material, supplies, and the personnel that has remained behind on account of sickness or from other causes. To this vessel you can transship the troops on board the *Buenos Aires* in order that the latter may be better adapted for any military operations with which she may be charged.

The Queen and the Government are confident that this expedition intrusted to your excellency and your subordinates will be carried out in such a manner as to earn the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may be accomplished, in spite of the scarcity



of resources, by energy, intelligence, and good will placed at the service of the King and the country.

The above is communicated to you by royal order for your action.

RAMÓN AUÑÓN.

CADIZ, June 15, 1898.

MEMORANDUM REFERRED TO.

*Group A.*—Fighting ships which are to go to the destination of the expedition, *Pelayo, Carlos V, Patriota, Rápido.*


*Group B.*—Fighting ships which are to return from the canal, *Audaz, Osado, Proserpina.*

*Group C.*—Transports of troops, *Buenos Aires, Panay.*

*Group D.*—Colliers, *Colón, Coradón, San Agustín, San Francisco.*

*Group E.*—Ships destined for different purposes which are to sail with the squadron and separate from it, *Alfonso XII, Antonio López, Giralda, Piélagos.*

ORDER OF SAILING.



1, *Pelayo*; 2, *Carlos V*; 3, *Patriota*; 4, *Rápido*; 5, *Buenos Aires*; 6, *Panay*; 7, *Colón*; 8, *Coradón*; 9, *San Francisco*; 10, *San Agustín*; 11, *Alfonso XII*; 12, *Antonio López*.

V.

*The Admiral (Camara) to the Minister (Auñón).*

PORT SAID, June 30, 1898.

After waiting four days for decision of Egyptian Government to transship coal to *Pelayo*, the transshipment has been prohibited, and we have been notified to leave at once all Egyptian ports. In view of critical aspect of question, and with assistance of Spanish minister at Port Said and consul, have succeeded in gaining time to receive full instructions from your excellency by telegraph. If I were to pass through canal at present without coaling here or at Suez, should have to tow *Pelayo* all through Red Sea, there being no port where transshipment could be effected until reaching Bab-el-Mandeb. If to avoid

international conflict it should be impossible for me to remain here until I receive your excellency's instructions, shall go out to Mediterranean and wait outside of territorial waters for your telegrams.

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## VI.

*The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cámara) to the Minister (Auñón).*

### CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON OF RESERVE, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: From the 16th, the day of our departure from Cadiz, until that of our arrival in this harbor, the weather has been perfect and the health and spirit of the crews excellent, so that we have been able to practice military exercises every morning and evening. On the 17th the *Patriota*, *Rápido*, and *Buenos Aires* took the three destroyers in tow, but several times during the voyage the lines parted, and on the third day the *Buenos Aires* collided with the *Proserpina* so hard that the iron cable was lost, so that she could not again tow the *Proserpina*. I then

ordered the *Carlos V* to take the latter in tow, which was done without difficulty. As I have already stated, the lines of all the ships parted several times as the result of the bad arrangement and lack of strength of the bridles which the destroyers carried.

The towing ships furnished coal and provisions to the vessels towed. This operation was always carried out as rapidly as possible, and the only drawback was that the squadron had to reduce its speed. The destroyers sustained several injuries to their engines, which were remedied with the contrivances on board. The *Audaz* was the only one that had injuries of any importance, the piston of the air pump being broken, which is detaining the vessel in this port. The flagship sustained some minor injuries in the feed-water apparatus and the air pump of the port engine, which were remedied without trouble. On the morning of the 26th, when near Port Said, a dense fog compelled us to moderate our speed for an hour. When it was over we went ahead at full speed and entered the canal at 11.20 o'clock, casting anchor at noon.

Yours, etc.,

MANUEL DE LA CÁMARA.

ON BOARD THE PELAYO, Port Said, July 1, 1898.

## VII.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cámara), Carthage.*

MADRID, July 23, 1898.

When the torpedo-boat destroyers have rejoined your squadron, start for Cadiz with the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Rápido*, *Patriota*, *Buenos Aires*, and the destroyers, keeping close to the shore, so as to be seen from

Spanish cities, exhibiting when near them the national flag, illuminated at night by searchlights, which are also to be thrown upon cities. If you meet any coast guard vessels, communicate with them. Advise me in advance of hour of sailing. The colliers that have unloaded or transhipped the good coal they carried may proceed to Cadiz, either with squadron or alone.

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HARVARD INCIDENT.

*Rear-Admiral Cervera to the United States Admiral (McNair), Superintendent of the Naval Academy.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Upon my arrival at Portsmouth, N. H., I read in the papers of an event that occurred on board the *Harvard*, and which has cost the lives of six of my sailors and resulted in many others being wounded. As I know, on the one hand, the spirit of discipline among my men, whose conduct is of the very best, and see, on the other hand, for myself the generosity and extreme courtesy with which we are being treated by the American nation, which fact I have had the pleasure of expressing in writing to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich and take pleasure in confirming here, I did not believe this piece of news, which I took to be one of the many inventions which may be seen in the press every day, but when the *Harvard* arrived yesterday I learned, to my surprise, that it was true.

Any act which costs the lives of six innocent men is extremely serious, and when to this is added the fact that they are defenseless prisoners of war, the seriousness is increased, as your excellency is well aware. In view of the spirit of justice and generosity shown us by this nation, prisoners though we are, I must believe and do believe that a full and impartial investigation has probably been made, for the purpose of clearing up the facts and in order that justice may be done to prevent the repetition of an act like the one in question. If the generosity of the United States Government would go so far as to advise me of the result of the investigation that has probably taken place, and whether any of my men have been examined, or only their slayers, also as to the measures adopted, I should be extremely obliged for this new favor. If, furthermore, I may be authorized to communicate this information to my Government, with such remarks as the reading may suggest to me, the whole civilized world will recognize therein a gigantic progress in the rights of men.

If the United States Government does not deem it expedient to grant my request, I shall not again speak of this matter while I remain a prisoner.

I beg that your excellency will pardon me for troubling you, although it is simply love of justice and of my subordinates which inspires these lines.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., July 21, 1898.

*The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the United States Admiral (McNair),  
Superintendent of the Naval Academy.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: On the 21st of July last I had the honor of forwarding to your excellency a letter, in which I referred to the incident that took place on board the *Harvard* which cost the lives of six of my sailors, and through which others were wounded, some of whom have since died. Your excellency did me the kindness of sending me a letter from his excellency the Secretary of the Navy, which letter kindly informed me that as soon as steps could be taken to get witnesses together I should be notified of the fact. It is not impatience and far less doubt that puts the pen in my hand, for that would be an insult to this great nation, and God save me from falling into such a grave error. It is simply the desire to contribute, so far as is in my power, toward establishing the truth in the interest of justice. I inclose you at the same time a copy of the report made to me by Lieut. Commander Juan Aznar. Not wishing to hurt your excellency's kind feelings, I refrained from sending it before, but seeing now by the papers that the regiment whose members fired upon my men is returning from Cuba, I thought that the opportune moment had arrived.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 29, 1898.

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DOCUMENT REFERRED TO.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: As the person most prominent among the prisoners taken on board the United States auxiliary cruiser *Harvard*, I have the honor to give you an account of all the happenings from the moment I became separated from your excellency on the Nimaniba beach. Once ashore, the balance of the crew of the *Infanta María Teresa*, including the wounded, marched toward the interior of the thick-wooded land, and finding a clearing in which we were safe from the explosions of the vessel, intended to camp there for the night. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon there appeared a lieutenant of the United States Navy, accompanied by an armed squad of sailors, and with provisions sufficient to last more than one day, who announced to us, after inquiring insistently if we had been ill treated by the insurgents, that we were to remain there under the protection of the United States flag until the next day, when he would return to take us away in a large boat. The vessel, which happened to be the *Harvard*, came up that same night and sent boats ashore to take us away, when we embarked after some difficulty, owing to the sea breaking with some force.

While in the act of embarking there came up 250 men of the *Oquendo*, who had been detained at the camp by the insurgent leader Cebrero, and they were also taken on board the *Harvard*. Having boarded the latter vessel at about 9 o'clock in the evening, each officer was provided

with a fatigue suit and a pair of shoes, and we were shown to our quarters in the first-class saloon, where we were ordered to remain from 10 o'clock in the evening till 6 the next morning, and cautioned not to hold any communication during the day with the noncommissioned officers and men, who had been placed on the upper deck aft. The wounded were treated that same night on the deck of the ship by the two surgeons of said ship, aided by those of the *Oquendo*, Guinea and Parra, and transferred the next morning to the hospital ship *Solace*. In spite of all our efforts to separate the noncommissioned officers from the men, it could not be done, and they kept together, corralled, so to speak, in the after part of the ship, guarded by the Massachusetts volunteers.

On the same day, the 4th, a list was made of all the prisoners, which, with the changes that occurred until the day of landing in Portsmouth, N. H., I have the honor to inclose to your excellency. At 2 o'clock in the morning of the 5th, while I was in my stateroom, I was summoned to the cabin of the commander of the vessel, Capt. S. Cotton. This gentleman in the presence of the executive officer expressed to me his regrets for the events that had taken place on board the vessel an hour before, and which had resulted in the killing of several prisoners. According to the investigations made by the captain, which he communicated to me, the incident happened as follows:

One of the prisoners at 11.30 of that night went forward of the lines indicated by means of cables stretched from port to starboard. The sentry ordered him to go back, and as he showed resistance in obeying, the sentry fired. The firing woke up the 600 men who, I repeat, were crowded aft, and jumped up naturally excited. The watch, which was under arms, ordered them to sit down, and as they did not obey, fired a volley which resulted in the immediate death of five and the wounding of about fourteen, also causing several to jump overboard. The latter were picked up by the ship's boats.

When the captain had finished speaking, I stated to him how much I deplored the act; that I could assure him that our people were incapable of doing anything that would have made the firing necessary, and that the disregard of the order, first of the sentry and then of the watch, must have been due to their ignorance of the language, and that, had the watch been composed of members of the Regular Army instead of volunteers, the thing would certainly not have occurred. As we were not allowed to communicate with our people during our stay on board the *Harvard*, I was not able to obtain information as to what happened that night. I could have only a moment's talk with the quartermaster of the *Teresa*, who told me that the men had jumped up, thinking that the ship was on fire.

As all the witnesses are in Portsmouth, I don't think it would be difficult to find out exactly what occurred, which will, without doubt, lead to trouble, to judge by the expressions of regret for what occurred, on

the part of some of the ship's officers. The wounded were cared for by our own surgeons, and transferred the next day to a hospital ship, except one who died that same night.

On the 5th, at noon, the bodies of the unfortunates shot the previous night were slid overboard. The ship's crews in line, with their officers at their head were present, as well as our people in line and also the military guard of the ship, who presented arms during the ceremony and fired three volleys at the moment the bodies fell to the water. The latter were wrapped in the Spanish flag and received the prayer and benediction of the chaplain of the *Teresa* before being committed to the deep.

Before the 7th it had been impossible to separate the warrant and petty officers from the men, the former being placed in the third-class passenger cabins and the first-class seamen in the emigrant's steerage, with the privilege of ascending to the deck aft. All were provided with a change of underclothes, soap, and a towel. From the night they picked us up until the 8th we stood off between Altares and Punta Cabrera. At noon of the 8th we anchored off Playa Este, and the ship began coaling. In the afternoon they brought on board as prisoners 4 officers and 200 men of the *Cristóbal Colón*, and landed the Massachusetts volunteers, who were replaced by 40 marines.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th we sailed for Portsmouth, in which port we cast anchor at 7.30 on the morning of the 15th. During the trip many cases of fever broke out among our people with fatal results for some, their deaths occurring on the dates your excellency will find recorded in the list herewith inclosed. At 9 of the morning of the 16th all the petty officers and men were sent to the navy-yard with Lieut. Adolfo Calandria, except 55 sick who remained on board for observation, and were landed on the 18th with Surgeons Guinea and Lallemand.

At 5.30 in the afternoon of the same day we went to sea, and anchored off Annapolis at 5 o'clock yesterday afternoon. Before terminating, I think it my duty to call your attention to the marks of consideration and respect shown to us by Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard*, who endeavored to make our stay on board his ship as pleasant as possible. This is all I have the honor to communicate to your excellency in the fulfillment of my duty.

Yours, etc.,

JUAN B. AZNAR,  
*Lieutenant-Commander.*

NAVAL ACADEMY, Annapolis, July 21, 1898.

A true copy:

CERVERA.

*The Secretary of the United States Navy Department to Admiral Cervera.*

SIR: The Superintendent of the Naval Academy has placed before the Department translations of your letter of the 29th ultimo and the report of Lieutenant-Commander Juan Aznar, therein mentioned, with

respect to the unfortunate incident which occurred on board the U. S. S. *Harvard* on the night of July 4 last, resulting in the killing and wounding of certain Spanish sailors, prisoners of war on board that vessel. When your former communication, that of July 21, on this subject was received, this Department immediately, under date of the 23d, addressed a letter to the honorable the Secretary of War transmitting, with a copy of your letter, all the other papers relating to the matter which were in its possession.

This action was taken because, while the incident occurred on board a vessel of the Navy, this Department recognized the fact that the firing was actually done by men belonging to the Army. At the same time the opinion of the Secretary of War was requested as to whether the subject was a proper one for joint investigation or whether the inquiry should be conducted by the War Department alone. No reply having been received, this Department subsequently, August 18 last, addressed to the Secretary of War a further communication on the subject. I deem it proper to add that copies of your letter of August 29 and of Lieutenant-Commander Azuar's report were on yesterday transmitted to the honorable the Secretary of War, inviting attention to the prior correspondence, and in view of the urgency which this matter presents, the Spanish prisoners under the control of this Department being soon to be released, and it being understood that the regiment to which the soldiers who did the shooting belong may be shortly disbanded, early consideration of the subject was earnestly requested.

In this connection it is proper to add that at the time the affair under consideration occurred Capt. Charles S. Cotton, the commanding officer of the *Harvard*, made an investigation of the circumstances, and the results of this investigation were communicated to Rear-Admiral Sampson, the commander in chief of the squadron, who, upon review of the matter, considered that no further inquiry was necessary.

Renewing the expression of sincere regret conveyed to you in this Department's letter of the 23d of July last that so unhappy an incident should have occurred, and assuring you that such steps as may be practicable will be taken to promote any further investigation of the matter which may be necessary and proper, so far as this Department is concerned,

I am, very respectfully,

CHAS. H. ALLEN,  
*Acting Secretary.*

WASHINGTON, *September 1, 1898.*<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>After my return to Spain I received the result of an inquiry made by order of the ministry of war by Judge-Advocate-General of Volunteers Edgar Dudley on the subject of this bloody and disgraceful incident. The conclusion reached was that it was an accident for which no one was responsible. All these documents were forwarded by me to the minister of marine.

## LIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS.

### DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO THE WAR.

- Jan. 8, 1898.—Cablegram from General Blanco to the minister of colonies, concerning economic situation of the navy in Cuba.
- 30, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to Mr. Spottorno and certificate in which it is stated that the latter was preserving in his possession a collection of documents intrusted to him by the admiral.
- Feb. 3, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to Minister Moret upon the necessity of providing for the pay of the men of the squadron.
- 6, 1898.—Official letter from the admiral to the minister setting forth the condition of the squadron.
- 16, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister of marine upon the situation of the naval forces of Spain.
- 25, 1898.—Official letter from the admiral to the minister upon the comparative strength of the naval forces of both countries.
- 26, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister emphasizing his former official letter and requesting that his opinion be made known to the Queen and to the council of ministers.
- Mar. 4 and 7, 1898.—Letters exchanged between the minister and the admiral making comparisons of forces.
- 16, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister expressing among other things the necessity of avoiding the war and of correcting the mistaken conception existing as to the naval forces.
- Apr. 4, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking permission to go to Madrid to form a plan of campaign, and reply from the minister.
- 4 and 6, 1898.—Letters from the admiral and the minister relative to the foregoing telegrams.
- 7, 1898.—Telegrams from the admiral to the minister insisting upon the necessity of forming a plan of campaign, and reply of the minister.

### FROM CADIZ TO CAPE VERDE.

- Apr. 8, 1898.—Instructions received at Cape Verde.
- 19, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister upon the condition of the ships and the international situation.
- 20, 1898.—Proceedings setting forth the opinion of the admiral and his captains as to the ultimate destination of the squadron.
- 21, 1898.—Official letter commenting upon the foregoing proceedings.
- 21, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister persisting in the foregoing opinion, and reply of the minister.
- 22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister disclaiming responsibility of the order to sail for Puerto Rico.
- 22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking whether war had been declared, and reply of the latter.
- 22, 1898.—Interesting letter from the admiral to the minister.



- 22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister insisting upon the disastrous results of sailing for America, and requesting that all his official and confidential correspondence be made known to the president of the council.
- 23, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking if war had been declared.
- 23, 1898.—Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at Madrid.
- 24, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, relative to the meeting of general officers, and stating in addition that the United States flag was hostile.
- 24, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister, in answer to telegram ordering departure for West Indies.
- 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1898.—Telegrams from the admiral to the minister relative to the difficulties of coaling.

#### FROM CAPE VERDE TO CURAÇAO AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

- May 5, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to Mr. Spottorno, inclosing copy of a telegram from Villaamil to Sagasta.
- May 12, 1898.—Proceedings of the meeting of captains held off Martinique.
- 14 and 15, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, announcing arrival at Curaçao, and reply of the latter.
- 15, 1898.—Report of voyage up to arrival at Curaçao.

#### SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

- May 19 and 20, 1898.—Telegrams from the admiral to the minister announcing arrival at Santiago de Cuba, scarcity of coal, and difficult situation of the city.
- 21, 1898.—Telegram from Admiral Manterola, stating the lamentable condition of naval forces of the navy-yard.
- 22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral in answer to the foregoing.
- 23, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, informing him of sailing of hostile fleets.
- 24, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, giving an account of the situation and opinion of the council of war.
- 24, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war on the situation.
- 24, 1898.—Letter from Rear-Admiral Rocha to the admiral, congratulating him upon his arrival at Santiago de Cuba, and reply thereto.
- 25, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, notifying him of blockade, and reply of the latter.
- 26, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war, discussing possibility of sortie.
- 28, 1898.—Telegram from the Captain-General to the minister of war, relative to supplies sent to Santiago de Cuba.
- June 3, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, advising him of operation of *Merrimac*.
- 3 and 4, 1898.—Telegram from the minister of war to the Captain-General relative to operations of squadron, and reply of latter.
- 8, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, relative to the authority granted the latter.
- 8, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war, setting forth its opinion as to sortie of squadron.
- 11, 1898.—Official letter from the admiral to General Linares, requesting that the batteries at the mouth of the harbor keep the hostile fleet at a distance at night, and reply of the latter.

- 22, 1898.—Telegram from Admiral Manterola, transmitting a telegram from the minister giving instructions how to order ammunition, and reply thereto.
- 23, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, relative to progress made by the enemy, and his plans in view of the situation.
- 24, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war held relative to the possibilities of sortie.
- 24 and 25, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, placing squadron under orders of General Blanco. Reply.
- 25, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General, placing himself at his orders and setting forth condition of squadron.
- 25, 1898.—Letter from General Linares to the admiral, stating desire of General Blanco to know his opinion. Reply.
- 25, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General, giving his opinion.
- 26, 1898.—Interesting telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral relative to sortie.
- 26 and 27, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral relative to sortie, and reply.
- 27, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to General Blanco, replying to his telegram of the 26th relative to the first order to sail.
- 28 and 29, 1898.—Telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral, giving him instructions as to sortie, and reply.
- July 1, 1898.—Telegram from the minister of marine to the Captain-General, approving instructions for the sortie of the squadron.
- 1, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war relative to the order to go out.
- 1, 1898.—Urgent telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral giving the order to go out.
- 1, 1898.—Urgent telegram from the same ordering departure to be hastened.
- 2, 1898.—Urgent telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral ordering him to go out immediately.

#### SORTIE FROM SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

- July 4, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General giving an account of the battle sustained at the sortie.
- 9, 1898.—Report of the battle.
- 12 and 13, 1898.—Telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral in reply to his telegram relative to the battle. Reply of the latter.

#### AT ANNAPOLIS.

- Aug. 20-23, 1898.—Communications relative to the granting of liberty on promise not again to take up arms.
- 31, 1898.—Unconditional liberty.

#### IN SPAIN.

- Sept. 20, 1898.—Report upon arrival at Santander.
- Aug. 7, 1898.—Official letter from the Captain-General to the Admiral acknowledging receipt of report of the battle.
- Oct. 8, 1898.—Official letter from the Admiral to the Captain-General in answer to the foregoing.
- Sept. 15, 1898.—Letter from General Blanco to the Admiral, with which he accompanied his official letter acknowledging receipt of report of the battle. Answer.
- Appendices, which in themselves justify many of the statements contained in the text.

## ADDENDUM.

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*Letter from Admiral Cervera to Mr. Juan Spottorno y Biernet, cited in the letter and certificate on pages — and — of the text.<sup>1</sup>*

PUERTO REAL, March 14, 1898.

DEAR JUAN: Three days ago I received your letter of the 9th.<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \*

The conflict with the United States seems to be averted or at least postponed, but it may revive when least expected, and each day confirms me in the belief that it would be a great national calamity.

As we hardly have a squadron, wherever it may go it must be as a whole, because to divide it would, in my judgment, be the greatest of blunders, but the next greatest would perhaps be to send it to the West Indies, leaving our coasts and the Philippine Archipelago unprotected. For my part, I am not eager for the sad glory—if there can be any glory in going to certain defeat—of perishing at the head of the squadron. If this falls to my lot I shall be patient and fulfill my duty, but with the bitterness of knowing my sacrifice fruitless; and before I go Beránger and Cánovas must hear what I say to you.

Still, if our small squadron were well equipped with everything necessary and, above all, well manned, something might be attempted; but you are right in saying that there is no ammunition but that on board, and I add that worse than this is the lack of organization in every respect, the result of many causes, conspicuous among which are the absurd economy in coal, the continual sending of the ships from place to place, and the local exigencies.

What you say to me concerning myself does not surprise me, for Beránger believes me his enemy, but, in truth, I am not the enemy of him or of anyone. Yes, I am the enemy of the system which leads to this disorder and to this disorganization, and I instinctively call to mind Admiral Byng, hung at Plymouth from a similar cause; Persano, after the battle of Lissa; Mathews, exonerated after the battle of Cape Sicié; Bazaine, condemned to death after the battle of Metz, and now

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<sup>1</sup> After the whole book had gone to print, Mr. Spottorno sent this letter, cited in the letter of January 30, 1898, which will be found on page — and in the certificate on page —. It being impossible to include it in the book in its proper place, it has been added at the end.

<sup>2</sup> The stars represent family matters.

Baratieri, who is just being tried by a council of war and already anticipates that he will be condemned to death or to imprisonment for life.

And thus it is that when the people are disorganized their governments (the products of such disorganization) are disorganized also, and when some logical disaster takes place they do not seek the true causes, but always cry "treason" and look about for the poor victim, who expiates the faults which were not his. For these reasons I was very vacillating before accepting the charge; but, having accepted it, I will fulfill it with the consequences which it may entail, and, as I said before, I will do my duty, but I shall recall the words of Jesus Christ and, not for myself as much as for poor Spain, say: "O, my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me."

Butler seems to me a very good choice, but I pity him, as I would anyone upon whom the lot should fall.

There is no occasion ever to divulge these things and less now, for which reason I enjoin upon you great secrecy as to what I say to you; but at the same time I beg you not to destroy this letter, but to preserve it, in case it should some day be expedient to make known my opinions at this time.

Your cousin,

PASCUAL.









OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.  
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

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VIEWS  
OF  
ADMIRAL CERVERA

REGARDING  
THE SPANISH NAVY IN THE LATE WAR.

---

NOVEMBER, 1898.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

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WASHINGTON:  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
1898.



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Ms. A. 9. 2. 5.

## INTRODUCTORY.

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Under the title "Vindication of the Navy" there appeared in the *La Epoca* Madrid, November 5, 1898, this article, which is made up mainly of extracts from letters from Admiral Cervera, written previous to the declaration of war and continued to May 5. These letters were written by Admiral Cervera in protest against Spain rushing into war in face of certain defeat, due to the naval strength of the United States and the unpreparedness of the Spanish navy.

Cervera writes: "I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war, we have lost it in fact, and with it all wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known to the Queen, and by the whole council of ministers.

" \* \* \* If our correspondence of the last two months is looked over it will be seen not that I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not have any illusions as to what we can do. \* \* \*

"I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities clearly and without beating around the bush. Now, let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst."

Spain had neglected her navy, and Cervera shows it was imprudent for her to attempt war against a superior naval power.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,  
*Chief Intelligence Officer.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,  
*April 29, 1898.*

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.  
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

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## STATE OF THE FLEET.

In the beginning of February Admiral Cervera wrote to a high official personage:

"Although I am sure that I am telling you nothing new, I think it is not idle, in these critical times, to make a study of the condition of the fleet. We must discount the *Alfonso XIII*, so many years under trials that it appears we shall not have the pleasure ever to count it among our vessels of war. The fleet is reduced to the three Bilbao cruisers, the *Colón*, the *Destructor*, and the torpedo destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*. The three Bilbao battle ships are practically complete, but the 14-cm. artillery, the main power of these vessels, is practically useless, on account of the bad system of its breech mechanism, and the bad quality of the cartridge cases, of which there are only those on board.

"The *Colón*, which is undoubtedly the best of all our ships from a military point of view, has not received her guns. The *Destructor* may serve as a scout, although its speed is not very high for this service in the fleet. The *Furor* and *Terror* are in a good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 75-mm. pieces. As for the supplies necessary for a fleet, we frequently lack even the most necessary. In this arsenal (Cadiz) we have not been able to coal, and both at Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half of the biscuit we wanted, and that only because I had ordered 8,000 kilos to be made here. We have no charts of the American seas, although I suppose that they have been ordered; but at the present time we could not move. Apart from this deficient state of the material, I have the pleasure to state that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that a lack of better and more abundant material, greater supplies, and less hindrances are wanting to put this personnel in a condition to amply carry out its role!"

\* \* \* \* \*

"I note," said the Admiral in another letter, "what I am told concerning the heavy artillery of the *Colón*. It is to be very much regretted that there is always so much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 254-mm. guns, because if we finally take them, it will seem that we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things come to the worst, it seems to me we will have to accept, as the proverb says, 'hard bread rather than none'; and if we have no other guns, and these ones can fire at least 25 or 30 shots, we will have to take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient. And we must not lose time, so that the

vessel may be armed and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible."

Some time afterwards, when matters were getting worse and worse, the Admiral was more explicit still. Shortly after the Dupuy de Lome incident he said:

"I do not know when the *Pelayo* and the *Carlos V* will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the first one I know nothing at all, but I have received some news concerning the second one, and certainly not very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for it to be ready. It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the *Numancia* will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the *Lepanto*. Of the *Carlos V* and the *Pelayo* I have already spoken. The *Colón* has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes, she will be caught without her heavy artillery. The eight principal vessels of the Havana station have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn out, therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us very dear.

"Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that with this force, extenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against them will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned. As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids with our fast vessels in order to do them as much harm as possible. It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it convenient to analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments."

#### COMPARISON OF THE FLEETS.

The comparison of both navies, based upon the studies made in prevision of a war with the United States, suggested to the Admiral the following considerations on February 25, 1898:

"If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of active service,

we find that the United States have the battle ships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*; the armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*; the protected cruisers *Atlanta*, *Minneapolis*, *Baltimore*, *Charleston*, *Chicago*, *Cincinnati*, *Columbia*, *Newark*, *San Francisco*, *Olympia*, *Philadelphia*, and *Raleigh*, and the rapid unprotected cruisers *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, and *Montgomery*. Against this we have, following the same classification, the battle ships *Pelayo*, *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*, armored cruiser *Colón*, and protected cruisers *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Lepanto*; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this supposing the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, and *Lepanto* to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the *Alfonso XIII*. I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still in service, the ram *Katahdin*, the *Vesuvius*, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate enough.

"Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United States have 41,589 tons against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons against our 6,840; in protected cruisers 51,098 against 18,887, and in fast unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we none. The total of vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons against 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half.

"In speed our battle ships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is superior to ours.

"Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 20 cm. are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the calibers 32, 30, 28, 25, 20, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 17.5, 5.7, 4.7, and 3.7 be represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1, which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in centimeters  $\left(\frac{(\text{caliber in cm.})^3}{100}\right)$ ,

we find that the artillery power of the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29,449; that of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (*Colón*) by 6,573; that of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected cruisers by 12,300. Therefore, according to these figures, the offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's.

"To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*, which probably will not be ready in time; the *Lepanto*, which surely will not be ready, and the *Alfonso XIII*, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.

#### IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN.

"Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this department, where everything is scarce, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, and aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources. This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign.

\* \* \* \* \*

"If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified port which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use them as a base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become more formidable.

"These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations for and against, and then, through the government of His Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors. Our motto is 'the fulfillment of duty.'"

**MORE DEFICIENCIES—THE COUNTRY MUST BE TOLD THE TRUTH.**

On February 26 the Admiral wrote the following:

"When I received yesterday the letter in which, among other things, you asked me if the *Colón* could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, or a machine to reform the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

"I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do we not owe to our country not only our life if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war, we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the Queen, and by the whole council of ministers."

That this thoughtful and patriotic advice was not favorably received by the government is shown by the following letter a few days afterwards:

"Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impressions caused by my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly sad, and still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one sees. Just now we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the *Colón* arises from the want of means (money), and this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of preparation.

"I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities clearly and without beating around the bush. Now let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst."

MORE DATA REGARDING OUR INFERIORITY—DANGER TO THE  
PHILIPPINES.

"An examination of our forces," said the Admiral on March 25, "based upon what I already know and upon recent information and observation, not only confirms what I said, but shows it to be still worse. I have visited the *Vitoria*, on which I counted, and from my visit I have drawn the conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. Neither does my information permit me to count on the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, or *Numancia*. And yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal observation, I include them in the inclosed statement. Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict, either war, negotiations direct, or through a third party, an arbitrator or otherwise, the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

"It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same, defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability, that is, that we should obtain a victory, that would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would not declare itself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. They would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would be always a disaster. Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result.

"But, besides having to discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison with the last.

"Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem already pointed out by somebody arises: Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? (Silvela in Burgos.) I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the character of modern vessels.

"The accompanying statement shows that our forces in the Atlantic are approximately one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery power. I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resistance to oppose to them. And as regards the American coasts of the Pacific, the United States have no anxiety about them. I think you are mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, the *Vitoria*, or the *Numancia* will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 14-cm. ammunition. It seems sure that by the end of April the 254-mm. guns of the *Colón* will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of that of the Americans in tonnage, and 47 per cent in artillery.

"Our only superiority would be in torpedo boats and destroyers, provided all of them arrive there in good order.

"I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority who profit by the continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which it is not for me to analyze.

"Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an old awning line. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. In old times, forty-three days after the *Hernan Cortes* was laid down the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers of a steam launch of the *Teresa*, and I do not yet know when it will be done. This will probably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the Havana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all. As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way.

"This is my loyal opinion, and for the sake of the nation I express it to the Government. If it is thought advisable for me to express it personally, I am ready to start at the first intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty.

## NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

## SPAIN.

Protected vessels actually there, or unprotected but with a speed of over 15 miles:

	Displacement.	Artillery.
Vizcaya .....	7,000	6,130
Oquendo .....	7,000	6,130
Marques de la Ensenada .....	1,064	1,000

## UNITED STATES.

Same kind of vessels:

New York .....	8,200	6,400
Indiana .....	10,288	9,304
Massachusetts .....	10,288	9,304
Texas .....	6,315	550
Brooklyn .....	9,271	7,880
Iowa .....	11,410	8,360
Montgomery .....	2,089	4,100
Marblehead .....	2,089	4,100
Detroit .....	2,089	4,100
Terror .....	3,600	2,896
	<u>65,639</u>	<u>60,994</u>

To these may be positively added:

## SPAIN.

Infanta Maria Teresa .....	7,000	6,130
Cristóbal Colón .....	6,840	8,490*
Alfonso XIII .....	4,826	4,340
	<u>18,666</u>	<u>18,960</u>

## UNITED STATES.

Minneapolis .....	7,375	4,790
Columbia .....	7,375	4,790
	<u>14,750</u>	<u>9,580</u>

Doubtful additions:

## SPAIN.

Pelayo .....	9,917	6,987
Carlos V .....	9,260	5,620
	<u>19,167</u>	<u>12,607</u>
Atlanta .....	3,000	4,270
Charleston .....	3,730	4,570
Chicago .....	4,500	4,470
Newark .....	4,098	6,740
Philadelphia .....	4,324	7,640
Dolphin .....	1,485	700
Yorktown .....	1,703	3,320
	<u>22,840</u>	<u>31,710</u>

In the South Atlantic they have:

Cincinnati .....	3,200	4,795
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All the other vessels have very little military value, with the exception of the torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this statement, including the "Katahdin" and "Vesuvius."

\* Without the 25-cm. guns, the value of which is represented by 1,248.



**CERVERA WISHED TO EXPLAIN HIS OPINION TO THE COUNCIL OF  
MINISTERS.**

Admiral Cervera's already expressed desire to personally inform the council of ministers was still more clearly expressed under date of March 16.

"Yesterday I received your favor of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It also appears that the whole government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favorable conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the general statement, and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, etc. We have nothing at all. If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest importance that the whole council of ministers without exception be fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war but to find some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the more time is spent, the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war.

"From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since we can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we can not treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious, perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of considerations does not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of the situation. Before dropping this subject, I must insist that perhaps it would be well for me to verbally inform the members of the Cabinet, and to say that I am ready to start at the first intimation.

"Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them: I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 254-mm. guns of the *Colón*. The 14-cm. cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. This vessel has only thirty, and it is to be supposed that the stores of the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* are not better supplied. For the present the firm is supplying only one hundred

per week; and supposing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz one of these days, at this rate we won't have finished until October. Then they have to be charged, therefore they can never be ready in time for the present conflict. I thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them until April. The engines of the *Pelayo* are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? These will not be ready. If the old battery could be mounted! But I doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the crew which brought the *Pelayo* was taken from the *Vitoria*, which is another proof of our excessive poverty. It will be very well if the *Carlos V* is soon ready, but I understand that the 10-cm. battery has not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made.

"I never had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels. Too much fuss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the *Garibaldi*, and now we have lost the Brazilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the *Colón*, an excellent ship, but which has not yet arrived, and the *Valdes*. And supposing that we had everything our own way, and that Providence should grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves in the condition explained in my last, and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the destination of the fleet. I believe the *Teresa* ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge cases are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were mounted.

"I will insist no more, but the voice of my conscience, animated by my love for my country, tells me that in saying this I am fulfilling my unavoidable duty."

#### CONDITION OF THE FLEET IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WAR.

In the month of April, shortly before the war, Cervera wrote:

"My fears are realized. The conflict is coming fast upon us; and the *Colón* has not received her big guns; the *Carlos V* has not been delivered, and her 10-cm. artillery is not yet mounted; the *Pelayo* is not ready for want of finishing her redoubt, and, I believe, her secondary battery; the *Vitoria* has no artillery, and of the *Numancia* we had better not speak.

"But after all I am glad the end is coming. The country can stand this state of affairs no longer, and any arrangement will be a good one, however bad it looks, if it comes without our having to lament a great disaster, as may happen if we go to war with a few half-armed vessels, and without want of means and excess of incumbrances."

A few days afterwards he wrote:

"On account of the general anxiety it is very important to think of what is to be done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency, and not be groping about in the dark, or like Don Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads.

"If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States, the question would be an easy one. All we would have to do would be to bar their way. But on the contrary our forces are very inferior to theirs. To endeavor to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive naval battle, would be the greatest of follies. That would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, who would easily take a good position in the Canaries, establish there a base of operations, crush our commerce, and safely bombard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going to do, and without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when the time comes.

"This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then. If we are caught without a war plan, there will be vacillations and doubts; and, after defeat, there may come humiliation and shame."

On the eve of the war Cervera justly lamented the lack of a plan as follows:

"I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some plan, even in general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the government persists in the idea of sending the little squadron (torpedo-boat flotilla) to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea entails a great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba because I have anticipated it long ago. A naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means, perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If our correspondence of the last two months is looked over it will be seen not that I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not have any illusions as to what we can do."

The last documents relating to the sailing of the fleet from Cape Verde are the most interesting. They show what was the condition of the vessels on the 19th of April, the day before the rupture of relations. Admiral Cervera wrote from Saint Vincent, Cape Verde:

"The boilers of the *Ariete* are practically out of service, so that this vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the fleet. She could only be used for port defense. The boilers of the *Azor* are eleven years old, and are of the locomotive type. As for the *Furor* and *Terror*, their bow plates give as soon as they are in a sea way, and some of their frames have been broken. The *Plutón* had an accident of this kind when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

"I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez can not be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the *Vizcaya*, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the Canaries. It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as well as the island commanding the port of La Luz in Grand Canary.

"The idea of sending the fleet to Cuba seems to have been abandoned, I believe very wisely.

"Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico is faithful, it will not be such an easy job for the Yankees; if it is not faithful, it will inevitably follow the same fate as Cuba, at least as regards us.

"On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines and the Canaries, as I have said before; and above all, the possibility of a bombardment of our coast, which is not impossible, considering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or five vessels of higher speed than our own. For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for me to do; and I will not take any decision without the opinion of the council of captains, as prescribed by the ordinances.

"I leave this letter open until to-morrow, in case something should happen.

"I have just now been informed that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are in sight. I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the *Vizcaya* needs docking badly. During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more than the *Oquendo*, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according to my reckoning, and a diminution of her sphere of action of from 25 to 35 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed. Both are now coaling, but it is a long job, for, unfortunately, we do not feel at home here. We are indeed unlucky!"

## COUNCIL OF WAR OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE FLEET.

It is well known that before the sailing of the squadron the commanders of the vessels held a council of war on board the *Colón*, on April 21.

This is what Cervera wrote:

“The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was of the purest discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my fortune to have as companions in these critical circumstances. The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy, and to surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of this same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else can be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior forces—forced them to see that such sacrifice would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place the mother country in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy, and finishing once and for all. But, as I said before, the specter of the country violated by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and, inspiring themselves with that courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in particular, and which believe that the *Alfonso XIII* or the *Cristina* can be pitted against the *Iowa* or *Massachusetts*, they expressly and energetically declared that the interests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

“One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments—it is hardly necessary to say—his scruples were soon overcome. Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has written, by my order, his ideas, which reflect, better than I could express them, the opinions of all. This document exactly expresses the opinion which prevailed in the meeting.

“An act was signed in which it was stated that, having met by order of the commander in chief and under his presidency, the second in command and the captains of the vessels, the president submitted to discussion the following point:

“Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries, and to provide for any contingency?”

“Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are able to offer for the purpose of establishing a base of operations. In consideration of this, and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus leaving unobstructed the coming of the enemy against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of the Government, by means of a telegram, in which the commander in chief of the squadron, in agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, suggested to go to the Canaries. The *Ariete*—it said—boilers in bad condition, those of the *Azor* very old, *Vizcaya* needs docking to paint bottom if speed is to be maintained. Canaries would be protected against a rapid descent of the enemy, and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, promptly to come to the defense of the mother country.”

#### OPINION OF SEÑOR CONCAS.

The opinion of Captain Victor M. Concas, commander of the battle ship *Infanta Maria Teresa*, concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the council of war held on board the *Cristóbal Colón*, was as follows:

“(1) That the naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in number and class of vessels, armor and artillery, and in preparations made—besides the advantage given them by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the one still existing in the East—that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the Philippines. That since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, which was perhaps the most urgent, in order to reduce our vulnerable points, and which could have been done with a single battle ship, to-day any division of our limited forces and any separation from the European seas involves a strategic mistake which would bring war to the Peninsula, a frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and perhaps the loss of some island. As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident—as has happened already more than once (sic)—that the American flying squadron will sail for Europe; and even if its purpose was only to make a raid or a demonstration

against our coasts, the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of its easy victory.

"The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula, the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the *Alfonso XIII*, of very little speed, are not enough for the defense of Spain, and in no way for that of the Canaries. The yacht *Giralda* and the steamers *Germania* and *Normania* are vessels of no fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

"(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impossible, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the government upon the subject, and even if it should be the maddest thing in the world, the government itself would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the conditions and at the point the latter might choose.

"(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across to-day, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might reorganize itself on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas its base of operations—is a strategic error the more deplorable because there have been months and even years of time to accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Vierges). For all these reasons the responsibility of the trip must remain entirely with the government.

"(4) Adding these three battle ships and the *Cristóbal Colón*, without its big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few and old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from its base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the enemy brings its best ships to bear on us.

"(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at one time; but duty and true patriotism compel us to clearly express the resources which the country gave us, and the necessities which present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

"(6) Lastly, I believe that the military situation should be made known to the minister of marine, reiterating our profoundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to

carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to these forces. But after pointing out the probable consequences, the responsibility must remain with the government."

FROM CAPE VERDE.

Finally, on April 22, the Admiral said:

"It is impossible for me to give an idea of the surprise and astonishment experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralizing return; when here in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation.

"You talk about plans, and in spite of all my efforts to have some laid out, as it was wise and prudent, my desires have been disappointed. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for? The *Colón* has not yet her big guns, and I asked for the bad ones if there were no others. The 14-cm. ammunition, with the exception of about 300 shots, is bad. The defective guns of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the *Colón* can not be recharged. We have not a single Bustamante torpedo. There is no plan or concert, which I so much desired and called for so often. The repairs of the servomotors of the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and the *Vizcaya* were only made after they had left Spain. In short, this is already a disaster, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful one before long. And perhaps everything could be changed yet! But I suppose it is too late now for anything that is not the ruin and the desolation of our country.

"The *Vizcaya* can no longer steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet.

"But I insist no more. The act has been done, and I will try to find the best way out of this direful enterprise."

The following are the last letters we know of:

"SAINT VINCENT (CAPE VERDE), April 24, 1898.

"I have just received the telegram ordering us to start, and I have given orders to tranship from the *Cadiz* to these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the destroyers, which was on board the *Cadiz*.

"I intended to sail without finishing the provisioning of the vessels, but since the *Cadiz* is to stay, I have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to sail to-morrow.

"As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion of it. May God grant that I be mistaken! You see I



was right when I said that by the end of April the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* would not be finished; the *Colón* would not have its big guns, unless we took the bad ones, and we would not have the new 14-cm. ammunition with which to fight, etc.

"With an easy conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand that decision of the navy \* general officers against my opinions.

"I have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of coal for Puerto Rico, where it is supposed to arrive on the 11th or 12th of May, but I am afraid lest it should fall into the hands of the enemy.

"It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval battle at will. The *Vizcaya*, on account of her stay in Havana and the nine months without cleaning her bottom, is nothing but a buoy, and I can not abandon her."

ONE TELEGRAM FROM VILLAAMIL.

"AT SEA, *May 5, 1898.*

"DEAR JUAN: To complete our collection of documents, I think you should have the inclosed copy of a private telegram from Villaamil to Sagasta. I send you this letter by means of two destroyers which I am sending to Martinique in search of news. All is well on board, and the spirit is excellent. We shall see what God has in store for us. The final result is not doubtful, but if only we could start with a good lucky stroke! God be with us! Good-by. Regards to your folk, etc.

"PASCUAL" (Cervera's first name).

[Copy of Telegram.]

*April 22, 1898.*

PRAXEDES SAGASTA, *Madrid:*

In view of importance to the country of destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that, while as seamen we are all ready to die with honor in the fulfillment of duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless for the termination of the war, if the representations repeatedly made by admiral to minister of marine are not taken into consideration.

F. VILLAAMIL.

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\* In a council of eighteen general officers, fourteen voted for the immediate sailing of Cervera's fleet from Cape Verde. Generals Gomez, Imaz, and Lazaga voted against it until the reinforcement of the fleet by the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Lepanto* and the three destroyers remaining in the Peninsula. Generals Butler and Mozo shared this opinion conditionally, subordinating it to the decision of the government.



